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Abstract
Seeking to tackle the widely acknowledged democratic deficit of current 
international affairs, the argument presented here for consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism sets itself apart from other international political theories, 
in that it provides a normative framework for an all-inclusive global 
politics. Such a framework offers a critical alternative to the phenomenon 
of international political exclusion as legitimised by a number of influential 
theories of justice, including realism, nationalism, contractarianism, harm 
theory and the cosmopolitan project.
Deriving from an examination of international consequentialist 
thought over the last two hundred years, the model developed here 
combines a new ethical interpretation of consequentialist principles with a 
new political interpretation of cosmopolitan principles. From this 
combination, a theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism is drawn which 
utilises a single principle of justice on different levels of political action. 
That principle is the maximisation of the world welfare condition.
Within this setting, the promotion of global welfare is pursued 
through the deployment of procedural instruments in terms of rights. In 
particular, the right to freedom of choice and the right to political 
participation form the core of the normative project. The institutional 
recognition of these rights as universal entitlements, in fact, is crucial in 
order to delineate an enfranchising conception of political agency in each 
level of political action, including the global.
Evidence in favour of the proposed version of non-exclusionary 
cosmopolitanism is provided in examples of two case studies of such 
enlarged citizenship: a horizontal case concerned with migration, and a 
vertical case regarding supranational institutions as embedded in a system 
of cosmo-federal democracy.
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Synopsis
Chapter I sets the stage for the entire thesis. It begins by identifying 
a democratic gap at the global level and by stressing the normative 
unacceptability of the degree of exclusion that characterises the current 
international political system. It then proceeds to a critical examination of 
the political paradigm underpinning such a system—interaction 
dependency—through the study of its two strands. The contextualist strand 
is analysed in its two principle variants: realism and nationalism; the 
universalist strand is scrutinised in its three principal components: 
contractarianism, non-harm theories and the project of cosmopolitan 
democracy. In so clarifying the political issue at stake—international 
exclusion—and outlining its normative dimension, the chapter anticipates 
the main lines of the argument supporting an all-inclusive consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism. Against this kind of exclusion, consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism is presented as anchored to two key concepts: global 
political agency and global political participation. The remainder of the 
chapter expounds a number of general considerations on the nature of the 
normative project attempted here, together with a brief genealogical 
account of the relationship between utilitarianism, consequentialism, and 
cosmopolitanism.
The following chapter, chapter II, presents a survey of the most 
significant international arguments proposed by classical utilitarian 
scholars, mostly during the 19‘^  century. After an introductory note on 
David Hume, William Godwin and their arguments on a consequentialist 
interpretation of the state and the universality of duties, all of the 
prominent exponents of classical utilitarianism are examined with regards 
to their formulations on international issues of justice. Through the analysis
12
of the theories of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Austin, John Stuart 
Mill and Henry Sidgwick, a number of central topics fundamental for an 
understanding of the origins and the value of contemporary 
consequentialist arguments on global justice are identified. Within this, 
particular attention is given to these thinkers’ discussion of the centrality of 
the state as well-being provider, the renewal of international law through 
its codification and the establishment of an international court of justice, 
the primacy of global public opinion as a factor for change in international 
politics, and the viability of the federal model as the ultimate political 
ideal. Underpinning the discussion of these topics is the utilitarians’ appeal 
to the ultimate principle of the universal maximisation of the well-being of 
mankind, as mediated by the specific historical-political circumstances. 
The relationship between these two factors—i.e., the pursuit of the ideal of 
well-being and the reality of circumstances—which indirectly generates 
forms of political exclusion, represents a central topic of the chapter.
In the light of such classical utilitarian teaching, chapter III presents 
a critical survey of the main arguments on global justice advanced in the 
last thirty years by contemporary consequentialist scholars, among which 
utilitarians represent the majority. A series of core topics are analysed, 
including the nature of international ethics and the scope of moral-political 
obligation, the legitimacy of state institutions and the supranational agency 
of citizens. This is done through an examination of the six most significant 
arguments of international contemporary utilitarianism: the Singerian 
argument, Neo-Malthusian life-boat ethics, domestic analogy, international 
specificity, vulnerability, and reductionism. Finally, the political potential 
of these arguments in terms of political and ethical inclusion is accordingly 
assessed and the theoretical limits identified in order to draw a precise 
research agenda for future investigations.
Chapter IV takes off from the conclusions on the limits of the work 
of contemporary utilitarianism on international ethics and presents the 
principal ethical and political aspects of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. 
Acknowledging that the notion of moral and political agency as tackled by 
contemporary utilitarians is in fact neither sufficiently sophisticated nor 
inclusive enough to meet the ethical challenges of current international
13
affairs, this chapter begins by pursuing a more subtle conception of the 
political good, which in being aware of the epistemological constraints on 
interpersonal comparisons of utility allows for the recognition of pluralism 
through respect for individual and collective choices. Fundamental to this 
is a notion of well-being in terms of freedom of choice, which produces a 
dual metric in terms of guaranteeing vital interests and political 
participation. Following from this, a notion of political agency in terms of 
choice-makers and choice-bearers is developed in order to deal 
exhaustively with the issue of responsibility and vulnerability at the global 
level. Finally, a number of critical comparisons with alternative theories of 
justice (including utilitarianism, contractarianism, autonomy-based, and the 
capability approach) are outlined.
Chapter V provides the second part of the core argument 
underpinning the project of consequentialist cosmopolitanism in that it 
conveys the central reasoning on global democracy in its institutional and 
international aspects through a detailed examination of the consequentialist 
theory of democracy. Such a theory ultimately aims at re-establishing the 
procedural congruence between choice-makers and choice-bearers, for 
only where such a correspondence is universally respected and an 
equilibrium among the different levels of political action is drawn, can the 
freedom of each individual to self-legislate be guaranteed and thus the way 
for the maximisation of world well-being conditions remain open. This 
innovative interpretation of global citizenship, entailing differing degrees 
of responsibility (both individual and collective) and relative power at all 
levels of political decision-making, including the global sphere, forms the 
core of the political project in terms of participatory entitlements and 
procedural assessment. From this, additional attention is given to the issue 
of international responsibility, which represents an interdisciplinary axis 
connecting the issues of overdemandingness, of the relationship between 
ideal and non-ideal theory, and finally that of the interdependence between 
social theory and the multilayered jurisdictional setting.
Chapters VI and VII present two case studies concerned with the 
principal political element of consequentialist cosmopolitanism: 
cosmopolitan citizenship. The cosmopolitan notion of enfranchisement is
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applied to two crucial cases—migration and supranational institutions— 
which represent socio-political challenges that are particularly exacerbated 
by recent global transformations. In dealing with multilayered membership 
in both horizontal and vertical dimensions respectively, the cases of 
migration and supranational institutions clearly exemplify new global 
circumstances of justice. They thus form obvious test-cases for an ethics of 
international relations in the present context of world affairs.
Chapter VI proposes a consequentialist cosmopolitan re­
interpretation of the issue of migration and citizenship. In line with a 
multilayered conception of political agency, the core of this migratory 
cosmopolitan argument resides in a particular interpretation of the idea of a 
universal right to free passage, which takes into account what are termed, 
following Hume, the “circumstances of migratory justice”. The two key 
steps in arguing for such a view consist in making clear the necessity of 
fair allocation of membership, and that global responsibility for migratory 
regulation resides globally. These steps lead to a number of political 
recommendations, notably the proposal of new admission criteria and the 
implementation of a new system of global co-operation. The latter, more 
specifically, entails the adoption of a convention on migrants and the 
establishment of a supranational agency for world migratory governance.
Chapter VII proposes a consequentialist cosmopolitan re­
interpretation of the issue of international institutions and citizenship. 
Again in line with a multilayered conception of political agency, this 
examination adopts a radical democratic perspective in which the 
possibility of participation in the process of self-legislation is offered back 
to citizens. Insofar as the right to democratic participation is considered to 
be the political tool for the maximisation of individual choice possibility 
and, consequently, of the world well-being condition, this chapter defends 
the case for the global level of action to be maintained as a legitimate 
domain of democratic self-determination. In this vein, the democratic 
prerogatives of cosmopolitan citizenship for a more direct and participatory 
membership at the world institutional level of political life are illustrated. 
In the context of globalized politics, this normative interpretation of
15
cosmopolitan political agency requires a federal reform of global political 
institutions, in particular of the United Nations,
Finally, chapter VIII presents a number of political considerations 
in order to synthesise the research, together with suggesting the 
contribution of the research to possible future studies.
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International Exclusion
"Why do you kill me? What! Do you not live on 
the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, 
my friend, I should be an assassin, and it would be 
unjust to slay you in this manner. But since you hve on 
the other side, I am a hero, and it is just. [... ] Three 
degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian 
decides the truth. [... ] A strange justice that is bounded 
by a river! Tmth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on 
the other side” (Pascal, 1660 [1995], § 293-4)
One of the most heated debates on the current political agenda 
concerns the social consequences and the political control of what is 
usually referred to as globalization. There can be no doubt that the world 
ethical consciousness has been altered by the global transformations of the 
last decades. The social and political life of nearly every citizen in almost 
all countries has been dramatically affected by the blurring of national 
borders, which in the past have effectively limited relationships among 
individuals. Individuals now find themselves in a social situation in which 
most of their actions carry the potential to have tremendous impact 
stretching across national frontiers into some other part of the world— 
either directly or as one of thousands of similar actions by others 
elsewhere. In this process, characterised by the intensification of flows of 
interaction and by the deepening enmeshment of local and global, 
economic concerns have undoubtedly taken the lead, but politics, law, and
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culture are also experiencing radical mutations that increasingly put into 
dispute the legitimacy of traditional canons of conduct (Ruggie, 1995; 
UNDP, 1999; Held & McGrew, 2000; Lechner & Boli, 2003).
From the World Social Forum to the World Economic Forum, from 
the UN General Assembly to the national and regional parliaments, the 
issue of the effects of the increased global interconnectedness, with its 
untamed intrusiveness in the daily life of virtually every citizen, occupies 
the centre of public debate. The responses to these new global 
circumstances vary. On the one hand, the reaction to the increased 
interdependence has often been negative, characterised by an attempt to 
protect local prerogatives against the competition of external and powerful 
agents. Instances of this attitude can be seen across a wide spectrum of 
political decisions, including the US/EU protectionist positions in some 
key areas of the WTO negotiation rounds, the wide-spread rise of right- 
wing nationalistic parties, the isolationist stance of groups such as the MST 
(Landless Peasants Movement) in Brazil, or the openly anti-globalization 
view of the influential newspaper Le Monde Diplomatique. On the other 
hand, a number of differing positions can be distinguished which claim to 
foster a more constructive approach to the global dimension of politics. 
They comprise among others: neo-liberal supporters of global capitalism, 
liberal-democratic reformists advocating the restructuring of the political 
system toward a more democratic system of global governance, and those 
advocating radical alternatives of ‘globalization from below’, of global 
solidarity outside the current global market system (Mittelman, 2000; 
Desai & Said, 2001, 65-75; Pianta, 2001, 188-90).
Underpinning the diatribes of the different positions facing the 
phenomenon of globalization is the issue of democracy in its alternative 
interpretations; in terms of both scope (local, national or global) and 
method (participatory, deliberative or representative). Whereas 
isolationists, for instance, advocate self-contained communities under the 
assumption that real democracy is only feasible at the local, participatory 
level, global supporters argue, conversely, that a global capitalist system 
represents the unique basis for an effective democracy in which the 
individual can pursue his or her entrepreneurial activities in a
18
unconstrained competition with minimal, representative institutions. For a 
long time almost ignoring the political discussion on the new forms of 
democracy, those holding to traditional political thought have been 
reluctant to recognise global phenomena as such, concentrating mainly on 
the individual and domestic domains of justice. Even theories of liberal 
democracy, based as they are on the principles of self-governance, consent, 
representation, and popular sovereignty, have been at a loss to offer a 
viable response to global phenomena until very recently. However, over 
the last thirty years, this traditional bias privileging domestic agendas has 
become a crucial focus of criticism within the debate on international
political theory 1. In this debate cosmopolitan theories have played a 
leading role in stressing the key relevance of the expanding scope of moral 
agency, and thus political responsibilities. Today no conception of political 
theory can afford to ignore the global dimension of the socio-political 
system and the correlate demands for its démocratisation. Within the terms 
of such a debate, this thesis aims to refocus the discussion on the issue of 
the relationship between democracy and global transformations in one of 
its most crucial pathologies; namely political exclusion.
This first chapter begins by presenting both the problem of 
international exclusion and a sketch of the principal research objectives 
which are necessary to locate the investigation within the wider framework 
of the studies of international political theory. Taking notice of the radical
 ^ For overall Surveys o f this debate (Ellis, 1986; Beitz, 1988; Luper-Foy, 1988; Brown, 
1992; Giesen, 1992; Nardin & Mapel, 1992; Thon^son, 1992; Brown, 1997; Graham, 
1997; Mapel & Nardin, 1998; Beitz, 1999a; Jones, 1999; Caney, 2001; Coicaud & 
Warner, 2001; Pogge, 2001; De Greiff & Cronin, 2002; Maffettone & Pellegrino, 2004). 
Conversely, for reference to specific schools o f thought see: Capabilities approach (Sen, 
1981; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993; Sen, 2000b), Contractarianism (Rawls, 1971; Beitz, 
1979; Richards, 1982; Gauthier, 1986; Barry, 1989; Buchanan, 1995; Held, 1995; Rawls, 
1999; Scanlon, 1999; Kuper, 2000; Pogge, 2002b). Ethics of communication (Apel, 
1992, 2000; Habermas, 2001). Feminism (Grant & Newland, 1991; Groom & Halliday, 
1994; Hutchings, 1999). Law of nature (Midgley, 1975; Finnis, 1980). Marxism (Berki, 
1971; Nielsen, 1983; Guevara, 2002). Nationalism and Republicanism (MacIntyre, 
1984; Tamir, 1993; Walzer, 1994; Miller, 1995; Viroli, 1995; Canovan, 1996; Dagger, 
1997). Neo-hegelism (Taylor & Gutmann, 1994; Frost, 1996). Neo-kantianism (Doyle, 
1983; O'Neill, 1986a; Hurrell, 1990; Archibugi, 1995b; Bohinan & Lutz-Bachmann, 
1997). Post-modernism (Der Derian & Shapiro, 1989; Der Derian, 1995). Society of 
nations (Bull, 1977; Wight, 1977; Hoffmann, 1981; Nardin, 1983; Bull, 1984; Zolo, 
1997). Theory of rights (Shue, 1980; Gewirth, 1982; Vincent, 1986; Bonanate, 1994; 
Bobbio, 1995). For Utilitarianism see note in chapter 3.
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transformations that have affected our social world from the seventies on— 
especially in relation to the political dichotomy inclusion/exclusion—the 
chapter examines the normative paradigm that is of paramount relevance 
when this dichotomy is put under consideration, interaction dependency. 
Consequently, the interaction-dependent theories of justice are thoroughly 
analysed and subsequently criticised for their failure on the side of 
inclusion. A number of considerations on the method for justifying any 
version of applied ethics are then developed before the last part of the 
chapter introduces the discourse on consequentialist cosmopolitanism— 
which, in being universalist and independent from interaction, avoids 
exclusion—as an alternative normative proposal. A new version of an all- 
inclusive cosmopolitanism is then presented in its overall characteristics, 
together with a brief genealogical consideration on the historical and 
theoretical origins of this thesis.
Outlining the problem of international exclusion and the 
research objectives
Political history can be interpreted as a long journey marked by 
battles for the equal right to participate in the decision-making process of 
political life; that is, for political enfranchisement. Indeed, the description 
of the development of political life over the centuries coincides for a 
significant part with the description of the fights for the inclusion of those 
political subjects who were kept apart in a subaltern status. Differences of 
social class, ethnicity, gender, and skin have for a long time represented 
insurmountable barriers deployed to exclude people from political and 
social power. Social categorisations of ethnic and religious minorities, 
indigenous peoples, women, the elderly, homosexuals, the young, the poor, 
and, by proxy, future generations, were used as exclusionary mechanisms 
to maintain a condition of political deprivation. These ostracised 
individuals consequently suffered a disadvantaged and profoundly unjust 
life in comparison with those endowed with full political membership, and 
with lives thus almost invariably characterised by a high degree of social 
vulnerability, those so dispossessed were motivated to advance claims to
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redress their political entitlement. And so they struggled for political 
inclusion (Bobbio, 1990; Walzer, 1993; Dryzek, 1996; Goodin, 1996a; 
Habermas, 1998; Young, 2000).
‘Foreignness’ constitutes another typical category of exclusion, and 
unlike those previously mentioned, despite the intense criticism under 
which the priority traditionally granted to fellow citizens over aliens has 
recently come, it is a category that is still powerfully effective in 
discriminating between^ncluded and excluded individuals. In fact, the very 
idea of a self-defining group implies exclusivity, i.e., the existence of 
public characteristics effectively delimiting the boundaries of a 
community. Every such society needs to assume a selective criterion in 
order to self-defme its jurisdictional constituency, thus simultaneously 
keeping out non-members. The demarcation of group identity entails 
drawing a line between those who are in and those who are om/, between 
those individuals who are recognised as equal and those who are treated 
unequally. Such a mechanism of limited inclusion creates a system of 
social exclusion shaped according to differing spheres of justice, the 
thresholds of which depend on the scope of application of the principle of 
impartiality (Walzer, 1985b; Walker, 1993). The degree of impartiality that 
each group applies in its relationship with aliens thus represents a good 
indicator of the degree of inclusion of non-members^.
At the moment, the discrimination on the grounds of national 
membership is nowhere more visible than on the edge between national 
and international jurisdictions concerning political participation. 
Increasingly, decisions taken in one country affect people in other 
countries who do not have the possibility to express their consent because 
of their subaltern status as non-fellow, ergo disenfranchised, citizens. The 
fracture between the socio-economic reality, which is transnational in its 
effects, and the political system, which is still fundamentally anchored to a 
community-based model, is widening. Environment, migration, finance, 
commerce, health, and security are just a few examples of how the link
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between actions and consequences extends tightly across borders. And yet 
those who bear the effects of decisions taken abroad are not typically 
entitled to have a political voice in the process (Falk, 1995; Held, 1995; 
McGrew, 1997; Bello, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002, 18-22; Cutler, 2003; Monbiot, 
2003).
A state-based political system remains an unsatisfactory framework 
for self-determination of trans-border interests such as those embodied by 
non-national or trans-national political agents like migrants, people of 
trans-border religions, minorities, workers, etc. (Scholte, 2004, 22). Both in 
cases where decisions taken in a given country have border-crossing 
consequences, and in those where decisions taken at the international level 
have correspondingly international effects, most often the individual 
consequence-bearer does not have significant power to register his or her 
‘trans-border consent’ (or, indeed, dissent). Assuming she or he has the 
power to register her or his consent at the domestic level (which is rarely 
the case), she or he nevertheless does not have a voice at all in the 
domestic decisions of other countries and has little voice in international 
fora^ even when they are public. In public international organisations, the 
only political voice available to him or her is through the double 
representation offered by national parliaments, which (if entitled) 
subsequently elect international representatives with differing effective 
powers. Should one come fi"om a poor country, in fact, he or she can expect 
to have an especially weak voice in the intergovernmental organisations.
Using these observations as a starting point, one can argue that 
current international affairs are characterised by a high degree of exclusion 
and disenfranchisement. Were this international scenario of multiple 
disenfi*anchisement translated into a domestic setting it could not be 
tolerated by any version of democratic theory. Any democrat would be 
ready to accept the principle that any citizen should be entitled to have a 
voice on the decisions concerning public issues, above all those that affect 
him. Accordingly, the democrat would not accept that decisions taken by.
 ^Accordingly, exclusion is maximal when impartiality is minimal. An extreme case of  
partiality is given by the Nazis’ attitude toward some of their victims, who, deemed to be 
Untermenshen, were denied moral standing. (O'Neill, 2000, 193).
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for instance, a private club with restricted membership could significantly 
affect the life prospects of the remaining citizens without the latter having 
the legal possibility to contest the outcomes. However, this is the common 
understanding, not to mention the usual practice, of international affairs— 
even though a vast part of the discussion on international political theory 
rests on the assumption of democratic principles. This incongruity is 
possible because political scientists conventionally work on a double 
supposition; one that yields huge social consequences in international 
affairs. On the one hand, national decisions are to be respected to the extent 
that they are the product of democratic self-determination within sovereign 
jurisdictions; and on the other, international decisions taken by 
intergovernmental organisations are to be observed since they are 
ultimately taken to be the indirect expression of the same democratic self- 
determination. Leaving aside their practical implausibility, such 
suppositions remain highly illegitimate according to the perspective 
presented here because they warrant and preserve a political system that 
structurally excludes relevant political subjects from political agency.
The dichotomy of political exclusion vs. political engagement 
illustrates a core component of international political theory in that it 
highlights a crucial element of political incompleteness in the current 
political arrangements at the international level. From a normative 
perspective, the inclusion of vulnerable agents into public and impartial 
decision-making processes at the international level represents a unique 
chance to improve the democratic legitimacy of the entire political system, 
both domestically and globally. The widely accepted creed of democracy 
remains in fact fundamentally flawed unless it is complemented with an 
international dimension of democratic participation. Until a criterion is 
found that allows for the justifiable delimitation of membership according 
to constituencies that effectively reflect public interests, rather than 
national or private boundaries, no democratic regime can be truly 
democratic. On the other side, however, addressing the democratic deficit 
at the international level alone will not solve all domestic problems 
regarding democratic representation. Deficiencies in the democratic ethos 
and procedures inside national structures will always afflict democratic
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practice on the whole. While domestic practices of democracy are not the 
object of the present study, this thesis maintains that a project of 
international démocratisation could facilitate the resolution of some of 
them^. The thesis argues that a major international democratic deficit 
remains a key characteristic of the current political system, and that this 
system needs to be revised in order to end the resulting unjust exclusion of 
a vast portion of the world population from transnational decision-making 
processes and thereby, improve the overall implementation of the 
democratic ideal.
In consideration of this, the research objective of the whole thesis is 
to defend the case for consequentialist cosmopolitanism as the normative 
theory best equipped to conceptualise both the international fracture 
exclusion vs. participation as well as an alternative political recipe for 
world democracy. As a response to the current international political 
fragmentation, which generates pohtical exclusion, the alternative political 
project offered here envisages a cosmopolitan system where all world 
citizens are included within a scheme of a direct representative 
participation under an overarching authority governing the process of 
democratising world affairs. The pursuit of the democratic ideal in terms of 
scope is thus implemented in this proposal through a re-worked notion of 
citizenship as global, multilayered, and all-inclusive. In essence, this 
entails an expansion of the domestic model of democracy to the 
international level, structured on several layers that take into account 
different jurisdictional boundaries as co-ordinated through a world 
federalist system. Only through the radical project of stretching the 
paradigm of democratic inclusion to the extreme limits encompassing the 
whole of mankind, together with recognising the legitimacy of multiple 
political allegiances, not simply those of state governments, can the 
inhuman mechanism of inclusion as exclusion-generator be avoided. If the 
phenomenon of illegitimate political exclusion is to be escaped, the 
authority to define jurisdictional boundaries needs to be re-allocated from
 ^ E.g., the domestic treatment o f migrants, or the semi-permanent extent o f internationally 
binding decisions, such as the adhesion to the WTO negotiation rounds, which cannot
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groups with a circumscribed scope, to a public democratic mechamsm 
which is global in kind. Hence, universal inclusion and multiple 
allegiances represent key components of this project; elements that will 
inevitably be shaped on a minimal scope in terms of universal entitlements 
and on differing levels of political inclusion.
The thesis proposal is divided into two principal parts, an ethical- 
political component and an international political component. Concerning 
the ethical and politicaj^aspects, the thesis advances a new understanding 
of political consequentialism based on the combination of normative 
principles and epistemological observations. Acknowledging the 
epistemological constraints that bar the possibility of interpersonal 
comparisons, emphasis is placed on individual freedom of choice and 
procedural democracy. As to the international political component, the 
thesis fosters a new understanding of the key component of 
cosmopolitanism—multilevel political agency and participation—through 
coupling consequentialist principles with international social features. The 
resulting understanding of cosmopolitan political agency is further 
developed as it applies to individuals (in the case of cosmopolitan 
citizenship) and the collective (in the case of cosmopolitan institutions).
The argument presented here is original in that seeking to bridge 
these new understandings of political ethics and international politics, i.e., 
the paradigms of consequentialism and cosmopolitanism, it provides a 
particularly strong argument in favour of a political system which is based 
on universal inclusion and participation. This is argued to be the most 
convincing critical response available to the current exclusionary 
conceptual framework of international affairs. Alternative normative 
theories are less fit to deal with the issue of global democratic inclusion 
because of their fundamental reliance on the interaction paradigm, which 
generates jurisdictional compartmentalisation and subsequently 
fragmentation-cMw-exclusion in international affairs. The reasons why the 
interaction-dependent theories are inclined to generate exclusion are 
presented in the next sections of this chapter.
easily changed by democratic deliberations of future generations.
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A final overall remark concerning the degree of comprehensiveness 
of the present proposal must be made before proceeding. In order to avoid 
misunderstandings, it is important to stress from the beginning that the 
theory elaborated in this thesis does not aim to be a comprehensive theory 
of the good life; it does not aim to tell people how to live. On the contrary, 
it aims to clarify the normative weaknesses of the current political system 
and to propose an alternative scheme of public rules. In this vein, the 
question with which it is engaged is not metaphysical, but pohtical. It is 
about how we are to live together given that we have different ideas about 
how to live, and not about what is the right idea of a good life. In this 
regard, consequentialist cosmopolitanism offers a theory for a political 
framework within which each individual can participate in the elaboration 
of public rules on an equal standing, while maintaining differing ethical 
perspectives on the meaning of life.
In more concrete terms, it is a proposal to dispute the power positions 
which characterise international social reality by redefining the legal 
institutional setting so that it is based on providing an equal opportunity to 
influence the public decision-making process and so maximally preserve 
one’s own freedom of choice. In this regard, it is different from 
phenomenological and post-modern directions of research insofar as it 
firmly believes in the unique value of political institutions to resist and 
redress social inequality. Even more, it holds that some form of democratic 
participation is necessary for any viable project of critical theory, in that 
without such an egalitarian participatory structure no dialogue aiming at 
genealogical self-investigation can hope to be freed from power 
relationships, indeed, be a dialogue at all. A minimal democratic structure 
is necessary to frame the basic mode of the relationship, be it political or 
cultural, from which any phenomenological enquiry is to be carried out. 
Failing such egalitarian and all-inclusive structure, no viable principle of 
respect for alterity can be identified, and without these grounds for 
difference, an undifferentiated acceptance of any alternative, including 
those based on power positions, remains as the only possible attitude. 
Global democratic institutions are thus needed to re-interpret critically the 
current international system and to re-dress its illegitimate inequalities.
, ‘
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Having clarified the general contours of the present investigation, the 
next three sections examine those arguments in the debate on global justice 
that most crucially demand to be contested with regard to the issue of 
exclusion: The arguments determined by the paradigm of interaction 
dependency.
Interaction-dependent justice: failing responses or contributing 
factors?
The ground for the high level of reciprocal exclusion that currently 
characterises the international domain is built, to a large degree, on the 
prevailing model of interaction among sovereign states. Despite some 
recent movements toward tighter intergovernmental co-ordination through 
forms of multilateralism and global governance, the fundamental structure 
of international relations remains anchored to the Westphalian model of 
independent self-contained states with sovereign jurisdictions. This 
paradigm, which became dominant in part as a reaction against the 
increasing instability brought on by the decline of the universal powers of 
the middle ages, envisages no duties beyond borders except those 
generated from modes of interaction. Thus, in this, any international duties 
are at bottom functional imperatives for self-regarding co-ordination. This 
remains still true despite the intensifying recognition of the legitimising 
status of the human rights regime which is based on a different 
universalistic axiom that, were it effectively accepted and enforced, could 
potentially destabilise the fundaments of the system.
Interaction-dependent justice is the normative paradigm 
underpinning such a model of international reciprocal exclusion. A model 
of justice is interaction-dependent if its prescriptions arise from and apply 
only to the interaction of the agents under consideration. A duty of justice, 
in this vein, has its normative source in the intercourse occurring between 
agents and it is only relevant for them, for where no intercourse occurs, no 
duty of justice applies. Consequently, no externally originated duties or 
external agents are taken into primary account in the normative assessment 
of the situation. In particular, the intercourse is typically determined within
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the context of a bounded state, and those members who (or aspects of 
humanity which) exist outside of this context are accorded only the thin 
principles of beneficence. A highly counter-intuitive stance derives from 
this according to which the moral agent is under no duty of justice to create 
ex novo an interaction in at least two crucial cases. That is, justice does not 
bind the moral agent to build up a relationship either a) to help other needy 
agents, or b) to promote a better overall outcome regardless of his personal 
benefit. In both cases, rather than a strict duty of justice, only a thin and 
imperfect obligation of beneficence applies, with its correlate of 
conditional blame and guilty. Since ethics always applies to actions or 
omission between agents, the establishment of new relationships 
constitutes a critical issue. Do the duties of justice extend to the duty to 
enter into an interaction, or do they only kick in once this is established? 
This determination is what really marks the practical distinction between 
interaction-dependent and interaction-independent normative theories.
The set of principles embedded in the interaction-dependent 
normativity is of paramount importance for it represents a (if not the) 
principal component of western liberal theories of justice, both ethical and 
legal. Doubtless such a paradigm has greatly contributed toward the 
reduction of domestic social and political exclusion, for it grounded the 
stance enabling many political movements to advance their emancipatory 
claims within the borders of the national state. Liberal societies have 
reached a high level of inclusion thanks to the adoption of such non­
discriminating principle of closed impartiality. At the international level, 
however, the situation is upside-down in that the very same principle 
reveals its closure clause, losing any further progressive force to include 
excluded individuals. It is, actually, used for excusing international 
exclusion, for it normatively legitimises the preservation of such a state of 
subaltemity and vulnerability. An examination of the interaction-based 
theories of justice is thus of extreme importance when the issue of 
international exclusion is at stake, both for its failure to respond to and its 
indirect contribution to warranting such discriminatory situation.
The following examination develops two of the most compelling and 
influential interaction-based theories of justice—the contextualist and the
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universalist theories of justice—both to highlight their inadequacy, as well 
as to set the stage for the consequentialist proposal of global ethics. 
Contextualist theories are unresponsive to others’ demand for justice 
insofar as not sharing the governing cultural and political background 
precludes inclusion in the realm of ethical and political consideration. 
Conversely, while universalist interaction theories have a more inclusive 
approach toward non-members, they still exclude all those agents with 
whom no intercourse occurs. Through the distinction between justice and 
beneficence, in fact, they draw the threshold of impartial treatment toward 
foreign people to a point that, despite universally prohibiting exploitation, 
still allows for significant exclusions. Both variants thus remain 
insufficiently attentive to the universal claims of aliens. The examination 
begins with the contextualist theories, because of the two interaction- 
dependent theories, they diverge farthest from consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism. The examination then proceeds to the scrutiny of the 
universalist theories of interaction-based justice: the most challenging 
alternative in the field of international ethics.
Interaction-dependent contextualist theories: statism and 
nationalism
Despite being profoundly different in other respects, realist and 
nationalist theories are here considered jointly on account of their reliance 
on the interaction paradigm, and the subsequent international consequences 
of their exclusive inclusiveness. Sharing a group-limited focus—the state 
in the case of realism and the cultural community in the case of 
nationalism—these theories draw the boundaries of justice according to a 
conventionalist paradigm. From their contextualist perspective, justice in 
any given society is determined by the socially defined, and thus shared, 
beliefs on the meanings of the goods to be distributed among the members 
of the community (Walzer, 1985b). In this way, both statist realism and 
nationalist-communitarianism hold that the limit of thick duties of justice is 
the horizon of domestic interaction, with their prescriptions toward non­
members varying from a thin obligation of beneficence, to a set of
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traditional modus vivendi principles of non-harm and non-intervention, to 
even a licence for aggressive and expansionist policies. The issue of 
inclusion/exclusion is at its clearest here, for the normative paradigm of 
realism and nationalism lies on the notion of limited inclusion as 
meaningfully in contrast to the political outranking of non-members. As 
aptly noted by a commentator, the idea of spherical justice yields the 
intrinsic risk of generating global injustice and exclusion (Barry, 1995b).
In international £ohtical terms, the state and nation paradigms are the 
normative basis for the two principal interpretations of the principle of 
sovereignty, which is in turn considered to be a constitutive and ordering 
rule of international organisation. Following a traditional definition 
according to which sovereignty is “the institutionalisation of public 
authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains” (Ruggie, 1986, 
143; Krasner, 1999), the state paradigm recognises this domain with 
reference to territory, the nation with reference to the population (Barkin & 
Cronin, 1995). Using such conventional categorisation, the present section 
develops its analysis through the adoption of the alternative state vs. 
nation, as illustrated by the two paradigms of realism and nationalism.
From Thucydides’ times at least, the paradigmatic interpretation of 
international relations has been realist: based on the idea of exclusion and 
competition among the various political agents^. The cardinal concepts of 
this school of thought can be summarised in the following three: 1) 
validation of political generalisation from historical experience, thus 
claiming to be axiologically neutral; 2) flexible key notions such as power, 
state interest, and international security; and 3) a state-centric approach 
(states as key unites of action) which privileges conflicts rather then 
common interests among international actors. Based on a negative 
anthropology of power and hostility à la Hobbes, the realists’ ultimate 
political objective thus remains the preservation and increase of state 
power in an environment characterised by the absence of any significant 
co-operative or inclusive international structures. Whether they take the
 ^For a first reference see (Morgenthau, 1960; Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1986b; Kipnis & 
Meyers, 1987; Baldwin, 1993; Oppenheim, 1993; Portinaro, 1999).
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perpetual conflict behind all of this to be generated by the self-seeking 
nature of human beings (natural realism) or by the anarchical structure of 
international relations (structural realism), realist explanations overlap in 
concluding that the constitutive function of power relationships inevitably 
implies the exclusion of the others from power.
Following from these assumptions, almost no space is left for justice 
intended as an impartial and inclusive mechanism of conflict settlement. 
Typically, given the choice between impartial justice and state interest, the 
realist scholar is always for the second—though this may sometimes be 
dissimulated—for the realists take the demands of justice to be merely a 
weak ideology serving a weak actor. It is a common realist creed that 
justice only exists, if it exists at all, by the grace of the powerful, and the 
weak rely upon it at their peril. If moral demands, such as respecting 
human rights, are advanced, they remain completely subordinate to the 
imperatives of foreign policy. Moral assessments are only relevant in 
instances in which state’s representatives are to decide on something other 
than national interest, and any such moral decision must conform to the 
national interest. The principal normative stance of realism regards the 
duties of the governor as intended toward the preservation and increase of 
national power to the detriment of non-fellow citizens.
Beyond the representation of the international realm as an external 
competitive environment, also of particularly significance within the 
discussion of exclusion is the mechanism of the externalisation of domestic 
conflict adopted by the realist school. While personal ambition can 
sometimes be redirected and tamed through domestic socialising 
mechanisms such as law, ethics, customs, and sport, a principal tactic of 
‘realist’ governments consists in the externalisation of personal ambition 
where these can overlap with national interest and expansionist tendencies. 
In this sense, for the realists there is an inevitable correlation between 
internal pacification and the externalisation of conflict. On this point, an 
obvious reference is Carl Schmitt, who maintains that political unity 
presupposes the real possibility of an enemy, therefore of an antagonist 
political unity. Hence, for one state to exist, more than one needs to exist; 
consequently a world state is not conceivable for the political scene is
I «
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intrinsically pluriverse (Schmitt, 1932 [1996]). Vice versa, the 
neutralisation of internal conflicts can also derive from external threats.
These considerations suffice here to characterise the realist position 
as one of the major supporting ideologies of the current level of 
international exclusion. However, realism does not exhaust the range of 
normative options within the contextualist category of interaction- 
dependent theories of justice. Its counterpart in nationalism—and more 
generally communitarianism and historicism—represents another source 
that has provided an almost equal contribution to the establishment of the 
present exclusionary system of international relations. The rationale for 
exclusion deriving from the community-based theories of political justice 
is in fact almost as old as the realist argument, and almost as influential, 
with thinkers such as Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel as principal philosophical 
references^. After the long-term realist hegemony attending the Cold War, 
nationalism resumed a politically relevant place in the late 1980s, and 
exploded in the 1990s. Its theoretical foe is undoubtedly represented by 
universal liberalism with its correlate of dis-embedded or unencumbered 
individual rights.
While the term ‘state’ represents a legal concept describing a social 
group that occupies a defined territory and is organised under common 
political institutions and effective government, ‘nation’ depicts a social 
group that shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, 
and a sense of homogeneity. In this sense, a nation can be seen then as 
community of sentiment or an ‘imagined community’. While the exact 
content of this sentiment—i.e., what constitutes a nation—remains highly 
controversial, a significant component of all its multi-dimensional 
definitions consists in an exclusionary clause to effect the delimiting of the 
boundaries of the national community. According to Smith for instance, 
national identity involves some sense of political community, which in turn 
implies, at least, a definite social space and a fairly well demarcated and
 ^For a reference to the political phenomenon (Kohn, 1944; Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 
1983; Hobsbawn, 1990; Smith, 1991). For a philosophical analysis (MacIntyre, 1984; 
Tamir, 1993; O'Neil, 1994; Taylor & Gutmann, 1994; Walzer, 1994; Miller, 1995; Viroli,
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bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel 
they belong, as opposed to other nations (Smith, 1991).
Another influential interpretation of nationality that is centred on 
political inclusion is that elaborated by Miller. According to him, a national 
identity entails the feeling of belonging to a community that is constituted 
by mutual beliefs, extended in history, active in character, connected to a 
particular territory, and distinguished from the others by its members’ 
distinct traits. In addition, Miller’s theory of nationality generates three 
cardinal claims: national identities are properly part of personal identities; 
they ground circumscribed obligations to fellow-nationals; and finally, they 
justify, aspirations to political self-determination. Nationality is, 
consequently, valued for two principal reasons. National identity is 
constitutively good insofar as it is endowed with an ethical value which 
crucially contributes to the full development of personal identity. 
Furthermore, national identity is also instrumentally good as a provider of 
social conditions needed for the implementation of domestic social justice. 
Losing this identity would loosen a number of solidaristic ties, which are 
necessary for an effective social project (Miller, 1988, 1993, 1995). At the 
basis of this lies Miller’s concept of particularistic ethical obligations, 
which originate from the recognition of the intrinsic values of the modes of 
relations within the community and is centred on the concept of loose 
reciprocity, built on the possibility of identification and on the feeling of 
membership. According to this contextualist theory of ethical identity, the 
contents of justice are culturally shaped so that those who are not part of 
the social game are not considered valid recipients of the same kind of 
moral attention reserved for members (Miller, 2000b, 168-71).
Both Smith’s and Miller’s theories confirm the intrinsically 
exclusionary character of nationalist theories, rendering them 
fundamentally consistent with the specific realist position on the issue of 
inclusion/exclusion. While a similar argument also applies to other kinds of 
relativist, historicist or communitarian theories, such as those of Walzer 
and MacIntyre, these theories are not analysed here for lack of space, as
1995; Canovan, 1996; Frost, 1996; Dagger, 1997), For surveys (McKim & McMahan,
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well as lack of any significant addition that they could offer to the issue of 
exclusion. Having ascertained the position of the contextualist interaction- 
dependent theories of justice, it is now necessary to examine the other 
strand of the interaction-dependent theories, the universalist one, in order 
to complete the depiction of the set of normative arguments which support 
exclusion at the international level.
Interaction-dependent universalist theories: contractarianism, 
non-harm theories, and the ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ project
Endorsed by the Rawlsian school of thought, the notion of 
interaction-based justice can be considered mainstream in current political 
philosophy. In fact, the principle of reciprocity—as opposed to beneficent 
samaritanism—is now widely accepted by many contemporary scholars of 
global ethics as the fundamental principle of justice —(Beitz, 1979; 
Gauthier, 1986; Beitz, 1999b; Rawls, 1999; Pogge, 2002b; Held, 2004a)^. 
Furthermore, as already noted, in being consistent with the principle of 
non-interference, the interaction-based principle of justice can be 
considered a central component of liberalism, and thus of modem 
western—especially Anglo-Saxon—political thought (Ryan, 1993)^. While 
this principle of justice offers a number of important normative resources 
for tackling relevant social problems such as exploitation, it fails on others 
that are especially pertinent to the problem of international exclusion. 
Thus, in providing crucial ‘support’ for liberal-democratic versions of 
international democracy such as the project of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, 
the paradigm of interaction dependence also generates a club-based version
1997; Kymlicka & Straehle, 1999; Frost, 2001).
 ^For a critical consideration of the notion of justice as reciprocity see (Scanlon, 1982; 
Barry, 1989, § III; 1991; 1995a, § 2-3).
 ^While I discuss the non-harm and non-interference principles here with respect to their 
reliance on the assumption of social interaction, I recognise that they need not rely on this 
assumption. The principle o f non-interference and non-harm can also clearly be embedded 
in a consequentialist framework; a single major reference for these principles is J.S.Mill. I 
do not include him in this discussion, however, on account o f the distinctive (non- 
Kantian) axiological foundations of his theory which generate a different interpretation of 
the harm principle (Mill, 1859 [1962], 1861 [1962]).
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of democracy, which renders them deficient in terms of capacity for 
inclusion and participation.
The principle of reciprocity forms the basis of interaction-dependent 
versions of justice. Being a rights-based theory of justice, interaction-based 
justice does not aim to promote the good, but rather to ensure that a 
number of principles often expressed as individual rights are honoured. 
Moral agents are not, according to this view, in charge of positive 
obligations of b é n é f ic ié  (which remain in the domain of supererogation), 
but rather they are simply under a negative duty of non-harm and non­
interference. Beyond such strict duty of non-harm and the relative duty of 
compensation, individuals are not recognised as having any further 
‘natural’ obligation except for that of reciprocity, which applies in the case 
of co-operative practices. Were they to pursue an advantage in entering 
into a social relationship, this voluntary step in their personal interest 
would then compel them to comply with a fairness principle of justice. If 
an agreement is stipulated, one has a duty to keep with it, but there is no 
duty to stipulate it ab initio. Similarly to this principle of pacta sunt 
servanda, the principle of reciprocity maintains that, “if one benefits from 
some co-operative practice, one should not be a ‘jfree rider’ by taking the 
benefits while failing to do one’s part in sustaining the practice when it is 
one’s turn to do so” (Barry, 1991, 530). Still, no duty of justice exists to 
enter a co-operative practice.
The principle of reciprocity is usually characterised as that which sets 
justice apart from beneficence; which is in itself a deontologically biased 
presentation clearly favouring reciprocity over beneficence (Singer, 1972; 
Buchanan, 1987). According to this view, the promotion of others’ well­
being is meritorious, but not, strictly speaking, required and thus non- 
enforceable. Acts of beneficence are then regarded as acts of charity rather 
than ethical imperatives, as imperfect obligations concerning which the 
vulnerable can advance claims, but on charge of nobody in particular. 
Conversely, the principle of non-harm and reciprocity generates perfect 
duties of justice, which are enforceable, in that it produces obligations 
whose compliance can be demanded of somebody specifically, i.e., the 
harm-doer or the practice co-operator. A very much studied case in relation
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to the distinction between beneficence and justice is the penetrating 
example originally formulated by Singer of a child being witnessed 
drowning in a pond (Singer, 1972). According to the ‘justice’ view so far 
presented, the duty to rescue the child depends on the relationship between 
the child and the witness. For the duty to exist, either both parties have to 
be members of the same community or social enterprise, or the witness has 
to be causally connected with the child (this implying a duty to repair and 
compensate for the rescuer wrongdoing). Outside these two cases, only 
thin obligations of beneficence—Good Samaritan actions among fellow 
members of humanity—remain^. Moreover, usually relying on the 
‘restricted causation claim’, a claim according to which only direct and 
intentional causal consequences count for attributing responsibility, this 
view on justice maintains the distinction between action and omission, 
according minor relevance to justice for the latter in comparison with the 
former^.
 ^For a discussion on samaritanism see (Kleinig, 1976; Glover, 1977; Mack, 1980; 
McMahan, 1993; Malm, 1995; O'Neill, 2000, § 10).
 ^The formulation of the justice requirements in the case o f the drowning child changes if 
a further refinement o f the conception o f harm is developed adopting a more 
consequentialist reading. Two options can be considered to give meaning to the concept of 
harm, a restrictive and a complex view: harm can entail deliberately injurious actions, or 
indirect lack o f assistance, such as a failure to comply with an obligation of beneficence. 
An example o f a car accident might clarify the point on the difference between a complex 
and a restrictive view of responsibility. If a bystander does not offer assistance to the 
injured in a car accident, if  the complex view is adopted he could be incriminated for 
failed assistance, whereas he could justly  walk away if  the restrictive view is accepted.
Bad samaritanism is not considered a punishable offence in the latter instance. Another 
consideration related to the case of the drowning child highlights the same opposition 
between a complex and restrictive view. If a conplex view o f responsibility is adopted, 
the non-rescue, the failure to act, could be interpreted as the causal factor prolonging 
(rather than originally causing) suffering, as it produces emotional pain damaging the self­
esteem o f the child. In this case the witness would be under a duty o f assistance for his 
special relation as witness, in causal terms, with the child. This counter-restrictionist, 
complex view does not constitute, however, the conventional understanding o f the causal 
relation claim associated with the principle o f non-harm and reciprocity, for it is 
discounted as illegitimately overburdening moral agents (Feinberg, 1984, 12; Linklater, 
2004, 21). Moreover, it has to be noted, as a critique, that both the restricted and the 
counter-restrictive view functionally need, contrary to what they affirm, an inclusive 
political paradigm, insofar as public comprehensive system needs to be envisaged in order 
to create a forum where harm recriminations and allocation o f responsibility can take 
place. Without this, in fact, the causal link between choice-bearers and choice-makers can 
never be established with certainty. In conclusion, it is important to remember that 
attitudes such as indifference, negligence and complicity are not only a matter of 
importance when distinguishing simple responsibility (i.e., the obligation to comply with 
established legal conventions) from complex responsibility (i.e., the added requirement to 
establish new legal conventions as necessary). More importantly, these stances are crucial
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The collective correlate of the principle of reciprocity and non-harm 
consists in the interaction-dependent institutionalism that forms the 
common ground of many, mainly liberal-contractarian, contemporary 
political theories^®. Before exposing their failure to capture the ethical and 
political relevance of the exclusion factor to critique, it is, however, 
necessary to point out the specific feature of these theories that generates 
such a failure. This can best be observed through their discussion of 
political justice, which invariably begins fi'om the historically false 
consideration of a “closed system isolated from other societies” (Rawls, 
1971, 8). The most emblematic case of such community-based approach is 
certainly Rawls’s notion of a mutually beneficial co-operative enterprise. 
Central to this is the disanalogy of the principles of justice according to 
which those principles that apply intra-society do not apply at the inter­
societies level, and consequently no substantial duty of redistributive 
justice exists at the international level (Rawls, 1999). In this sense, the 
Rawlsian position offers eminent evidence of the inadequacy of the 
contractarian theory of justice in dealing with problems which pertain to 
multiple levels of political action. In being anchored to a state model of 
societal organisation, these theories fail to detect the relevancy of other 
trans-border spheres of social conduct (Scheffier, 2001, 33-4). Since the 
principle of fair play and reciprocal justice is conditional, “the most Rawls 
can say about a society that does not have such a scheme is that it suffers 
from collective irrationality in that it is passing up a chance to do itself 
some good” (Barry, 1991, 531).
aspects o f the fact of the exclusion of suffering people with whom one does not interact 
from moral consideration, as the Holocaust literature has made amply (Geras, 1999; 
Nieman, 2002).
But the republican theory also suffers a similar limitation (Pocock, 1975; Skinner, 
1978; Viroli, 1995; Pettit, 1997). At the normative level it is possible to detect in this 
school o f thought the same kind o f weakness as based on the interaction-paradigm. For a 
republican state to be just it suffices to be both non-dominated and non-interfered, or 
alternatively non-dominating and non-interfering. Such a criterion o f legitimacy does not 
prevent, however, a certain degree of indifference toward peoples and countries with 
which no intercourse o f domination or interference exists. For republicanism, as for all 
other interaction-based theories, sufficient sensitivity to prevent the vulnerable from 
suffering independently from the relationship with them is not present. This remains the 
case despite recent attempts to link republicanism and cosmopolitanism (Bohman, 2001; 
Chung, 2003).
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Other scholars theorise along similar lines. For instance, despite 
representing two different traditions of thought, Gauthier and Pogge both 
fundamentally rely on the assumption of a self-contained community, 
however expanded. (Gauthier, 1986, § IX; Pogge, 1992, 51; 1998). Pogge, 
in particular, holds that the duty of justice toward every other person, 
which can be discharged merely by not co-operating in the imposition of 
an unjust institutional scheme upon her, is conditioned on the contingent 
presence of social interaction and consequently does not exist with respect 
to the plurality of self-contained communities. Pogge admits that prior to 
any trading there would still be fairly weak duties of morality in terms of 
beneficence, but he is firm in maintaining that there would be no duties of 
justice (Pogge, 2000, 166-7). One of the challenges raised by Pogge’s 
argument consists in the capacity to distinguish between a positive and a 
negative responsibility. For him, any ethical theory unable to accommodate 
the fundamental common sense difference between acting and omitting 
would prove implausible. While a consequentialist theory can 
accommodate this requirement by way of differentiating between action 
and omission^ ^  in terms of instrumental v a l u e i t  is important to stress 
that attaching intrinsic value to such a distinction inevitably leads toward 
the kind of interaction-dependent justice, with its correlate of exclusion so 
far exposed.
Before proceeding to a consideration of the particular significance of 
the interaction-based paradigm for the international realm of politics, a 
note of clarification on the issue of global interdependence is due. While
 ^  ^ Related to this is the concept o f omission, which is here intended as produced by the 
renunciation o f performing an act that the agent is able to perform.
According to consequentialism, for instance, action could be valued higher in so far as 
it is reasonable to assume that if one commits an act, he can also equally avoid it, whereas 
the opposite concerning omission is less reasonable to reckon. Also, a number of agent- 
centred considerations could be taken into account in order to grant a prima facie  priority 
to acting over omitting in instrumental terms, according to a consequentialist perspective. 
However, no intrinsic value can be associated with action rather than omission à la Pogge, 
in that ultimately both count in proportion to their contribution to the final outcome in 
terms o f the universal and impartial promotion o f well-being. As a consequence, the 
subsequent strict distinction between duties of justice and duties o f beneficence also has to 
be revised from a consequentialist point of view. Instead, a scale o f duties differentiated 
according to their contribution toward well-being must be envisaged, in which various 
degrees o f demandingness can be accommodated, but qualitative distinctions such as that 
between duties o f justice and obligations of beneficence can not be accepted.
38
the ever increasing world-wide interdependence occasioned by recent 
global transformations has certainly been a key factor in awakening global 
moral consciousness, it can not play an independent normative role in any 
argument on international political theory and global justice. In particular, 
important as interdependence may be in the moral assessment of current 
international duties (Van den Anker, 1999), it is not the decisive factor for 
what concerns positive duties (Hurrell, 2001, 34). From a consequentialist 
perspective, that we currently influence each other to such a high degree 
serves only to clarify that we are in a relevant position to influence 
outcomes that affect others, it does not constitute a deontic principle in 
itself. If it did, the result would be a contingent ethics recognising only a 
duty to those upon whom we depend, and “indeed, a wealthy nation that 
wished to exempt its populace from having any obligation to redistribute 
part of its wealth to impoverished nations might simply withdraw from
economic exchanges with those nations” (Hardin, 1999, 410)^^.
Internationally speaking, the political correlate of the interaction- 
based paradigm of justice entails a club-based interpretation of democracy, 
as embodied in the recent proposal associated with the project of 
‘cosmopolitan democracy*. In holding to a notion of democratic 
congruence based not on an ideal of universal constituency, but instead on 
the strict relation between those who make the rules and those who directly 
suffer the consequences of those rules, the ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ 
paradigm tends toward a club-based system of democracy (Held, 1995). 
The strict notion of congruence, in fact, can be more easily associated with 
the decision-making method of a democratic club than a democratic 
political system, in that it avoids the exploitation of those it chooses to 
include, but does not allow for those not designated as ‘members’ to be 
included in a public decision-making process. Thus those ‘non-members’ 
who are only indirectly or ‘publicly’ involved in the socio-political 
interaction are shut out. Such a system also shares a number of elements 
with the corporativist model of political participation, as characterized in
For a similar point see (Murphy, 1998, 271-5, esp. 272; Linklater, 1999,476-7; Singer, 
2002, 197).
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particular by the two following features: interest-groups can only take part 
in those political discussions specifically dealing with the interests they 
represent; and their representatives have an issue-constrained political 
mandate (Bobbio, 1999, 410-28).
In suggesting a net of narrowly circumscribed institutions, the 
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ proposal refuses citizens outside such structures 
a guarantee of representation. In particular, such corporativist model 
excludes three crucial ^ tegories of stake-holders: those who represent a) 
non-formally organized interests, b) future interests, and c) general 
interests (Einaudi, 1919 [1973], § I: 30-3). In the attempt to identify a 
threshold according to which only those who are relevantly affected are 
taken into consideration, this paradigm sometimes deploys the harm 
principle, restrictively intended, and other times deploys the principle of 
non-imposition of unjust institutional settings. In both cases, however, 
those who are indirectly (but for them, perhaps, critically) affected are 
twice excluded: in being left out both fi'om the public decision-making 
process in charge of assessing the degree of the causal relation, and later 
from the mechanism of compensation for the harm suffered.
In sum, what the analysis of the paradigm of interaction-dependent 
justice developed in the last two sections has shown, is that the possibility 
of legitimately not entering into, or legitimately withdrawing fi'om, a 
relationship can be identified as a major generator of political ostracisation. 
That ‘consequentialism’ has a suggestion of interaction creates a point of 
tension that runs throughout this thesis; however, a clear point of 
distinction can be drawn between consequentialist cosmopolitanism and 
the theories of justice based on the interaction paradigm in that the former 
interprets institutional exclusion as a net factor of welfare deprivation^^. 
When, as has just been done here, universalist and contextualist
Here it suffices to note that exclusion from interaction is analytically intended as 
causing a twofold cost in welfarist terms related to individual freedom of choice. On the 
one hand, exclusion from a profitable interaction means a net loss of opportunity to take 
advantage o f the gains thereby generated, which are divided among the interacting agents 
only. On the other hand, ostracism also implies the absence o f power to influence the 
outcomes o f that interaction, whose (indirect or unforeseeable, present or future) 
externalities are often to be borne even from the non-interacting parties. More on this in 
chapters IV and V.
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interaction-dependent theories of justice are considered together in light of 
their specific prescriptions toward international exclusion, an image of the 
mighty normative armature providing everyday politics with the 
ideological support for such political outranking is clearly revealed. 
Ultimately, this attitude equals to indifference to the injustices not 
immediately occasioned by the moral agent in question. To use the famous 
case of a bystander passive at the sight of a child drowning in the pond: it 
is this passive stance, the justly walking away attitude that these sections 
aimed to discredit. The rest of the thesis then presents an alternative 
reading of political justice with the intention to offer a viable normative 
foundation for a political system not driven by the inhumanity of 
international exclusion. The institutional proposal of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism will therefore be presented as a consistent case of global 
democratic inclusion that claims to offer a better, more just and more 
humane, alternative to the exclusionary theories which currently prevail in 
international political theory. In the next section, a more detached view on 
the entire project is suggested together with a number of considerations on 
‘meta-apphed ethics’.
A view from a distance, or ‘meta-applied ethics’
Pulling back our perspective and leaving aside the specific issue of 
international exclusion for a moment, the fundamental and difficult 
question concerning the ground on which a theory of applied ethics could 
ultimately be justified comes into view. Discussion on the topic of the 
ultimate foundation of ethical reasoning applied to specific fields of action 
has intensified in the last two decades, without, however, reaching any 
wide and substantial consensus that could serve as a starting point here. A 
comprehensive response to this legitimate concern would consequently 
require a separate study on what could be called “meta-applied ethics”. 
Consequently, the following considerations do not claim to be exhaustive, 
but instead aim to offer sufficient normative guidance on this arduous issue 
to justify the concentration here on the more concrete aspects of 
international ethics.
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The shift from strict meta-ethics towards normative and applied 
ethics beginning in the sixties should not be read as a revolution, but rather 
as a rediscovery of the original attitude of moral philosophy. Given that 
nobody was keener than Socrates to analyse concrete cases to test ethical 
principles, current applied ethics should be seen as a re-discovered 
comprehensive sensitivity rather than as an independent field of study. No 
fimdamental axiological distinction can in fact be traced between 
normative ethics and applied ethics, in that the latter derives its conclusions 
from a set of premises in which inferences drawn from ethics are conjoined 
to factual findings. One of the cardinal assumptions of this thesis is that 
ethical practice and theory are inextricably linked.
Correctness and completeness are conventionally recognised as the 
two major criteria for the assessment of the legitimacy of moral theory. 
The test of correctness concerns the ability to satisfy rational and formal 
requirements, and the test of completeness regards the ability to solve 
practical disputes. Despite both being equally required, there is a tendency 
to deploy them discretely: the test of correctness tends to be used 
principally in the investigation of the realms of normative morality, and the 
test of completeness above all in the field of applied ethics (Monist, 1984; 
De Marco & Fox, 1986, 3; Griffin, 1986, 2-4; Lecaldano, 1996). Thus, a 
principal concern of most normative theories of the second half of the 20^  ^
century was to produce a correct model of political theory, rather than to 
test it through a wide spectrum of applicative cases. Only with the recent 
resurgence of applied ethics has a major flourishing of concrete case 
studies contributed to a move to include the account of the completeness 
test in the discussion. In keeping with all of this, this thesis concerns the 
area of ethics applied to international relations, it takes on the test of 
completeness—which urges it to provide practical evidence in order to 
justify its model—as the major challenge. Accordingly, this thesis is 
ultimately committed to offering an innovative defence of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism in relation to a number of case studies pertaining to 
international affairs, and specifically to the issue of exclusion. However, 
while concentrating on the provision of a valid defence against such a 
demand of completeness, this thesis nonetheless recognises that its
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legitimacy is equally dependent on the acceptance of the general theory 
underpinning it, i.e., ethical consequentialism. In response to this second 
concern, thus, in chapter III the thesis also provides a discussion in defence 
of the ultimate normative assumptions underpinning ethical 
consequentialism.
As regards the completeness test, the degree of acceptability of this 
thesis depends for the most part on the capacity of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism to assess the greater quantity of practical cases in a 
coherent way, in this it is guided by the identification of the critical focus 
on international exclusion. Since it is assumed that “the way to submit a 
moral theory to the test of completeness is to spread the theory as widely as 
possible, especially into areas where the chances are best of its running into 
trouble” (Griffin, 1986, 3), the present proposal tests the capacity 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism against competing theories to cover 
consistently a number of arguably key dilemmas of international ethics; all 
of which are ultimately related to the issue of political exclusion. While the 
specific case studies consist in considerations of migration and 
international institution, at this meta level of analysis they can be 
subsumed in the two following normative notions: moral agency and 
multilevel dimensionality. The principal challenge of international political 
theory for what concerns the issue of political exclusion is played out on 
the interpretation of these latter notions.
The major distinguishing characteristic of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism as a theory of ethics applied to international relations is 
its consideration of moral and political agency, as mutually dependent and 
operating within a universalistic and all-inclusive conception of 
responsibility and vulnerability. The strength of this theory is the flexibility 
of its paradigm, which allows it to respond more strongly than others to 
social and political reality. This strength has particular value in the current 
times of radical transformations. Our world system increasingly places the 
relationship between those who take decisions and those who bear the costs 
of those decisions under pressure, with the double effect of broadening the 
possibility for co-operation and impoverishing the moral ties of 
disapproval. Until recently, the effects of actions were principally
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circumscribed by a defined territory; most people influenced, for good or 
bad, the lives of a limited number of other people. The situation is now 
different, with many actions/omissions we implement having often an 
(unintentional) relative impact on thousands of others. Even if these effects 
are imperceptible when taken singly, they often become decisive when 
combined with the effects of thousands of similar actions. Consequently, in 
so far as local possibilities acquire a global dimension, our moral 
responsibility is revealed as encompassing a far greater field of 
inclusiveness. The moral question must, therefore, evolve into the 
following: Is my action part of a complex of actions of different agents, 
organised by public rules, which taken together affect others? (Arendt, 
1971; Parfit, 1984, § 28-29; Hardin, 1999). Hence the concept of global 
agency with its correlate of negligence becomes a crucial component of 
any international political theory.
Consequentialist cosmopolitanism includes the consideration of both 
sides of the equation of global ethical concern. Choice-makers, i.e., those 
who have the power to decide and carry out an action which produces 
consequences, are made responsible through a precise method of multiple 
accountability based on the capacity to influence the outcome. Choice- 
bearers, i.e., those who suffer the consequences of others’ actions, are, by 
contrast, identified as potentially vulnerable and consequently protected 
(Goodin, 1985b; Held, 2002). According to the normative ideal of 
impartiality, and in opposition to that of Hobbesian realism, a mechanism 
of congruence should be established between choice-makers and choice- 
bearers, in which the latter can impose on the former a duty of 
accountability concerning their actions. Since there can be multiple agents 
on both sides, a ethical-political theory based on impartiality cannot in fact 
be complete when it fails to identify clearly the moral position of every 
agent involved in the situation under scrutiny. In presenting a 
comprehensive reading of the issue of international agency as unfolded on 
several layers of political action, consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
challenges its rivals by offering a consistent version of inter-linked 
political responsibilities and social vulnerabilities (O'Neill, 1996, 131-2; 
2001).
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The politically most relevant element of the consequentialist 
cosmopolitan conception of moral agency is its insistence on the institution 
of cosmopolitan citizenship (Pogge, 1992; Held, 1995; Goodin, 1996a; 
Sen, 1996; Linklater, 1998a; Hutchings & Dannreuther, 1999; Dower & 
Williams, 2002; Sassen, 2002). It is through this new interpretation of the 
meaning of political membership that a comprehensive understanding of 
political responsibility can be consistently associated with social 
vulnerability. The ideaLof political responsibility can only be fully realised 
through the conceptualisation of an all-inclusive system of political 
membership, which, avoiding exclusion, imposes on each political agent 
his/her right burden of responsibilities, or alternatively alleviates his/her 
from the condition of social vulnerability. Once some basic social and 
political entitlements are identified, the agent, in the position to influence 
the outcome (in terms of choice possibilities) concerning the potentially 
vulnerable needs in fact to be made responsible, and in case of failure to 
comply, needs to be sanctioned proportionately. This legal setting, though, 
has to be complemented by a multi-layered political system which enables 
responsibilities to be enforced through a net of intermingled and subsidiary 
duties.
In this way, the issue of global moral agency also directly informs 
the second significant characteristic of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, 
namely that concerning multi-layered dimensionality. As individual and 
social existence is increasingly spread over a number of different domains, 
a common social framework is needed to bring together this diffusion of 
engagement through an updated conception of multilevel political agency. 
Failing such a framework, the social and political existence of individuals 
would be fragmented and suffering from exclusion, and therefore any 
pursuit of a good life would most likely be self-defeating. Once the 
necessity of the recognition of a multiple and yet integrated political action 
is accepted, then the issue of their jurisdictional equilibrium arises. 
Consequentialist cosmopolitanism claims, as one of its virtues, the capacity 
to balance properly three levels of analysis (individual, state, world), 
through the use of a single principle of justice. In this, the normative 
content of both the individual level and the state level is consistently
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integrated with the third level of the global. The ground on which an 
extension of the principle of welfare promotion from the national to the 
international level can be consistently implemented in a consequentialist 
way is the idea of governmental institutions as benefit providers. It is on 
this account that a major aspect of the present thesis consists in the study of 
the evolution of this idea, which in this tradition of thought has been 
originally proposed by David Hume and subsequently improved by 
classical utilitarians. Having set out the challenges that the theory of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism needs to address in order to prove its 
validity, it is now time to introduce the basics of the theory itself, 
beginning with its utilitarian origins.
Utilitarianism, consequentialism, and cosmopolitanism
The normative theory underpinning the present proposal consists in a 
combination of an ethical theory of choice-based consequentialism and a 
political theory of cosmopolitanism. In this section, a brief presentation of 
each of these two components is offered, while a full presentation will be 
outlined in chapters IV and V. Before this, however, a genealogical note is 
due in order to explain the juxtaposition, perhaps curious, of utilitarianism 
and consequentialism.
When this research began several years ago it was intended as an 
investigation of the field of international utilitarianism. However, close 
study revealed the limitations of utilitarian theory, and in particular its 
inappropriateness as a theory of international ethics. These limitations do 
not, though, entirely coincide with the objections to utilitarianism 
vehemently formulated over the last forty years, i.e., objections grounded 
on the issues of ends, justice and personality (Rawls, 1971; Williams, 
1973; Nagel, 1980; Williams, 1981; Scheffier, 1982)1^. I maintain that in 
fact these traditional objections address only the symptoms of a deeper 
disease. The more profound limitations of utilitarianism are those affecting 
any attempt to perform interpersonal comparisons of utility. Once this fact
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is acknowledged, the central aggregative (sum-ranking) principle of 
utilitarianism dissolves, but at the same time effective and liberal responses 
to the oft-repeated objections mentioned above become possible.
Although they require that a considerable part of the utilitarian 
paradigm be abandoned, the limitations of interpersonal comparison do not 
in fact rule out the salvation of what remains of the theory in terms of 
universalist and inclusive consequentialism. Moreover, this study reveals 
that what was considered to be an inescapable stumbling block for 
international utilitarianism—i.e., its incapacity to accommodate diverse 
levels of political action because of its straightforward and aggregative 
universalism—is precisely that which shows up a major strength of 
consequentialism; namely its promotion of democratic participation and 
multilayered inclusion. In order to appreciate fully the nuances of the 
present consequentialist argument as applied to the international domain, it 
is, however, necessary to understand its theoretical and historical origins, 
which can be found principally in the international utilitarian thinking.
This suffices for now to explain why the first part of the thesis is 
devoted to the study of current and past proposals of international 
utilitarianism, whereas the second portion presents a different and arguably 
more defensible theory of consequentialism. In line with this, I now present 
utilitarianism in its general form, and in so doing also render its 
consequentialist component understandable. From there, the case is 
developed for the independence and superiority of consequentialism over 
utilitarianism with respect to field of international ethics.
Utilitarianism is traditionally summarised in the following three 
principal features: consequentialism, welfarism, and sum-ranking (Sen, 
1979; Sen & Williams, 1982; Allison, 1990, § 1; Scarre, 1996)1^. Hardin 
offers a useful and general working definition of utilitarianism: “the moral 
theory that judges the goodness of outcomes—and therefore the rightness 
of actions insofar as they affect outcomes—by the degree to which they
For a presentation of the utilitarian response to traditional criticisms see; (Rescher, 
1966; Griffin, 1982; Kagan, 1987, 1989; Allison, 1990; Goodin, 1990a, 1995).
For tracking the recent chronological development of utilitarian studies, refer to 
(Brock, 1973; Griffin, 1982; Barrow, 1991; Scarre, 1996).
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secure the greatest benefit to all concerned” (Hardin, 1988, introd: XV). 
Accordingly, a course of action has to be chosen on the basis of likely 
consequences, and the consequences assessed in terms of the resulting 
aggregate well-being of all involved agents. Consequently, the agents’ 
responsibility is understood in terms of the agents’ capacity to influence 
the outcome of any given situation in terms of utility promotion. In order 
to understand this formulation better, however, a further explanation of 
each of the three components is due.
The first component, consequentialism, consists in the normative 
view affirming that “whatever values an individual or institutional agent 
adopts, the proper response to those values is to promote them” (Pettit, 
1993b, 19). Such a view which prioritises the good over the right is 
traditionally opposed to those theories that give precedence to motives or a 
priori laws, as the typical classic deontological maxims Fiat justitia, pereat 
mundus or Fiat justitia, mat caelum. Welfarism is a theory of the good that 
identifies utility with the well-being of the agent. Originally, the notion of 
utility was intended in a purely hedonistic way, i.e., as a balance of 
pleasure and pain (Bentham, 1781 [1988]; Mill, 1861 [1962]). A more 
comprehensive version of well-being is currently preferred; in this view the 
satisfaction of individual preferences is supposed to be the best indicator of 
the well-being of each individual and thus constitutes the good to be 
pursued (Brandt, 1979; Harsanyi, 1986; Brandt, 1992; Goodin, 1995). 
Finally, the sum-ranking principle affirms that it is possible to aggregate in 
a cardinal order every individual’s utility into an overall utility total, 
insofar as interpersonal comparisons of utilities are, at least, reasonable. 
Underpinning this is an isomorphic model of individualism based on the 
similarity postulate, according to which different utility functions are 
grounded on the same inner psychological laws (Harsanyi, 1955).
A straightforward extension of this basic formulation of 
utilitarianism to the international domain consists in the application of 
these three principles to states rather then individuals. In doing this each 
country is treated equally as a vessel of utility, which has to be calculated 
in aggregate terms regardless of national boundaries. While in the case of 
the individual, such a strategy of disregarding boundaries leads to the
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critique about the separateness of persons raised by Rawls and Williams, in 
the case of state the utilitarian reasoning would be more acceptable insofar 
as the ethical relevancy of national boundaries is more contested (Roemer, 
1993, 352-3). Despite being of some interest, this straight international 
utilitarianism is not however viable. The reasons for this are discussed at 
length in chapters IV and V, here I will just mention that although its 
across-the-bound equality offers a promising description of largely 
arbitrary national boundaries, such direct extension also exacerbates the 
problem of interpersonal comparison of utility, and in so doing fails on the 
side of guaranteeing the inclusion of all single individuals. When trade-offs 
of utility are allowed, the issue of moral agency is in fact altogether 
downgraded, in that the concept of vulnerability becomes subject to 
interpretation and consequently the inviolability of the individuality of 
persons is transgressed. In allowing no substantial respect to be shown for 
agency, both individual and collective, straight international utilitarianism 
denies the normative necessity for the inclusion of all the agents in a 
universal and multilevel political constituency. In so condemning 
straightforward versions of utilitarianism to failure, these crucial inclusion- 
related requirements of international political theory demand the evolution 
of the utilitarian paradigm into a more viable version of non-exclusionary 
consequentialism ^  ^ .
In order to respond consistently to the challenges of international 
ethics in terms of exclusion, this thesis proposes a version of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism, which is centred on the individual 
capacity for choice and thus fosters a universal and yet multilayered 
principle of political justice. While the rest of the thesis, and especially 
chapters IV and V, is devoted to explaining in detail the particulars of this 
proposal, here it suffices to note that with this strategy, consequentialist
The move from utilitarianism to consequentialism for epistemological reasons is 
contested by Brink who argues that it is unnecessary in that utilitarianism could still 
remain utilitarianism even when the ‘well-motivated’ objection on the reliability of 
interpersonal comparison is accepted. In this istance, utilitarianism would be undermined, 
in fact, on its function o f decision procedure, but it could still be a viable standard or 
criterion of rightness (Brink, 1986,417 n.l; 1989, § 9). I reject such a position on the 
ground of the radical change that the renunciation of using interpersonal utility 
comparison imposes in terms of impossibility of cardinal utility aggregation.
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cosmopolitanism aims to dispute a number of competing theories. At the 
ethical level, beyond contesting utilitarianism, it contests theories of 
autonomy, contractarianism, and the capability approach on different 
grounds by referring to consequentialist and epistemological 
considerations. At the political level, it challenges interaction-dependent 
theories of political justice, both communitarian and cosmopolitan, for 
their limited capacity of political inclusion, as introduced in the previous 
sections. Against communitarian theories such as nationalism and realism, 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism argues that the scope (not only the form) 
of justice should be universal as no discrimination is justified when 
considering the ultimate entitlement of every citizen to control his destiny. 
Conversely, in opposition to interaction-dependent versions of 
cosmopolitanism, the present proposal advocates the combination of 
moderate, institutional, co-operativist, and federal components as elements 
necessary to envisage an inclusive system of global democracy. This 
implies, consequently, the rejection of the following contrasting claims: a) 
only global principles of justice are acceptable, b) global principles of 
justice consist in merely ethical precepts, c) the individual represents the 
primary agent of justice, d) club-based multilateralism, through global 
governance, constitutes a legitimate form of cosmopolitan d e m o c r a c y  ^  8
Conclusions
In this chapter the principal boundaries of the research to be 
undertaken have been drawn. On the one hand, the political issue of 
international exclusion has been identified both in its empirical aspects and 
in its normative fundaments, and on the other hand, an alternative political 
direction within the paradigm of consequentialist cosmopolitanism has 
been sketched out. In the remaining chapters, a more detailed presentation 
of the consequentialist cosmopolitanism theory of international justice will 
be presented. In chapter IV and V the ethical-political and the institutional- 
international aspects of the proposal will be exposed, followed in chapter
For introductory surveys on cosmopolitanism see (Jones, 1999; Scheffler, 1999;
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VI and VII by the analyses of two case studies concerning the issue of 
transnational citizenship. Through them, this thesis aims to make a 
consistent, normative case in defence of a world political system able to 
escape the evil of exclusion. In order to present the argument in its clearest 
form, it is however necessary to step back for a moment and examine the 
first attempts and subsequent refinements of international consequentialist 
arguments formulated over the last two hundreds years. To that end, the 
next chapter takes a close look at the international rationales of classical 
utilitarianism.
Caney, 2001; Archibugi, 2004).
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Classical International Utilitarianism
“It is just that I should do aU the good in my 
power. Does any person in distress apply to me for 
relief? It is my duty to grant it, and I commit a breach 
of duty in refusing. If this principle be not of universal 
application, it is because, in conferring a benefit upon 
an individual, I may in some instances inflict an injury 
of superior magnitude upon myself or society” 
(Godwin, 1793, II, II: 125)
The first consequentialist arguments applied to international relations 
were elaborated in the 19*’’ century in connection with the rise of utilitarian 
thought. Despite the fact that a teleological approach to ethics and politics 
was developed much earlier in Greek philosophy, the first clear and 
deliberate attempt to deploy universalist, goal-based arguments specifically 
intended to tackle issues pertaining to the sphere of international relations 
occurred only at the beginning of the 1800s. While Kant’s cosmopolitan 
thought was rapidly gaining ground in continental Europe (Brown et al, 
2002), in the Anglo-Saxon world the so-called radicals were offering a 
comprehensive but alternative conception of international politics.
Although the classical utilitarians’ outlook was universaliStic and all- 
inclusive in principle, international relations were nonetheless not high on 
their agenda: their central concerns were private morality and public 
domestic ethics. From Bentham to Sidgwick, the major political interest 
was on the domestic organisation of society, which included both rules of
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personal conduct and a collective legal framework. Underlying this narrow 
focus was the utilitarians’ belief in the ideal of the division of political 
work. Within this division, depending on the socio-political circumstances, 
an indirect concentration on the local could result in the maximisation of 
the overall world outcome. Accordingly, the utilitarians elaborated a 
sophisticated theory on the contingent relation between the scope of the 
utility principle and that of the institutions within which it was applied, 
thus, while fostering a universalist interpretation of the principle of utility 
(even to the extent of including non-human species), Bentham was 
nonetheless firm, for instance, in maintaining that the social fact of the 
habit of obedience, upon which the application of the utility principle 
depended, was still very much anchored to the domestic dimension, and 
thus the correlate institutional framework of state sovereignty. Thus, an 
underpinning assumption of the utilitarians’ rationale held that within the 
international political constellation of their time, the best way to maximise 
universal utility W2is to concentrate primarily on domestic governmental 
policies.
In practice, their prescriptions supported an international system 
based on fairly independent sovereign states, which in being reciprocally 
exclusive generated an environment of outranking. Classical utilitarians did 
undoubtedly propose a number of political reforms, such as the 
codification of international law, the establishment of an international 
court, publicising foreign negotiations, and new machinery for 
international treaties, which were certainly in the right direction for the 
démocratisation of international relations. And even more importantly, 
they elaborated a method for applying consequentialist ethics to 
international relations based on the balancing of universal principles and 
social theory which is still viable. However, their works cannot be 
considered fully satisfactory, for the overall outcome of the international 
system they envisaged would arguably be sub-optimal by their own 
measure. The lack of multilevel political participation leading to would-be 
international political institutions denied the possibility for each individual 
to pursue fully his or her own well-being and consequently denied the 
promotion of the general well-being. While the intensity of international
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interaction during the 19*** century was definitely not equal to that of the 
current level, and therefore the share of individual well-being dependent on 
international or global phenomena was undoubtedly less significant than 
today, the situation was nevertheless not one of fully self-contained 
communities^^. A truly consistent consequentialist prescription would have 
indicated an enlargement of the degree of political participation to the 
international domain. And yet, that Sidgwick’s writings do propose a few 
steps in this direction is an indication of the stark divergence from the 
Hobbesian state tradition that classical utilitarian thought represents. It is 
for this reason that an understanding of such a thought is still crucial to any 
understanding of consequentialist international ethics today.
The survey of classical international utilitarianism presented in this 
chapter does not fully consider any proto-utlitiarians. However, despite the 
fundamental heterogeneity of their thought to the rest of the paradigm 
analysed here, a brief note is dedicated to David Hume and William 
Godwin, since their formulations anticipated two central political ideas 
subsequently developed in 19^ ’’ century utilitarianism: a consequentialist 
interpretation of the state and a universalistic approach to duties. Following 
this note, the core survey then begins with the examination of Jeremy 
Bentham’s writing on international law, as he is recognised as the father of 
the utilitarian tradition. After passing through James Mill, John Austin, 
and John Stuart Mill, the survey concludes with Henry Sidgwick’s works. 
As it is intended as a historical-theoretical introduction to the following 
chapters dedicated to contemporary international issues, this chronological 
survey is highly selective in that only those arguments are discussed that 
are relevant for the development of a consequentialist international 
argument as applied to the issue of democratic inclusion. The lack of any 
such review of contemporary utilitarians’ progenitors in the literature^O has 
perhaps contributed to the almost monadic diffusion of the diverse research 
projects currently conducted by utilitarian scholars. In filling this gap a bit, 
this chapter aims to elucidate the slow emergence and progressive
But, even if  this had been the case, still a duty to attempt to establish a relation could 
have been envisaged, as explained in chapter I.
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refinement of the arguments on which contemporary utilitarians draw. 
Only thus can such reasoning be understood and the rest of the thesis be 
equipped with a consolidated method and coherent principles to tackle the 
new dilemmas of global justice.
The inheritance of two ancestors
The relationship^ between the universalist principle of utility 
maximisation and its historical implementation through political 
institutions represents a key crux for the utilitarian theory of political 
justice, and in particular for its application to the international domain. As 
mentioned, classical utilitarians also elaborated on this relationship for 
what concerns international affairs. However, it was David Hume and 
William Godwin who first investigated and developed the two components 
of this relationship. While Hume was masterly in clarifying the notion of 
state as welfare provider, Godwin provided a clear-cut formulation of the 
universal attributes of the principle of utility. Despite the limits of their 
thought, an understanding of these two ancestors is fundamental to 
grasping the entire development of the utilitarian theory up to our days.
David Hume’s theory of the formation and preservation of the 
legitimacy of the state constitutes a particularly significant component of 
the proto-utilitarian tradition (Lecaldano, 1991; P. Kelly, 2003a; Rosen, 
2003, § 3)21. In opposition to the social contract stance, Hume defends a 
representation of the state according to which its ultimate legitimacy rests 
on its social performance in terms of the provision of benefits enjoyed by 
citizens. His analysis of the political domain begins with the enquiry on the 
origin of justice. For Hume this coincides with the artificial virtue 
originating from the special situation in which human beings find 
themselves, the ‘circumstances of justice’. Selfishness and limited 
generosity together with scarce natural resources—both in terms of goods 
and personal capacities—conduct individuals to the recognition of the
29 A few pages are dedicated to the classical utilitarianism in (Ellis, 1992).
21 For a collection o f critical assessments and further references see (Tweyman, 1995).
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importance of reciprocal covenants, which provide general advantages 
such as increased force, ability and security. Following from this 
recognition are principles—including principles of property, rights and 
obligation—that create distinction and stability in possession. Finally, the 
concept of justice becomes linked to that of virtue as moral approbation 
through the creation of general rules motivated by sympathy with public 
interest (Hume, 1740 [1973], III, II: II).
Such social development motivated by a combination of prudence 
and partial benevolence, however, is not sufficient for the formation of 
stable societal organisations. Because human beings are naturally inclined 
to prefer present over distant and remote interests, a further institutional 
modification of the social circumstances is needed. In order to compensate 
for the natural deficiencies concerning the limited scope of our sentiments, 
the observance of the law of justice needs to be made our nearest interest 
through the establishment of political and judiciary institutions. This 
completes the process of the formation of a political community. It is this 
mechanism, turning on the mutual interest of individuals in respecting a 
scheme of public rules of justice that forms the core idea of Hume’s 
interpretation of government in terms of benefits provided to individuals. 
And it is one of utmost significance to the following utilitarian tradition, 
for it allows for a fimdamentally instrumental interpretation of political 
institutions, which remain thus open to revision and expansion (Hume, 
1740 [1973], III, II: VII and VIII; 1748 [1870]; 1751 [1979], V)22.
Godwin is the second major precursor of the utilitarian school with 
special relevance to international issues. His theory of universal duties 
represents a powerful point of reference for many authors inside and
22 The same explanatory model applies to the international level, according to Hume, 
though here the circumstances are different and consequently the level o f justice only 
partially attained. The underlying assumption consists in the recognition that the moral 
capacity o f individuals to reason beyond their present interests is limited. Single agents 
can extend their perspective to include the social relations within a determined 
community, but they are not able to embrace the whole of mankind. Since a world 
government is not thus feasible, a much thinner kind of rule is left at the level o f interstate 
relationships: the law o f nations, which grants a great degree o f discretion to national 
governments (Hume, 1740 [1973], III, II: XI; 1751 [1979], IV). Hence, the traditional 
concept o f the balance o f power plays a significant role as conflict mediator in the
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outside this tradition, in so far as it informs notions of the scope of the 
application of the principle of utility, and consequently the highly 
controversial concept of special relations. Godwin’s respect for the 
ultimate principle of the maximisation of utility stands out as a crystalline 
example of a rigorous application of a universal maxim in a non- 
discriminatory manner. His well-known discussion on the magic in the 
pronoun ‘my’, spun out through the example of the archbishop Fenelon 
and his chambermaid, leads to the conclusion that no special relation can 
legitimately impede the discharge of the universal duty to promote the 
general happiness of human beings. No partner, companion, neighbour or 
fellow-citizen has the right of precedence over the possibility of generating 
a greater quantity of utility to society. No exceptions are allowed, even “if 
the extraordinary case should occur in which I can promote the general 
good by my death, more than by my life, justice requires that I should be 
content to die” (Godwin, 1793, II, II: 140). Godwin arrives at other radical 
conclusions, such as the following:
“In the same manner as my property, I hold my person as 
a trust in behalf of mankind. I am bound to employ my 
talents, my understanding, my strength and my time for 
the production of the greatest quantity of general good.
Such are the declarations of justice, so great is the extent 
of my duty” (Godwin, 1793, II, II: 165).
To conclude this note, differing though they do, Godwin’s arguments 
about universality and Hume’s rationale on the welfare character of the 
state represent the starting points for the analysis of the utilitarian school of 
the 19^  ^ century. Without these two thinkers, those studied in the rest of 
this chapter would have most likely argued from a very different 
perspective.
interstate system according to Hume’s interpretation (Hume, 1752 [1870]; Kratochwil, 
1981; Glossop, 1984; Kratochwil, 1989, § 4).
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The limits of international law; Bentham, J. Mill, and Austin
Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and John Austin represent the three 
principal authors of classical international utilitarianism in the first half of 
the 19^ ’’ century. In them, political theory is intermingled with a strong 
expertise in jurisprudence, producing a careful analysis of the limits of 
international law and of its potential to evolve through political action. 
While they account for the deficient legal nature of international norms in 
reference to the lack of positivistic legitimacy and habit of obedience, they 
are simultaneously sensitive to the requirement of the universal principle of 
utility in terms of world-wide welfare promotion. Rather than a world 
government, they envisage specific international reforms that would 
contribute toward the development of peaceful and democratic interstate 
relationships, such as the codification of international law or the 
establishment of an international court of justice. If this can be considered 
a definite step forward toward more egalitarian and inclusive forms of 
international democracy, the other side of their theories—the positivistic 
account of legal theory—has had a strong influence on the legitimisation of 
a system of independent and sovereign states, with its correlate of 
international exclusion, that this thesis aims to dispute. Hence, the 
ambivalent verdict of this critical examination of these three authors: while 
this thesis accepts a number of their arguments, it refuses the remainder.
Jeremy Bentham’s crucial function in the trajectory being outlined 
resides in formulating the principal elements of the classical utilitarian 
paradigm of international justice^^. Combining universal utilitarian 
prescriptions with the recognition of the specific historical characteristics 
of the international domain, he tackles a number of crucial issues for 
international consequentialism, including the relation between the criterion 
of rightness and sociological analysis, the multilevel character of the
Bentham’s writings on international issues consist principally in the four uncompleted 
manuscripts written between 1786 and 1789, and published only in 1843 under the title 
Principles o f  International Law (Bentham, 1843 [1962]). But see also (Bentham, 1786; 
1793 [1962], 417-8; 1810, 1817a, 1817b, 1820-1822 [1995], 1830 [1983]). They played 
an important role within the long-standing debate on peace project (Bentham, 1811-1830 
[1998], II, X, 1,4; Colombos, 1927; Kayser, 1932, 66-7; Schwarzenberger, 1948; Conway, 
1987,1989, 1990; Archibugi & Voltaggio, 1991; Heater, 1996; Van den Dungen, 2000).
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jurisprudential system, and the different strategy to be deployed to attain 
democratic improvements at the international level. Assuming a 
fundamentally cosmopolitan perspective, Bentham reinterprets the 
functions of the state both internally and externally and proceeds to design 
a comprehensive political system in which the well-being of the individual 
represents the core value. Issues such as the harmonisation between 
national and universal interests, the stipulation of international principles 
of justice, the codification of the international law, and the establishment of 
an international court all form the specific content of his revolutionary 
analysis of international morality.
The fundaments of Bentham’s theory of justice, at both the domestic 
and international level, have a clear universalistic character in terms of 
ultimate validity and scope, i.e., in order to be accepted, any principle, 
must be universalizable and all-inclusive. Concepts such as the two 
sovereign masters of human beings (Bentham, 1781 [1988], I: 1), the 
impartiality of the legislator, and the jurisprudential model shaped on 
different levels (world, national, provincial and local), are all claimed to be 
valid for all nations (Bentham, 1781 [1988], XVI: 60; 1811-1830 [1998]; 
Twining, 2000, 18). Nonetheless, the fact that these first principles are 
universalistic does not exclude the possibility of national governance. The 
scope of political responsibility is, in fact, decided according to an 
algorithm that combines universal principles with historical circumstances, 
including social habits and the extent of individual capacity for action. 
Consequently, social and territorial limitations (families, states, and other 
particularistic entities) are envisaged, but admitted solely on contingent 
and strategic grounds. For Bentham, the universal maximisation of utility 
is in fact most likely to occur via a regulated division of the moral work 
based on the assumption that the greatest well-being is attainable only 
when everyone concentrates on the sphere of action in which he is more
effective24. From here, Bentham’s twofold political strategy aims to
Lyons interprets Bentham’s domestic political theory in a slightly different way 
(Lyons, 1973). He suggests that the basic principle is not universalistic in kind, but in the 
interest o f the governed. I disagree, since I think a universalistic second order principle
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formulate the appropriate intermediate prescriptions through the 
amalgamation of the two strands of his theory, expository and censorial 
jurisprudence, which study respectively the current and the prescribed 
forms of public norms.
Bentham’s expository analysis of morals and legislation begins with 
a positivistic account of sanction-based theories of obligation. Such a 
obligation is where the universalistic principle of utility combines with the 
historical circumstances of the social fact of the habit of obedience, which 
limits the scope of institutional justice. To have a legal obligation means, 
according to Bentham, being under an obligation which is sanctioned by 
appropriate punishment for non-compliance. Thus the existence of 
institutionalised means of enforcement is essential for the effectiveness of 
the law and consequently for its legitimacy, for it creates stable 
expectations in the citizens, which in turn represent a fundamental source 
of utility. In this sense, law intended as a set of authoritative sovereign 
commands derives its legitimacy from the fact of being issued by a 
publicly recognised body which enjoys the habit of obedience of his 
citizens. Without such a habit of obedience spread widely among the 
constituency, public rules cannot properly be called laws. The social fact of 
the habit of obedience is thus central to the expository component of 
Bentham’s theory of legislation, both at the national and international level 
(P. Kelly, 2003b, 312-5).
Running parallel to this expository side, is the other component of 
Bentham’s theory of morals and legislation: his censorial jurisprudence. 
Following Hume’s perspective on government as benefit-provider 
(Bentham, 1776 [1977], I: 439 ff), Bentham argues in favour of 
constitutional democracy and popular sovereignty on the grounds of the 
principle of the maximum of happiness. Bentham’s argument rests on the 
observation that the best outcome, with the minimum of resistance is 
achieved only in those cases in which personal interests are pursued within 
the scope of general interests. Endeavouring to achieve her own happiness, 
each person will encounter the least resistance when the pursuit of her own
can sustain a parochial first order principle. For other points o f view on this see
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personal happiness overlaps with that of others engaged in a similar task, 
for the endeavour of each assists that of all. “Each particular interest is 
opposed by those and those only, by whom it is regarded as adverse to their 
own” (Bentham, UC xxxviii: 217, quoted in Rosen, 1983, 49-50). From 
this, a two-fold prescription follows concerning the domestic institutional 
design of the Benthamite project. On the one hand, a democratic 
representative government with a system of checks and balances is 
necessary to avoid sinister interests prevailing and to improve the public 
accountability of political institutions. On the other hand, however, a 
framework of individual rights should also be set, for these are recognised 
as the primary material condition of the interest formation and realisation 
necessary to maximise the pleasure of his own citizens (Kelly, 1990).
On these grounds, Bentham considers the possibilities and the limits 
of expanding his theory to the international level. While within the English 
positivist tradition Bentham can be considered one of the most committed 
scholar to a cosmopolitan perspective, insofar as he is particularly aware of 
the limits of the theory of the national legal system (Rosen, 1983, XI, II: 
203-206; Twining, 2000, 16 and 47), he is also aware of the sociological 
difficulties that arise in enlarging his theory to the international domain. 
Bentham sets out a clear method and the political principles for applying 
his utilitarian theory of municipal law to the international domain. He 
holds that were a world citizen in charge of drafting a set of international 
norms, he should aim at “the common and equal utility of all nations”, i.e., 
“the most extended well-being of all the nations on the earth” (Bentham, 
1843 [1962], 537-8). However, a major problem at the international level 
consists in the lack of the habit of obedience, which disqualifies 
international law as law properly called. Since these international laws are 
not sanctioned, they are not effective and therefore they do not produce 
either expectations or utility. Given these circumstances, Bentham’s 
strategy is to differentiate two applicative levels. While his preference 
remains for a concentration on the national domain as this was likely to be 
the most conducive path to the maximisation of the general well-being of
(Rosenblum, 1978; Hart, 1982; Rosen, 1983; Fagiani, 1990; Parekh, 1993b).
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mankind, he acknowledges that an interest for international harmonisation 
nonetheless exists. Much as the state needs to co-ordinate the actions of 
individuals at the domestic level, so, from the hypothetical point of view of 
a world governor, a form of co-ordination among states is necessary at the 
international level. In holding to the centrality of the nation-state, 
Bentham’s model is not immediately cosmopolitan, but it is so in the 
ultimate principle for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, 
without any limitation.
Bentham’s entire reasoning leads only toward a démocratisation of 
foreign policy. A world government is simply not capable of increasing the 
overall habit of obedience and so unable to secure citizens’ expectations. 
Bentham’s international model is one of free trade driven by citizens’ 
interests25; every state able to have commercial and political relations with 
all other states in a pacific and beneficial environment. Thus, instead of a 
world government, a number of international reforms are envisaged that, 
albeit more moderate, still represent an enormous step toward international 
democracy. That many of these reforms have been enacted gives evidence 
of Bentham’s seminal influence. First of all, Bentham was keen to 
encourage an international codification of law (Bentham, 1843 [1962], § 1; 
Janis, 1984) to be coupled by the establishment of a permanent 
international tribunal (Bentham, 1843 [1962], 545), which could prove 
essential to stimulating an international habit of obedience. Also, he 
planted the idea of publicly recognised treaties and clear international 
rules, as embedded in a transparent and public diplomatic politics 
characterised by the prohibition of secret negotiation and the guarantee of 
freedom of press (Bentham, 1843 [1962], 558-60). Underpinning this 
vision is the encouragement toward a flourishing of a brotherhood of 
feeling among European countries (Bentham, 1843 [1962], 552; Baumgart, 
1952,159) under the assumption that
It seems, subsequently, fair to include international Benthamite theory within the 
diffusive model o f international political relations, in so far as both the pyramidal model 
in which only the states counts is rejected, and full cosmopolitan politics is not yet 
envisaged (Archibugi & Voltaggio, 1991,165-73).
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“there is no nation that has any points to gain to the 
prejudice of any other. Between the interests of nations, 
there is nowhere any real conflict: if they appear 
repugnant anywhere, it is only in proportion as they are 
misunderstood” (Bentham, 1843 [1962], 559).
According to Bentham, the major problems of international relations 
thus arise not from the lack of common interests, but rather from a weak 
integration, which does not allow recognition of occasions for possible co­
operation. Such an oversight produces a lack of institutional instruments 
that could boost the habit of obedience and consequently the general well­
being. While it is aware of the sociological limits constraining any 
proposal for international ethics, Bentham’s proposal thus aims to 
formulate means to advance the structuring of international political rules 
and institutions to the effect of promoting welfare from a universal point of 
view.
James Mill’s elaboration tends in the same direction. Mill’s most 
significant writings on international issues consist of two articles published 
in 1825, Law o f Nations and Colony, plus a number of essays on war and 
peace26. In these, he examines the nature of international law in terms of 
sanctions provided by global public opinion and concludes with the need 
for a universal codification of law and the establishment of an international 
court. Mill’s relevance for the present study rests on his advancement of 
the understanding of the relation between universal principles and 
historical forms of international jurisprudence, and in his clear support for 
campaigns spreading international democratic sentiments as part of a 
continuous process toward the consolidation of a universal and inclusive 
political constituency.
Mill’s analysis of the law of nations depends on his understanding of 
law as constituted from three elements: command, authority, and sanction 
(Mill, 1825 [1967]-b). This juspositivistic approach, which Mill takes up 
from Bentham and which is developed later by John Austin, denies a 
proper juridical status to the current international law on the ground that a
26 See (Mill, 1807, 1813, 1814, 1816, 1825 [1967]-c, 1825 [1967]-a) and (Yasukawa, 
1991).
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superior authority, command, and sanction are missing at this level. 
However, a set of norms is nonetheless commonly respected in the 
relations among states. These norms, which resemble court ceremony or 
the etiquette of polished society, can be acknowledged as a law of states 
concerning the whole of mankind and one establishing the recognition of 
the rights of national interests (Mill, 1825 [1967]-c, 5). The deficiency of 
this normative system is undoubtedly its weak capacity to sanction the 
violation of rule. Only a popular sanction is in fact possible, since, due to 
the absence of any associative link among states, no other legitimate force 
is recognised. Mill locates the power of public sanctioning in the 
deployment of a number of social tools like approbation, praise and blame, 
and sees these as stemming from a stable association of ideas concerning 
action, other’s favourable sentiments, and possible benefits. Thus, as 
popular sanction represents the only public moral force able to integrate the 
law in areas such as international relations which remain outside the reach 
of legal institutions, the promotion of education and civic formation as 
means to influence international outcomes is shown to be a substantial 
portion of the political commitment of classical utilitarians^^.
Like Bentham, Mill also believed popular sanction is more effective 
when it is supported by well-defined and certain rules. Just as national 
codes and tribunals are fundamental to canvassing and reinforcing this 
attitude at the domestic level, so is it necessary to concentrate on such 
institutions to improve the efficacy of popular sanction at the international 
level. The first step in this direction consists in the allocation of rights 
according to a cosmopolitan perspective: “what would it be desirable, for 
the good of mankind upon the whole, that the several nations should
This reasoning is based on the belief that it is possible to stimulate a causal association 
of ideas related to sanction, which can increase the likelihood o f a correct behaviour. In 
Mill’s opinion, democratic countries are the most conducive to fostering such a forma 
mentis, in so far as they offer a roughly egalitarian context in which such an association 
can sediment and later be applied to the international level. In fact, only where an overall 
social parity among individuals exists, can the individual reasonably expect not to be 
harmed, provided he abstains from harming others. In such a social environment, 
consequently, he will be interested in having a good reputation as public guarantee o f his 
correct behaviour. Conversely, where an agent is present who is so strong that he has no 
fear o f the whole community, then this kind of sanction can not be expected to have much
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respect as the rights of each other?” (Mill, 1825 [1967]-c, 10; Yasukawa, 
1991). Following the recognition of such entitlements, the tasks of drafting 
an international code and the institution of an international court become 
prominent; the ultimate objective remains the creation of a system that is 
‘the most advantageous for all’ and that is expected to have the maximal 
compliance rate. Drafting procedure should be in the charge of 
representatives of countries, but works in progress should be made public 
for two reasons: first, world intelligence from every comer of the globe 
would then be able to supply suggestions for improvements, and second, 
“the eyes of all the world being fixed upon the decision of every nation 
with respect to the code, every nation might be deterred by shame from 
objecting to any important article in it” (Mill, 1825 [1967]-c, 28). Since the 
sanction of public opinion will be the key tool of the new code, its maximal 
dissemination—i.e., not only at governmental but also at citizen’s level— 
from its drafting period on represents a fundamental step.
The code alone, however, is not sufficient for world utilitarian 
objectives. A super partes court is also necessary to examine carefully the 
conflicting cases and pass sentences in order to focus and inform world 
public opinion. Mill affirms that “a decision solemnly pronounced by such 
a tribunal, would always have a strong effect upon the imagination of men. 
It would fix, and concentrate the disapprobation of mankind. Such a 
tribunal would operate as a great school of political morality” (Mill, 1825 
[1967J-C, 31-2). To that end, James Mill proposes collecting the 
international sentences in a schoolbook in order to direct the minds of 
young generation toward the values embodied in the code. This interest in 
education, in particular the improvement and strengthening of 
cosmopolitan sentiments in mankind, forms a central political concern for 
Mill.
John Austin’s relevance to the present survey resides in his careful 
analysis of international law in imperativistic terms and in the international
effect. J.S. Mill develops a similar argument on the educative function o f representative 
government, as shown below.
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propositions deriving from this (Austin, 1832 [1965], 1861 [1885])28. 
Among the latter, of particular significance here are his proposal for a 
subtle division of ethical labour between the national and universal 
political spectrums, and his support for the interpretation of state in terms 
of national autonomy. As with Bentham, influence on utilitarian thought 
and beyond has been contradictory. While his universalistic framework has 
strongly informed the multi-layered framing of legal and political systems, 
his positivistic accounfof domestic law has been at the base of much of the 
doctrine of state sovereignty with its correlate of international exclusion.
Austin’s theory of jurisprudence should not be reduced to a simplistic 
form of positivistic imperativism where no space is reserved for any 
superior principle. The process through which rules become legally 
codified is, according to Austin, long and complex: they derive from 
positive morality, pass through judicial reformulation and are finally 
expressed as governmental commands. Even in this last passage, however, 
authoritative legitimacy is not supreme. Ultimate legitimacy can only be 
granted by the utilitarian principle, which serves as a criterion to judge 
both the whole system of norms as well as those “anomalous” single cases 
where the right to resist public rules is admitted in the name of the greater 
general happiness (Austin, 1832 [1965], 53-4; Agnelli, 1959; Cattaneo, 
1962, § IV).
International law, or the law of people, forms part of positive 
morality: a set of rules constituted by simple customs, produced by public 
opinion and sanctioned merely by social disapprobation (Austin, 1832 
[1965], 122-26). This categorisation of international law, which follows 
Bentham’s and James Mill’s ideas, represents a leitmotiv of classical 
utilitarianism that demands key consideration if one is to understand this 
tradition’s insistence on a codification of international law and the 
establishment of an international court of justice. If such steps—which for 
Austin must even include a sovereign power—are not taken, international 
law will remain not true law, but merely a form of comity, at its best 
sanctioned by a popular consent in the form of world public opinion. The
See also (Agnelli, 1959; Hart, 1961; Cattaneo, 1962; Hart, 1982).
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lack of an international magistracy and sovereign world government 
prevents the jus gentium from becoming positive law. Austin states this 
clearly:
“If the same system of International Law were adopted 
and fairly enforced by every nation, the system would 
answer the end of law, but, for want of a common 
superior, could not be called so with propriety. If courts 
common to all nations administered a common system of 
International Law, this system, though eminently 
effective, would still, for the same reason, be a moral 
system. The concurrence of any nation in the support of 
such tribunals, and its submission to their decrees, might 
at any moment be withdrawn without legal danger.” 
(Austin, 1861 [1885], 575).
Thus the law in force between nations cannot be considered legally 
positive, but rather a set of laws of courteous civility morally sanctioned 
only by the public opinion in the form of a threat of general hostility 
(Austin, 1832 [1965], 200). Furthermore, Austin reveals a more pessimistic 
attitude than the other scholars in this survey. He maintains that 
expectations on the current practical efficacy and the future developments 
of international law have to be downgraded, since in his view a court and a 
code without a superior power do not constitute sufficient elements for 
granting full legal status to such norms, and a supranational sovereign 
power is deemed to be not feasible.
Beyond his philosophy of international law, Austin’s work is also 
interesting on account of other arguments on international justice, among 
which a particularly relevant one concerns the distinction between 
utilitarianism as a theory of moral justification, i.e., criterion of rightness, 
and as a theory of moral deliberation, i.e., decision procedure. Most 
utilitarian arguments for the international political sphere rely on this 
distinction since they interpret the utilitarian principle as a second order 
indirect criterion of rightness. Austin makes clear that in order to attain the 
ultimate end of universal happiness, an indirect strategy that paradoxically 
privileges prima facie prudential actions is sometimes the most effective. 
With a touch of conservative wisdom, he reminds us that “even that
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enlarged benevolence which embraces humanity, may lead to actions 
extremely mischievous, unless guided by a perfectly sound judgement” 
(Austin, 1832 [1965], 110).
The consideration of the normative harmonisation of particular 
interests and general welfare here represents a turning point both in the 
domestic and in the international domain of justice. Austin’s reasoning 
begins with the societal case, in which the individual is deemed to be the 
best judge of his own interests and the person in the best position to satisfy 
them. Although the ultimate principle remains universalistic and 
impartialist, this observation generates a prima facie duty to pursue 
personal interest. In fact, since the general good is constituted by an 
aggregate of individual pleasures, “the principle of general utility requires 
imperatively the individual to usually care for his interests rather than for 
other’s ones” (Austin, 1832 [1965], 106). In acting differently, he would 
run the risk of neglecting things he knows better in order to pursue some 
other about which he knows less or even nothing.
“The principle of general utility does not demand of us, 
that we shall always or habitually intend the general good: 
though the principle of general utility does demand of us, 
that we shall never pursue our own peculiar good by 
means which are inconsistent with that paramount object” 
(Austin, 1832 [1965], 107).
At the international level, Austin’s reasoning is similarly dependent 
on the Benthamite assumption of the harmony between universal and 
particular interests, which generates the normative possibility of special 
duties and national priorities. Using an indirect strategy for the 
maximisation of world welfare, Austin succeeds in presenting a viable 
combination of universalistic and particularistic claims of justice, which 
remains cardinal for the utilitarian argument applied to international 
relations.
“The proper purpose or end for which a sovereign political 
government, or the purpose or end for which it ought to 
exist, is the greatest possible advancement of human 
happiness: Though, if it would duly accomplish its proper
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purpose or end, or advance as far as is possible the well­
being or good of mankind, it commonly must labour 
directly and particularly to advance as far as is possible the 
weal of its own community. The good of the universal 
society formed by mankind, is the aggregate good of the 
particular societies into which mankind is divided: just as 
the happiness of any of those societies is the aggregate 
happiness of its single or individual members. [...] It were 
easy to show, that the general and particular ends never or 
rarely conflict. [...] An enlightened regard for the 
common happiness of nations, implies an enlightened 
patriotism; [...] Now if it [a sovereign political 
government] would accomplish the general object, it 
commonly must labour directly to accomplish the 
particular: And it hardly will accomplish the particular 
object, unless it regard the general” (Austin, 1832 [1965],
294 and 295, note 28).
In this vein, despite the recognition of the universal utilitarian 
principle, Austin’s theory of jurisprudence also represents the continuation 
of a long tradition of positivistic interpretations of the authority of the state. 
Deriving from Hobbes, this reading of the legitimacy of government action 
has generated strong theoretical support for state autonomy not least on 
account of its powerful impingement on the traditional relevance of the 
divine sanction. However, it is also just this interpretation that has created 
the conditions allowing for a great degree of arbitrariety in national 
politics. A typical example of this is the solely state-based allocation of 
citizenship, which bears profound consequences for the concept of 
community and the correlated claims of aliens. Again, it must be noted that 
classical utilitarianism simultaneously produced a moral theory of 
universal duties and rights, and a legal conception of state sovereignty that 
generates the social phenomenon of international exclusion, which is at 
odds with such rights and duties.
The relevance of nationality: J. S.
While sharing a number of fundamental arguments with those of his 
utilitarian predecessors, John Stuart Mill’s analysis of international 
relations differs in that rather than an imperativistic conception of 
sovereignty, it recognises a greater role to the principle of nationality, or
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patriotisme éclairé. Despite his personal commitments in the colonies of 
the British Empire, Mill composed only a few texts on international justice, 
nonetheless, these few texts suffice to infer his normative ideas on 
interstate relations (Mill, 1859 [1991], 1861 [1991], 1870 [1991]). The 
writings concern a number of bitterly discussed issues such as the right of 
peoples to fi-ee development and the duty of non-intervention, the differing 
degrees of civilisation and the duty to paternalism, new machinery for 
international treaties, and the universal principle of the maximisation of the 
well-being of mankind. Throughout the decades following the publication 
of these texts and up to contemporary discussions on global justice. Mill’s 
impact on how these issues are thought has been decisive, though often 
criticised and equally misinterpreted.
The assumption on the normative primacy of human well-being 
forms a core value of Mill’s theory both at the domestic and at the 
international level of justice. The ultimate end, with reference to which all 
other things are desirable from a moral point of view, consists in an 
existence exempt as far as possible fi'om pain, and as rich as possible in 
enjoyments (Mill, 1861 [1962], 262). From this. Mill deduces the 
universalistic principles of utilitarianism, in the form of “the rules and 
precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such 
as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to 
all mankind” (Mill, 1861 [1962], 263). The best political strategy to allow 
for the individual to achieve such personal state is to grant them individual 
freedom of choice. The principle of freedom assumes, in fact, a particularly 
significant role in Mill’s argument about justice, in so far as it warrants 
political relevance to personal autonomy as well as to group self- 
determination (Cressati, 1988), At the individual level, the sole end for 
which mankind is warranted in interfering with the individual freedom is 
self-protection. For the rest, “over himself, over his own body and mind, 
the individual is sovereign” (Mill, 1859 [1962], 135). Consequently, a set 
of rights should be guaranteed to the individual to allow for autonomous 
flourishing within a society governed by a rule of law. This is best attained 
through a representative democracy.
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Following from this rationale on the value of individual freedom and 
in concert with Hume’s and Bentham’s arguments^^, Mill reasons that an 
independent representative democracy constitutes the institutional form 
that best satisfies domestically the general utilitarian requirement, provided 
a sufficient degree of social development is attained by the public^®. His 
case in support of representative democracy, which has become very 
influential in the utilitarian tradition, rests on a two-fold argument: the 
protective argument and the educative argument. The former, later tagged 
consumer sovereignty, maintains that since each man is considered to be 
the best judge of his own interests, he has to be placed in a position to 
guard his own rights and interests through freely appointing his rulers. 
Looked at in its negative contours, this principle affirms then that since, no 
matter how well-intentioned they could be, government and society usually 
do not know better than the individual what is in his interest, he has to keep 
the deliberative power with him as much as possible. The educative 
argument holds that political participation generates civic education, which 
in turn can foster an ‘interest in the common good’ll. Mill’s support for 
active inclusion in the democratic system is thus grounded on the 
recognition of the beneficial effects that a democratic government would 
produce when embedded in a national context. Democratic participation 
has to be valued insofar as it promotes the well-being of society in two 
ways: it secures the interests of all citizens by resisting exclusion, and it 
stimulates a better and higher national character (Thompson, 1976, § 1;
On the differences between Mill’s Considerations and Bentham’s Code see (Rosen, 
1983, X).
In the chapter “Of federal representative governments” in the Considerations, Mill 
shows a clear and sympathetic understanding o f federal theory, and in particular o f the 
direct relationship between a federal government and citizens. Despite this, however, his 
conclusions are somewhat contradictory, in that while his ideal rests in the greatest 
dispersion o f power consistent with efficiency, he prefers unitary government whenever 
possible (Finder, 1991, 101). For critical considerations o f Mill’s stance that the state and 
the nation must be co extensive in a unitary state see (Acton, 1907).
 ^^  In particular, “Mill points to three educative consequences o f participation, which 
together define the ideal active character: 1) a sense o f citizenship that makes citizens feel 
‘under no other external restraint than the necessities o f nature, or mandates o f society 
which he has his share in imposing, and which it is open to him, if  he drinks them wrong, 
publicly to dissent from, and exert himself actively to get altered’; 2) a largeness of 
‘conceptions’ and ‘sentiments’, which extends citizens’ thoughts and feelings beyond the
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Urbinati, 2002, § 3; Varouxakis, 2002, § 7). Accordingly, Mill states that 
representative democracy’s
“superiority in reference to the present well-being rests 
upon two principles, of as universal truth and applicability 
as any general propositions which can be laid down 
respecting human affairs. The first is, that the rights and 
interests of every or any person are only secured from 
being disregarded when the person interested is himself 
able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them. The 
second is, that the general prosperity attains a greater 
height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the 
amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in 
promoting it” (Mill, 1861 [1991], Iff: 208).
It is in A Few Words on Non-Intervention that such principles are 
applied to the international level. The article’s examination of the specific 
topic of the rightness of military and political interference also serves to 
draw a normative utilitarian framework for international organisations in 
relation to both civilised and uncivilised nations (Miller, 1961). Assuming 
the importance of the national process of democratic self-determination for 
the aforementioned reasons. Mill maintains that the principal virtue of a 
country concerning foreign policy consists in the lack of aggressive 
intentions toward other states and respect of their national autonomy. “Any 
attempts it makes to exert influence over them, even by persuasion, is 
rather in the service of others, than of itself’ (Mill, 1859 [1991],111). The 
good country should not, as a matter of course, pursue personal benefits at 
other’s expenses, except in the case in which other countries can 
participate in them. Drawing on this, the case of intervention is considered 
in detail by Mill.
Mill reconsiders the doctrine of non-interference, advocating a 
differential application according to the degree of civilisation attained by 
the nations involved in the dispute. In the case of civilised people, issues 
such as war for conquest or forced annexation are publicly recognised as 
immoral; intervention can only be warranted in order to: 1) mediate as
‘satisfaction o f daily wants’; and 3) an understanding of the general interest and 
stimulation o f public-regarding attitudes” (Thompson, 1976, 37-8).
72
third parts in international disputes; 2) stop persistent civil wars; 3) 
reconcile fighters; 4) intercede for a respectful treatment of the losers; 5) 
stop crimes against humanity, such as slavery. Beyond these special 
circumstances, no help should be offered to a government for the 
repression of internal rebellions, because if it is not able to obtain 
obedience by its own power, then it is not legitimate and should therefore 
not exist (Mill, 1859 [1991], 121; 1862 [1991], 136-8). A Humean 
interpretation underlies this argument, which assumes that a population is 
ready to support its own government when it acts rightfully, and, 
conversely, to rebel against it when wide-spread dissatisfaction is 
experienced by the population (Mill, 1861 [1991], § I, IV). The unique test 
of having sufficient maturity for maintaining free institutions resides in the 
capacity and willingness of the people to fight for them. If they do not 
value fi-eedom enough to be ready to fight for it, then a benign external 
intervention to provide them with liberty would be useless, since they 
would not be able to sustain their artificial status (Mill, 1859 [1991], 122; 
Walzer, 1977; Grader, 1985; McMahan, 1986; 1996, 40; McKim & 
McMahan, 1997, § V; Varouxakis, 2002, § 5).
In accordance with this. Mill affirms:
“But war, in a good cause, is not the greatest evil which a 
nation can suffer. War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest 
of things: the decayed and degraded state of moral and 
patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a war, is 
worse. [...] A war to protect other human beings against 
tyrannical injustice; a war to give victory to their own 
ideas of right and good, and which is their own war, 
carried on for an honest purpose by their free choice- is 
often the means of their regeneration. A man who has 
nothing which he is willing to fight for, nothing which he 
cares more about than he does about his personal safety, is 
a miserable creature who has no chance of being free, 
unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men 
then himself. As long as justice and injustice have not 
terminated their ever renewing fight for ascendancy in the 
affairs of mankind, human beings must be willing, when 
need is, to do battle for the one against the other” (Mill, 
1862 [1991], 141-2).
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Such is the crystalline rationale supporting non interference in 
domestic affairs of civilised people, that Mill brings it to the point of its 
paradoxical reversal: “Intervention to enforce non-intervention is always 
rightful, always moral, if not always prudent” (Mill, 1859 [1991], 123).
However, in those cases in which an unequal level of civilisation 
exists between peoples and, consequently, a strong imbalance in social 
development characterises the agents in question. Mill’s recommendations 
alter considerably. A more closely detailed explanation of his concept of 
civilisation is offered in Considerations on Representative Government, 
which shows it to be ultimately based on a qualified utilitarian principle. 
Barbaric people are those who have not sufficiently developed moral, 
intellectual, and practical qualities, and are consequently not able to 
consolidate effective and autonomous political institutions. Such peoples 
thus attain a balance of general happiness much inferior to civilised 
people’s, since the latter are in a position to enjoy qualitatively superior 
pleasures (Mill, 1861 [1991], § I, U, IV; Robson, 1968; 1998, 350-55). In 
Mill’s opinion, two reasons can be determined that prevent the application 
of the same moral rules to these classes of people (Mill, 1859 [1991], 118- 
119). Firstly, international morality requires reciprocity, but uncivilised 
people are not able to respect and comply with the rules of morality in so 
far as they are not able to commit to a remote objective. Secondly, the 
sentiments of independence and nationalism essential for the growth and 
development of advanced nations obstruct the development of uncivilised 
peoples, since such peoples would receive more benefit from the 
benevolent interference of a foreign and civilised government than if they 
were abandoned to their fate. Hence, as the latter are not entitled to the 
same rights as proper nations, but solely to those aids which are necessary 
for them to become civilised nations as soon as possible, the traditional 
international law need not be respected with them. It is appropriate to 
civilised nations only, barbaric peoples are e x c l u d e d ^ ^
A note o f comment is due on Mill’s attitude toward colonialism. His position is the 
result o f a combination o f eurocentrism, utilitarian paternalism, and British imperialism, 
according to which the civilised man has a duty to improve the whole world’s state of 
well-being; such a duty often implies forms of political domination (Sullivan, 1983; Moir
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In conclusion, the ideas of Mill presented here are evidence that a 
number of Mill’s arguments have been extremely relevant for the 
continuation of the utilitarian debate on international justice up through the 
contemporary discussion. His reasoning concerning the indirect 
deployment of a universal principle to structure political rules on differing 
levels represents an extremely fertile precursor to current proposals, just as 
his considerations on the principle of nationality and the correlate of non­
intervention have beetrat the centre of the dispute on international law for 
more than a century. At the same time, his paternalistic position on 
uncivilised peoples has provided major intellectual support for a regime of 
international exclusion lasting for more than a century. Before concluding 
this survey and proceeding to more recent consequentialist propositions, it 
is worthwhile to dedicate a last section to Sidgwick and his contribution to 
international utilitarian thought.
Between nationality and federalism: Sidgwick
Despite favouring the democratic strengthening of international 
relations, the 19*^  century utilitarians surveyed here never went so far as to 
propose any federal reform of international institutions. This stance, which 
was influenced in part by the dogmas of legal positivism fostered in 
English legal debate by Bentham and Austin (Bryce, 1901, 50) and in part 
by the support for nationalistic movements, as in Mill, came under dispute 
toward the end of the century and even more in the first half of the 20^ ’’ 
century with consequentialist ‘idealist’ thinkers such as Hayek, Robbins, 
and Russell. Toward the end of the 19^  ^ century, the federal idea began to
et al., 1999; Souffrant, 2000). Since greater well-being is attainable only through a 
developed cultural sensitivity, it is an obligation of all civilised men to help barbaric 
peoples in their spiritual and material growth, in order to maximise the general world 
welfare (Mill, 1861 [1991], § XVIII). This idea is grounded on a number of premises 
which are unjustifiable from a moral point of view. The argument about the barbarity of 
colonised peoples implies in fact an illegitimate and unfounded universalization of 
‘localised’ qualitative criteria, when not an explicit racial discrimination. Both claims rely 
on postulates which remain completely arbitrary if  compared with contemporary positions 
on the ethical equality o f human beings. Racism in particular has been theoretically 
overcome by Darwinism, which maintains a non-specism that increasingly enlarges the 
sphere of moral consideration. For this consideration I am originally indebted to
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attract a measure of interest in the British intelligentsia, in part inspired by 
the success of the Canadian and Australian federations, but also as a 
reaction to the nationalist fervour which was rising across Europe. While 
the major proponent was most likely J.R.Seeley, who was a major 
supporter of European and Commonwealth federations (Seeley, 1883), 
Henry Sidgwick occupies a relevant place in this debate (Sidgwick, 1903 
[1920]; Finder, 1991; Bosco, 1995, 251).
Among the thinkers of the classical utilitarian school, Sidgwick 
dedicates the most attention to and presents the most detailed analysis of 
international ethics. He examines a number of different issues related to it 
in the five chapters of The Elements o f Politics exclusively dedicated to 
international ethics and in his other internationalist writings. Included 
among these issues are: the nature of international obligations and the task 
of international scholars, the normative status of the state and nationalism 
in relation to universal principles, non-intervention and war, the 
desirability of a federal model, and colonies and migration (Sidgwick, 
1874 [1996], 1891 [1996], 1903 [1920], 1919). The two principal 
achievements of Sidgwick’s study consist in a definitive systématisation of 
19^  ^ century utilitarian thought on international justice—one showing a 
high degree of comprehensiveness and consistency—and the identification 
of a number of pragmatic limitations which mark the borders of 
international consequentialist arguments in terms of feasibility.
Following Bentham and Austin, Sidgwick begins his analysis of 
international ethics by noting that in reference to international obligations, 
the term ‘international customary rules’ should be used rather than 
‘international law’, because at the international level the distinguishing 
elements of the domestic legal systems (supreme judge, common 
legislation, and central executive) are missing (Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 
238-9; 1919, § I). The un-codified means of generating international law 
results in fact in a high degree of ambiguity with respect to international 
norms. Such a process of norm production is especially deficient in the 
international arena given the historical characteristics of the international
Lecaldano. On this, see also (Hare, 1963, § 11; Singer, 1979, 1981; Hare, 1989a, § 12;
I
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community such as: a small number of members and a subsequent great 
importance of everyone with respect to the whole, the absence of a superior 
government, imperfect internal cohesion of states, and differing degrees of 
civilisation. In so far as these conditions of ambiguity lead to reduced 
compliance with norms within international society, they decrease the 
legitimacy of international obligations and correspondingly increase the 
conditions for arbitrary behaviour. The best way to overcome this 
ambiguity and uncertainty in international law, according to Sidgwick, 
consists in ‘expositors’, i.e., international jurists, undertaking research with 
the intention to harmonise customary jurisprudence in order to make it 
more systematic and definite (Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 285-93). Like the 
other utilitarians, Sidgwick also stresses the importance of publicity. Thus, 
this investigative process should be given as much publicity as possible in 
order to stimulate the moral sentiments of mankind concerning the 
common interest of peace. The maturation of world public opinion remains 
a central moment of international reforms (Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 296).
Sidgwick’s pragmatic realism explains why the state is still 
considered to be a fundamental political reference in his international 
model despite cosmopolitan ideals always being the ultimate ideals to 
pursue. Following Bentham’s and Austin’s notion of a territorial state as 
rights/duties allocator and obedience receiver, four principal features 
define the state according to Sidgwick: 1) an aggregate of human beings 
united by the fact of acknowledging permanent obedience to a common 
government; 2) the government exercises control over a certain portion of 
the earth’s surface; 3) the society has a not inconsiderable number of 
members; and finally 4) a national spirit based on a shared sentiment
moulds the state into a n a t i o n ^ I n  Sidgwick, thus, the recognition of the 
volontaristic esprit de corp remains relevant for the stability of state, which 
bears practical consequences on issues such as immigration and citizenship
Rachels, 1991).
This notwithstanding, he cautiously admits the possibility o f a ‘multicultural’ society, 
unlike from J.S.Mill who is forthright in denying it and proposing a strong assimilationist 
policy.
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(Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 224; 1903 [1920], 27 and also 1891, 221-30; 
Miller, 1995,64).
Accordingly, from Sidgwick’s point of view, a number of valid 
elements can be traced in the doctrine fostered first and foremost by 
Hobbes. Thus, moral obligations, both at the domestic and the international 
level, are conditional on a reasonable expectation of reciprocity. The basic 
norm of international relations consequently consists in the reciprocal non­
interference in domestic affairs (Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 324). In the field 
of international relations, in fact, the lack of the habit of obedience in one 
state creates a situation that permits an enlargement of the rights and duties 
of self-protection for another. While this interference would certainly not 
in itself cancel the obligation to other virtues such as veracity, good faith 
and abstinence from aggression on person and property, even they must 
admit exception based on special circumstances and a previous record of 
non-reciprocity (Sidgwick, 1919, 46). Moreover, because of the lack of a 
super partes arbiter, war is recognised as a legitimate, though ultimate 
instrument for the resolution of international controversies.
State political entitlements and rights are well defined, according to 
Sidgwick’s view, though they are not absolute in kind. Special cases in fact 
exist which demonstrate the presence of limitations due to ‘general claims 
of mankind’ and consequently create a compromise between universalistic 
utilitarianism and state-nationalism. A typical example of this is 
represented by the prerogatives of the state on its territory, which grant to 
the state the authority to pose some limits on the admittance of aliens, and 
in this offer negative recognition of the ultimate principle of free 
movement and immigration. Thus, a deeply under-populated country 
cannot legitimately prohibit entrance into its territory. These cases 
illustrate the utilitarian framework underpinning Sidgwick’s reading of 
international norms. Accordingly, the ultimate and general principles 
remain fimdamentally consequentialist, in so far as they aim at the overall 
interest of mankind, realism is rejected and an enlargement of the right to 
self-protection is allowed only on contingent grounds (Sidgwick, 1891 
[1996], 289-9). Sidgwick affirms this in a crystalline passage which recalls 
many of the issues forming the focus of this survey:
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“For a State, as for an individual, the ultimate end and 
standard of right conduct is the happiness of all who are 
affected by its actions. It is of course true, for an 
individual no less than for a State Das the leading 
utilitarian moralists have repeatedly and emphatically 
affirmed □ that the general happiness is usually best 
promoted by a concentration of effort on more limited 
ends. As Austin puts it: 'The principle of general utility 
imperiously demands that [every individual person] 
commonly shall attend to his own rather than to the 
interests of others: that he shall not habitually neglect that 
which he knows accurately in order that he may habitually 
pursue that which he knows imperfectly.' But the principle 
of utility does demand of us that we shall never pursue our 
own peculiar good by means which are inconsistent with 
the general good: accordingly, in the exceptional cases in 
which the interest of the part conflicts with the interest of 
the whole, the interest of the part Obe it individual or 
State □ must necessarily gave way. On this point of 
principle no compromise is possible, no hesitation 
admissible, no appeal to experience relevant: the principle 
does not profess to prescribe what States and individuals 
have done, but to prescribe what they ought to do. At the 
• same time, I think it important not to exaggerate the 
divergence between the private interest of any particular 
State and the general interest of the community of nations” 
(Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 299).
Sidgwick’s ideas here—or rather normative hypotheses—on the 
organisation of a community of states are consistent with his general 
attitude, which combines pragmatic considerations with an ultimately 
universalistic approach. In his view, the ultimate political structure to strive 
for at the international level is an inclusive federation of civil nations. This 
would be advantageous both in terms of external economic strengthening 
and international securing of local liberties (Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 301;
1903 [1920], § XXIX)34 The best (and maybe the only) means to achieve
“It is worth recalling that the idea of the world at last finding peace through the 
absorption o f the separate states in the large federated groups and ultimately perhaps in 
one single federation was indeed the ideal o f almost all the liberal thinkers o f the 19^ 
century, [...] 19* century liberals may not have been fully aware how essential a 
complement o f their principles a federal organisation of die different states formed; but 
there were few among them who did not express their belief in it as an ultimate goal. It 
was only with the approach of our twentieth century that before the triumphant rise of
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such a structure consists in peaceful and positive co-operation among 
states. Nonetheless, since the political situation of his time seemed to 
Sidgwick premature for an effective federal system, the establishment of 
defensive leagues—thought of as limited confederations—to be extended 
gradually, appears as the strategic sub-optimal goal of his international 
political theory. In such war-less situation which respects the principle of 
non-intervention—the hinge of the Sidgwickian model—universal 
sentiments can deeply-root in the minds of mankind. From this, a twofold 
political program follows: a short-term set of regional federations in which 
states maintain a great part of political power, and a future world 
federation, in which states establish an effective co-operative regime. In 
conclusion, Sidgwick’s cosmopolitan ideals are expressed at their best in 
the following passage, which also serves as a summation of the present 
survey of 19‘^  century international utilitarian thought:
“Our highest political ideal admits of no boundaries that 
would bar the prevention of high-handed injustice 
throughout the range of human society: and from the point 
of view of this highest ideal it might be fairly urged that 
we ought no more to recognise wars among nations as 
normal than we recognise wager of battle as remedy for 
private wrongs: and that if so, we ought not to recognise as 
normal the existence of a number of completely 
independent political communities, living in close 
juxtaposition; since we must expect that grave and 
irreconcilable disputes among such communities will be 
settled, as they always have been settled, by wars. 
Certainly the effective substitution of any kind of judicial 
process for wars among civilised States would seem to 
involve the ultimate subjection of the relations of such 
States to some kind and degree of common government, 
able to bring overwhelming force to overbear the 
resistance of any recalcitrant State; since judicial decisions 
which cannot be enforced, cannot be expected to prevent 
wars. And perhaps some federation of European or West- 
European States, with a common government sufficiently 
strong to prevent fighting among these States, is not 
beyond the limits of sober conjecture as to the probable 
future course of political development. From the earliest 
dawn of history in Europe, down to the present day, the
realpolitik these hopes came to be regarded as impracticable and utopian” (Hayek, 1944, 
256-7) and also (Robbins, 1937, 240-57).
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tendency to form continually larger political societies— 
apart from the effects of mere conquest—seems to 
accompany the growth of civilisation” (Sidgwick, 1891 
[1996], 218; 1903 [1920], 439).
Conclusions
The intention of this survey remains in the provision of a theoretical 
introduction to the contemporary discussion of global justice, and in 
particular to the consequentialist arguments made therein. The focus of this 
survey is however extremely interesting even in itself for its capacity to 
pull together many common trends within a number of progressive stances 
of the 19^  ^ century European political thought. Beyond the then wide­
spread appeal of the nationalistic cause, the prevailing attitude one takes 
from this tradition of thought is one of moderate optimism and strong 
moral conviction, characterised by a continuous effort to interpret 
international social reality in a progressive manner. Reinterpreting previous 
arguments, most notably those of Hume and Godwin, classical utilitarians 
discuss a number of issues which cover a wide range of cases of interest to 
contemporary international ethics. The unifying factor of all of these topics 
consists in the appeal to the ultimate principle of the universal 
maximisation of the well-being of mankind. Despite the recognition of a 
number of intermediate political rules and institutions that provide the best 
possible utility outcome given the specific conditions of the sphere of 
social action to which they apply, the last or second order judge of any 
political action remains in fact the adherence to the ideal of “the most 
extended well-being of all the nations on the earth”.
Following Hume, a new reading of the notion of the state is proposed 
according to which such an institution is warranted primarily on the basis 
of the social utility it generates. Enquiry into the state’s potential for well­
being production leads to the recognition of it as a legitimate component of 
a correct political system, in which national and universal values are 
developed in harmony. A mainly imperativistic legal framework is 
reconciled with a subtle division of ethical labour, thus indirectly 
strengthening the state in terms of national autonomy, a right to self­
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determination, and a duty of non-intervention. The final cosmopolitan 
system is pragmatically shaped according to a pyramid model, in which 
states maintain a central role in deciding those policies that promise to 
better conciliate national and international interests—although a significant 
consideration of the theory of federalism appears in the last utilitarians. 
This signifies a remarkable and neat turning point away from the previous 
realist-Hobbesian tradition, according to which sovereign states are 
portrayed as the alpha and omega of both national and international 
domain. A clear political project underpins this 19^  ^ century school of 
thought: the gradual extension of democratic principles to the international 
sphere of action in order to promote world welfare in a more efficient way.
In line with this, a re-stipulation of the international principles of 
justice is propounded through an analysis of the nature of international law 
as based on the absence of a superior power. Given the primacy of popular 
sanctions in the form of global public opinion, the most conducive strategy 
for the diffusion of cosmopolitan ideals is identified in a series of 
institutional changes which should bear great potential in terms of 
awakening mankind’s awareness of global issues. A codification of the 
international law, the establishment of an international court, publicity of 
foreign negotiations, and new machinery for international treaties are all 
principal proposals of classical utilitarianism for attaining world peace.
Nonetheless, a major constraint is recognised that impedes the 
extension of such an approach toward a more inclusive and supranational 
model: the narrow-minded proclivity of states toward a self-defeating, 
short-term pursuit of interest; a characterisation which applies both to 
civilised and uncivilised nations. A federal structure is perhaps desirable in 
the future, but for the time being a twofold political strategy is necessary. 
While civilised peoples need to be convinced, as aforementioned, of the 
importance of universal values through a publicity campaign, uncivilised 
people need to be escorted through their development by a wise 
paternalistic authority in the form of colonial power. Localised and limited 
as it is, this approach nevertheless offers a valid perspective from which 
the contemporary discussion on global justice can be advantageously
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accessed, i.e., the universalist assumption of the primacy of the individual 
and of his well-being.
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Contemporary International Utilitarianism
“The difference between utilitarianism applied to 
persons and countries is this. Utilitarianism among 
persons treats each individual as a vessel for utility, but 
pays no attention to the boundaries, or rights, of the 
individual; utilitarianism with regards to countries 
treats each country as a vessel for health, but pays no 
particular attention to national boundaries, or the 
rights of countries. What in the first case violates 
conceptions that some of us hold about individual 
r i^ ts— about the ethically relevant boundaries 
between individuals— in the second ignores what some 
of us consider to be ethically irrelevant national 
boundaries” (Roemer, 1993, 352-3)
Following Sidgwick’s writing at the beginning of the 20^  ^ century, a 
long period of silence held before the first significant arguments of 
contemporary international utilitarianism were heard. The dramatic events 
of the two world wars, together with a scientific turbulence wrought-up by 
such developments as logical positivism, annihilated Anglo-Saxon 
normative thought. Moral philosophy retreated into meta-ethical theory, 
while political theory lost faith in normative ideals, preferring sociological 
description, ‘scientific’ Marxism, and economic analysis. Overall, there 
was scant intervention on concrete political issues, as scholars dropped 
prescriptive politics in favour of neutral discussions on the meaning of 
ethics, or technical economical debates. To this was added the international
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stalemate of the cold war and the grip of the realist school on the field of 
international political theory; all motives enough for such persistent 
reluctance to deal with international normative issues. With few exceptions 
such as RusselP5 and Hare, this situation lasts until the end of the sixties, 
when a new sense of practical commitment awoke part of academia.
Against realist assumptions that politics means pursuit of national 
interest regardless of universalistic ethics, in the seventies moral and 
political philosophers again started to claim the relevance of transnational 
ethical considerations. One of the first signs of this was the resolution of 
the American Philosophical Association against the Vietnam War in 1967. 
Besides warfare, world poverty represented the other principal topic of 
interest for the resurgence of international ethics. At that time, several 
political events brought to public attention the urgency of the extreme 
condition of the vast majority of the world population, provoking an 
intense debate both inside and outside academia. The end of the colonial 
system; the oil crisis and the withdrawal of the international monetary 
system based on the Bretton Woods agreements; the increasing claims of 
poor countries, which generated the discussion on the New International 
Economic Order; the growing development of the global economy and the 
emergence of substantial foreign investments by multinational corporations 
are all phenomena that contributed to the establishment of world poverty 
and the north-south wealth disparity as central issues in the international 
agenda. From the initial interests of warfare and poverty the discussion
While Russell’s writings of the fifties represent the first explicit products of 
contemporary international utilitarianism (Russell, 1954), his character, differently from 
Hare, remains completely external to the debate here analysed. Before Russell in the first 
half o f the 20*** century, a heterogeneous bunch o f (oft non-academic) scholars, usually 
grouped as international idealists, produced works on international organisation, which 
show a number o f interesting theoretical (and personal) overlaps with the utilitarian 
tradition described so far. These shared ideas are comprised o f the belief in 1) reason as 
capable to reach a universal ethical standpoint; 2) progress and the harmony of interests;
3) public opinion; and 4) international organisation as able to preserve order and prevent 
war. Moreover, idealists shared the willingness to strengthen international law and to 
establish both a permanent judicial organ and a certain degree o f international 
government. However, since significant differences remain between these thinkers and the 
utilitarians, and since they do not label themselves as utilitarian, they are not included in 
this survey. Examples o f this are idealists such as Woolf and Hobson (Hobson, 1915; 
Woolf, 1916; Long & Wilson, 1995; Long, 1996; Wilson, 2003), and other thinkers such 
as Robbins and Hayek (Robbins, 1937; Hayek, 1939; Robbins, 1939; Hayek, 1944; 
Wilson, 1996). With regards to Hare, see the discussion in a following section.
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widened enormously, so much so that almost every school of political 
thought has since offered a recipe for global justice and its various sub­
disciplines. Within this highly contentious political debate, utilitarianism 
also has submitted its contribution; one, in my opinion, both equally 
underdeveloped and underestimated^^.
Despite the heterogeneity of content of the utilitarian arguments on 
international justice, all of the authors here surveyed inevitably refer to a 
more comprehensive approach to global justice. It is this common and 
general rationale which underpins the investigation of this chapter. Instead 
of surveying each of the specific global issues, this paper examine the six 
principal arguments of contemporary international utilitarianism, 
concentrating only on those normative aspects bearing relevance for the 
topic of the present study, international exclusion and global democratic 
participation. From this examination, a number of crucial features of 
contemporary international utilitarianism are identified, including: the 
nature of international ethics and trans-border obligations, the legitimacy 
of state institutions, the recognition of global agency as a meaningful 
political status, and a series of supranational entitlements ascribed to 
individuals as well as to other non-states agents. In drawing up this 
general framework of the contemporary utilitarian discussion, this survey
For a first approach to utilitarian literature on international issues, according to a 
thematic division see:
W arfare: War and Deterrence (Brandt, 1972,; 1980; Hare & Joynt, 1982; Goodin, 
1985a; Hare, 1989b; Pontara, 1990, 2000; Glover, 2001; Calhoun, 2002). Self- 
determination and Intervention (Hare & Joynt, 1982; Elfstrom, 1983; McMahan, 1986; 
Brittan, 1988a; Glover, 1991; McMahan, 1996).
Global distributive justice: Poverty (Narveson, 1972; Singer, 1972; Hardin, 1974; 
Narveson, 1974; Fletcher, 1976; Glover, 1977; Singer, 1977; Finnin & Alonzo Smith, 
1979; Bennett, 1982; Carson, 1982; Hare & Joynt, 1982; Parfît, 1984; Goodin, 1985b; 
Goodin & Pettit, 1986; Pontara, 1988; Elfstrom, 1989; Hare, 1989b; Unger, 1996; Hooker, 
1998; Singer, 1999; Hooker, 2000; Kuper & Singer, 2002; Marchetti, 2005b).
Global issues: Environment (Goodin, 1990b, 1992b). Health (Roemer, 1993). 
Demography and future generations (Narveson, 1967; Hardin, 1968b; Narveson, 1973; 
Fletcher, 1974; Hardin, 1976; Parfit, 1984, § IV; 1986; Pontara, 1995, 1997). Migration 
and citizenship (Hardin, 1968a; Goodin, 1988; Singer & Singer, 1988; Elfstrom, 1989; 
Barry & Goodin, 1992; Goodin, 1992a; Hardin, 1995; Goodin, 1996a; Marchetti, 2003b, 
2004a).
Democracy: Human rights (Lyons, 1977; Goodin, 1979; Narveson, 1981; Hare, 1982; 
Lyons, 1982; Gibbard, 1984; Pontara, 1989). Nationalism and multiculturalism  
(Goodin, 1997; McKim & McMahan, 1997). Supranational Institutions (Pogge, 1992; 
Singer, 2002; Goodin, 2003a; Marchetti, 2004b, 2005a).
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not only fills a serious gap in the literature, but also reveals the limits of 
these arguments, which need to be overcome in a fixture evolution of 
international consequentialist scholarship.
The Singerian argument
Peter Singer’s essay on Famine, Affluence and Morality (Singer, 
1972) was the first and certainly the most influential utilitarian reflection 
on international issues of justice. While the argument presented in it 
concerns the case of famines, it is extensible to the overall theme of 
inequality and global justice, as the author himself has indicated in the later 
versions of it (Singer, 1977, 1979,1999, 2002). Singer’s position is centred 
on the acknowledgement of the universalistic character of moral 
judgements, fi*om which he deduces a crucial principle of equality: the 
equal respect for the interests of all sentient beings. Consequently, the 
primacy accorded to this capacity to have interests, rather than a rational 
faculty, generates the identification of a number of fimdamental claims for 
the individual; these include avoidance of pain, development of personal 
capacities, satisfaction of primary needs such as food and shelter, 
enjoyment of friendly personal relationships, and freedom to pursue one’s 
own project without interference (Singer, 1979, § II). These claims, 
together with the classical principle of the decreasing marginal utility, 
conduce to a version of utilitarianism of universal interests, which has 
fertile spill-over on global redistributive policies.
Singer introduces his argument concerning the duty to alleviate 
hunger with three premises (two moral and one factual), which he 
considers to be acceptable to a vast audience since they are based on 
minimal assumptions that do not require any sympathy toward 
utilitarianism. They are the following: 1) Pain and death due to the lack of 
food, shelter and medical assistance are evil. The degree of goodness of the 
world depends, all other circumstance being equal, on the least number of 
people in such a deficient state. 2) If it is possible to prevent something bad
General; Surveys (Ellis, 1992; Jones, 1999). Multi-thematic studies (Hare & Joynt,
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happening, without sacrificing anything of moral importance, then there is 
a duty to act (moderate version). If it is possible to prevent something bad 
happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, 
then there is a duty to act (strong version). 3) The citizens of rich and 
developed countries are in the position to reduce the number of people in 
extreme poverty in the world. From this (strong version), a normative 
conclusion can be deduced, which is based on a negative and impartialist 
version of utilitarianism according to which a duty exists to prevent as 
much extreme poverty as possible, up to the point in which something of 
equal moral importance would be sacrificed.
Singer’s position stands out with respect to other ethical stances such 
as Nozick’s (Nozick, 1974) and the interaction-dependent theories of 
justice, according to which there is a firm distinction between moral duties 
and charity. For the latter, benevolent acts are praiseworthy but not strictly 
compulsory as those originated by an interaction between the action-maker 
and the action-bearer, so that in the case of omission, no merit or guilt is 
incurred. Deploying an interaction-independent, consequentialist method 
which equals action and omission. Singer, on the contrary, brings the duty 
of assistance back into the field of perfect duties, where omission is 
sanctioned at least by moral blame. Accordingly, given the condition of 
contemporary society in which an immoral outcome is inevitable without a 
radical change in attitude, indifference is not an option.
The radicality of Singer’s proposal for a change in the attitude of 
daily life is accentuated by the fact that individual commitment plays a 
central role in his moral world. His ideal recommendation is to renounce a 
great part of current consumerist lifestyle, but he scales this back to 10 % 
of one’s salary, similar to what a medieval tax demanded toward poverty 
relief. However, something that has not always been noted by criticisms 
focusing on the overdemandingness of his proposal is that Singer has also 
included the institutional side of the issue of poverty relief in his 
consideration. Above all in his recent proposal. Singer in fact expands his 
directives to include the duty to support public campaigns for international
1982; Elfstrom, 1989; Pontara, 1998; Singer, 2002).
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co-operation and the reform of international institutions such as the WTO 
and UN (Singer, 2002).
Another feature that neatly distinguishes Singer’s argument from the 
communitarian stance of special obligations is the universal value he 
ascribes to utilitarian precepts. For Singer, factors such as proximity or the 
number of potential helpers do not influence, directly and significantly, the 
qualitative aspect of prescriptions. The division of labour remains as a 
viable instrumental option to grant prima facie validity to territorial 
dimensions, but it is clear that this is only warranted upon universal 
principles, as classical utilitarians have shown. The ultimate duty to 
maximise general welfare entails assumptions which claim transcultural 
validity, in as much as the fimdamental interests previously mentioned are 
elementary in kind and thus allow for interpersonal comparisons and cost- 
benefit analysis. This universality of moral precepts receives a further 
confirmation, though remains independent from the increasing 
interdependence of the current world affairs. The fact that we live in one 
world, ever more unified by global transformations, offers only additional 
proof of the urgency to establish a global moral code (Singer, 2002).
Further evidence that Singer doesn’t shy away from solutions likely 
to incur serious criticism is his acceptance of the triage as a criterion to 
select the destination of aid in a situation in which there are not enough 
resources to accommodate all needs. This consequentialist method, taken 
from medical practice and based on the principle of universal interpersonal 
comparability, imposes that preference be given to those patients who 
promise to benefit most from the resources offered to them. Singer adopts 
it in order to justify the priority granted to some countries over others that 
do not implement benefit-maximising policies, such as demographic 
policies of birth control. As in other highly disputable points of his 
proposal, here Singer overlooks more complex issues such as democratic 
internal liability and multicultural axiological problems^^. However, the 
intent of this section is not to critically analyse each specific point of the 
authors surveyed, but rather to identify those aspects of their arguments,
For a more detailed critical analysis o f Singer’s last study (Marchetti, 2004c).
89
which are valuable for the rest of the thesis. To that end, in concluding this 
brief presentation of Singer’s position, it is worth underlining the profound 
stimulus his stance has had on the subsequent discussion of global justice. 
Despite the enormous volume of criticisms that he has attracted from 
almost every political angle—so that he has been accused at the same time 
of being a radical egalitarian ready to unleash a revolutionary world and a 
self-deceived conservative more interested in neo-liberal charity than in 
political justice—in its robust rebuttal of mainstream contractarianism. 
Singer’s thought remains a fundamental component of cosmopolitan, post- 
Westphalian utilitarianism.
Neo-Malthusian life-boat ethics
Concerned with the same theme, but advocating a very different 
approach, are the Neo-Malthusian scholars. Their universalistic analysis 
shares a common consequentialist background with the other utilitarians, 
but diverges so starkly that it inspired accusations of immorality or a- 
morality. The Neo-Malthusians do not deny the dramatic situation of poor 
countries, but rather the possibility of developed countries to intervene 
positively on it (Finnin & Alonzo Smith, 1979). Their scientific method is 
inspired by Thomas Malthus, according to whom, given the difference in 
growth between population (geometric) and means of survival (arithmetic), 
the only available option to politicians for redressing this imbalance 
consists in waiting for the completion of the natural circle through wars, 
famines, and epidemics. Only this, with the exception of education to 
procreative abstention, can rebalance the equilibrium between 
demographic growth and supply (Malthus, 1798 [1826]). Neo-Malthusian 
are not to be confused, however, with realists, according to whom solely 
national interests are relevant. Their approach is fully normative and 
universalistic, as demonstrated by their schoolmaster, Garrett Hardin, who 
created a scandal in the academic debate with his description of life-boat 
ethics (Hardin, 1968b, 1974, 1976).
Hardin asserts that lifeboat ethics constitutes a specific case of the 
more general logic of the commons, exemplified by the tragic case of
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common land. If everybody bred cattle at will and alone enjoyed the 
cultivation of this land, the likely result would be its drying up and 
generalised poverty. Similarly, in an overpopulated world, the overcoming 
of the carry capacity of public resources would lead to a general failure. In 
such circumstances, a better ethical solution consists in leaving those who 
are drowning around us to their fate, rather than overloading our lifeboat 
and all sinking without any hope for the future. Since world population can 
be described as a bomh threatening us all, it is reasonable and moral to 
detonate it before it explodes and takes out humanity (Ehrlich, 1971).
The ethical approach of the Neo-Malthusians thus gives special 
attention to the environmental constraints on global justice. The central 
concept of carrying capacity refers directly to the territorial potential in 
view of present and future generations. A significant consequence of this is 
that the discount rate on the future must be balanced with the fact that the 
future population will be by far larger than the present one. Their recurrent 
question ‘and then what?*, based on the classical maxim of primum non 
nocere, has a strictly consequentialist character and purports to criticise 
first and foremost those deontological theories according to which the old 
maxim fiat justitia, pereat mundus is still valid (Fletcher, 1974).
Along these lines, since it is not possible to feed the entire world 
population, any discussion on the relative duty to do so is nonsense. The 
observation that actual food production is sufficient to satisfy world needs 
does not damage the Neo-Malthusian argument, insofar as such distributive 
action would boost the demographic increase and consequently push the 
same problem into the future in a more serious form^^. For the Neo- 
Malthusians this epitomises a case of self-defeating generosity, which fails 
to take into consideration the diachronic examination of the capacity 
fallacy and its relative costs in terms of human lives. In order to avoid this.
Crucially, the Neo-Malthusian model rejects the theory o f demographic transition, 
according to which all countries who receive appropriate aid should experience a decline 
in birth rates parallel to the economic growth of average life. Neo-Malthusians assert that 
when this occurs it is because of contingent factors which preclude the possibility of  
establishing a universal law. Examples used to bolster this argument are the cases of  
France, Ireland and US, where a huge demographic growth accompanied social-economic 
development. For a defence of the developmentalist theory refer to (Easterlin, 1980; 
Schultz, 1981; Caldwell, 1982; Sen, 2000b).
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their policy recommendation, based on the triage method, consists in food 
aid being tied to development aid, with both contingent on the acceptance 
of birth control and the reasonable prospect of an increase in the socio­
economic status of the receiving countries^^. When these terms are not 
met, the failing countries should be abandoned in favour of the best risks 
countries on moral grounds, i.e., to minimise the total of present and future 
pains. Consistent with this, even transnational migration should be 
prohibited in order to avoid straining the carrying capacity of the receiving 
countries. Industrialised countries should thus reduce as rapidly as possible 
the net immigration caused by overpopulated countries dumping of the 
human excess to zero (Hardin, 1968a, 1995).
In conclusion, the common consequentialist and universalistic 
background creates the overlap between Malthusianism and utilitarianism. 
The neo-Malthusianism approach presents a typical case for the 
maximisation of average welfare in global terms based on the possibility of 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. This allows for a transcultural 
measurement of utility goods that leads to the exclusion and the 
exploitation of those who are most vulnerable and at the bottom of the 
welfare scale. The constant attention to the total and long-term 
consequences of any public action thus generates proposals of present 
sacrifices of some for future benefits to others; a proposal which other 
agent-relative theories cannot accept. What it is important to notice at this 
point is the epistemological methodology which Neo-Malthiasuanism and 
utilitarianism hold in common, despite the remaining stark differences 
between such (following one commentator’s definition) scientific and 
humanitarian utilitarians (O'Neill, 1985). The reliance on interpersonal 
utility comparison is a fundamental component of these versions of 
consequentialism, one which bears profound and problematic 
consequences in terms of international exclusion in that it allows for 
interpersonal re-distributions which disregard the distinctiveness of
This implies anyway the exclusion from the aid system o f all those countries that have 
already exceeded their carrying capacity because of their excessive population, and that 
consequently suffer chronic famines and economic stagnation. In such a category were 
included countries like India, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Niger (Fletcher, 1974,1976).
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persons. This weakness clarified (more on this in chap. IV), it is now worth 
concentrating on the remaining international utilitarian arguments, for they 
present a number of other rationales at the basis of a proper formulation of 
international consequentialism.
Domestic analogy
International utilitarianism, as shown in the previous chapter, has 
adopted the model of domestic analogy since its first elaboration in 
Bentham’s writings. Taking as its original paradigm the social relations 
within a determined social group, this model extends the arguments 
concerning rights and duties to the international arena through an 
analogical substitution of the relative agents; from individuals to states in 
primiSy but also to other non-state international agents such as individuals 
themselves, civil associations, private corporations, and international 
organisations (Suganami, 1989). The descriptive value of the analogical 
passage is, however, tempered by the rise of a number of resulting 
theoretical problems, the most arduous of which concerns the moral status 
of collective subjects. Of this analogy and its relative problems and 
potentials. Hare and Goodin both offer utilitarian analyses with interesting 
repercussions for international ethics. This section examines Hare’s 
proposal, whereas Goodin’s is discussed further down.
As early as 1957, in a discussion in the Reasons o f State, Hare 
proposed a comprehensive normative vision of politics which included 
both the internal and the external sphere of the political domain (Hare, 
1957). Drawing on the domestic analogy. Hare maintains that despite 
having only a representative and indirect existential status, governments 
are liable for their actions insofar as they always have the option of 
resignation. Thus, like individuals, governments possess a kind of freedom, 
or moral capacity, which compels them to ground their actions in a 
universal intention. Therefore, much like individual moral judgement, 
public political judgement too has to be based on the perceived 
consequences of acts universally intended; admitting, however, the 
difficulties of any assessment in the case of international acts with their
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multiple and far-reaching affects. The greater scope of a state’s actions 
subjects it to a higher number of ethical constraints in terms of 
responsibilities than the citizen considered uti singuli, above all where the 
consequences are intentionally caused and foreseeable. Hare asserts:
“when we think of it as a moral decision, we have to 
consider, not merely what consequences would be in our 
own interest, or in that of our own country, but what 
consequences ought to be chosen by anybody placed in 
such a situation. It means that we have to consider the 
effects of our actions on other people and other countries, 
as well as upon ourselves, and, having imaginatively 
placed ourselves in their position, think whether we can 
still say that we ought to do what our own interest prompts 
us to do. [...] Really the fundamental difference is not 
between morality and expediency; it is between a narrow 
national self-interest and public spirit. Both can be called 
kinds of expediency; for both aim at some good, and the 
expedient is what is conducive to good. But the first is an 
immoral kind of expediency, aiming only at the good of 
the agent and his country; whereas the second is a kind of 
expediency which is coextensive with morality” (Hare,
1957, 22-3).
In a subsequent refinement of his theory. Hare proposes a distinction 
between two levels of moral judgement (Hare, 1981). The first regards 
daily life—prima facie norms—while the second, relying on a critical and 
less frequent direct appeal to the utilitarian principle, regards universal 
concerns. This distinction, designed to enable the balancing of the two 
kinds of expediency underpins Hare’s position on justice, and on 
international justice in particular. The differentiation between a second 
order direct utilitarian principle and a number of first order intermediate 
rules is one that fits well with the requirement of international ethics in that 
it allows for a consistent normative coverage of several applicative levels 
of political action. In particular, the overall principle of Hare’s proposal 
aims to recognise and guarantee to everybody, regardless of nationality, the 
right to equal consideration and respect (Hare, 1981, § IX, 5). This has a 
number of prescriptive intermediate consequences in terms of political 
recognition and social distributive justice in terms of impartial, gradual,
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and moderate redistribution, both domestically and internationally. On the 
one hand, concerning political inclusion Hare affirms that:
“If any principle is a candidate, formally speaking, for 
inclusion in the list, it will be accepted or rejected 
according to whether its general acceptance is likely to 
advance the preference-satisfactions of all the inhabitants 
o f all the countries considered impartially''' (Hare, 1989b,
73, italics added).
This universalistic foundation of ethical and political principles 
leads, if not to world government because of historical constraints, to the 
possibility of envisaging confederate projects in which citizenship duties 
are intended to increase considerably the level of global satisfaction of the 
preferences of all citizens considered impartially (Hare, 1989b, § VI). On 
the other hand concerning distributive justice. Hare holds that political 
implementation of these principles should take into consideration that 
revolutions or brutal confiscation would yield a negative outcome in the 
overall utilitarian calculation, in so far as they would generate social 
instability and a fall in the degree of future expectations of all citizens. 
Thus, in line with the objective of balancing the two levels of expediency, 
while denying these radical actions as valid options in a scheme of global 
justice, Hare is nonetheless favourable both to international emergency aid 
(Hare, 1981, § IX, 8) and even more to structural plans aimed at tackling 
the problem of hunger at the world level (Hare, 1981, § XI, 7).
In conclusion, the double levels of Hare’s domestic analogy rationale 
represent a valuable theoretical tool for international ethics, insofar as they 
permit the appropriate application of the ultimate utilitarian principle to 
both domestic and international political actions. Despite this, theoretical 
limits remain which curtail the overall consistency of Hare’s international 
proposal. For instance, the use of the classical image of castaways as the 
ground for the discussion on political obligations (Hare, 1989b, § II), or the 
support for a non-aggressive patriotism within a stable and ordered world 
system (Hare, 1989b, § VI), are both inconsistent with the general 
universalistic framework of a highly interdependent world. A more 
sophisticated normative proposal for international ethics is offered by
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Elfstrom, which, as shown in the next section, applies Hare’s two-levels 
principle in a more intemationally-sensitive way, providing a slightly 
different argument on state legitimacy.
International specificity
According to Gerard Elfstrom (Elfstrom, 1989), the direct application 
of the individualistic paradigm used in the domestic analogy should not be 
pursued since the specific conditions of the current international 
environment determine and constrain the possibility of agents to act. The 
diversity of international relations is not as radical as realists maintain, but 
it is in any case morally significant. In daily life, the moral references of 
individual action are the effects (intentional and foreseen) within an 
environment organised by public institutions with assistance objectives. 
State’s international actions are, instead, presently characterised by a high 
degree of uncertainty due to the complexity of that social realm, which 
renders consequences indirect and unintentional, over time and space. In 
loosening—through multiplying—the links in the chain between those who 
make decisions and those who receive their effects, international relations 
necessarily create a difficulty in locating responsibility and establishing 
democratic congruence, thus making for the ambiguous identification of 
morally relevant actions and liable agents. For instance, although chief 
public officials, who in Elfstrom’s arguments represent the prima facie 
political agents in question in moral assessments, have a number of 
recognised duties, it could be the case that their organisation is structured 
in such a way as to impede their compliance with both moral and political 
duties. The question in this and other cases in which an international 
political system is missing, thus rests on the legitimacy to override the 
classical institutional mandate in the interest of the governed in order to 
prioritise external duties over internal responsibilities.
A version of utilitarianism based on preference and two levels à la 
Hare represents, for Elfstrom, the most appropriate normative theory to 
respond to the previous dilemma. In this theory, the ultimate moral 
reference resides in the particular individual and in his welfare, while the
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State possesses only a derivative moral agency as characterised by three 
main features: capacity of rational deliberation, moral responsibility, and 
absence of right to existence. “They [the states] matter from a moral 
perspective only in so far as what happens to them ultimately has 
consequences for individual persons” (Elfstrom, 1989, 32). Hence, 
Elfstrom*s theory of international ethics assigns moral centrality to 
individual welfare and political centrality to the state. An individual cannot 
play a direct role of responsibility due to the curtailed means that define an 
individual’s possibility of action, but he nonetheless maintains an ethical 
role within public institutions in so far as he must primarily aim to promote 
structural changes that allow for the moral liability of the organisation 
itself. “Understanding the role of individuals within the institutional 
structure opens the way to recognising how to apportion moral 
responsibility for the acts of the institution” (Elfstrom, 1989, 34).
The cardinal point of this ethical proposal resides in the identification 
of a number of basic wants, which are deemed universal and henceforth 
given priority. Following Bentham, these are individuated in the general 
desire to sustain life, and in security from harm from others. Such a priority 
is based on the triple assumption according to which life and means of 
subsistence are maximally valued, these means are necessary to enjoy any 
other good, and want of such means is easy to measure and satisfy. 
Remaining wants can be defined as secondary, as they are varied and 
consequently very difficult to measure and satisfy. The general moral 
precept following from this thus affirms: “all have a strong obligation to 
work to satisfy basic wants wherever they are found, but a much weaker 
obligation to look after the secondary wants of each and every human 
being” (Elfstrom, 1989, 15). Accordingly, moral priority is granted to the 
basic wants of aliens against the secondary wants of fellow-citizens, but 
when wants of the same form are at stake, governors can legitimately 
concede preference to nationals on the grounds of their contribution to the 
general welfare.
Following a pattern which is typical of utilitarianism’s way of 
thinking, Elfstrom concentrates more on distributive justice than on 
political entitlements, insofar as he deems it viable to take into account the
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possibility of redistribution based on interpersonal comparison of utility. 
Rather than tackling the issue of inclusive participation per se, he discusses 
at length the possibility, and indeed the duty, to re-allocate resources 
according to a universal principle of justice and takes into consideration the 
issue of citizenship in an instrumental way. For Elfstrom, once individual 
welfare and the current international circumstances are assumed as 
parameters, the problem of distributive justice splits into two main options; 
either movement of wealth or of population. Either transfers of economic, 
financial and technological resources are implemented, or a new migratory 
policy is envisaged based on a renewed concept of citizenship. In this vein, 
Elfstrom affirms:
“Citizens are correct in believing that they do have special 
ties and responsibilities to one another which they do not 
share with aliens. They are correct, in addition, in 
believing that they have claims to the material and cultural 
resources within their nations. And they are correct in 
believing that these claims and entitlements have moral 
weight. They are mistaken, however, in so far as they 
share the commonly held opinions that these entitlements 
are absolute and that they have not obligations to concern 
themselves with needs of non-citizens. Particularly where 
the fundamental requirements of human life and well­
being are at stake, they have the strong obligation to 
relinquish their resources for the benefit of others. [...] 
National borders make no moral difference in any 
fundamental sense” (Elfstrom, 1989, 170-1).
Such a universalistic fi-amework of justice certainly represents a valid 
challenge to all those contextualist theories which limit duties to fellow 
members of a determined community. In suggesting a instrumental reading 
of national boundaries, Elfstrom’s approach offers a viable alternative for a 
normative reconstruction of the political system at the international level. 
However, as mentioned, the epistemic reliance on interpersonal 
comparisons renders his theory weak on the side of respecting agent- 
relative values. More sensitive on this issue is the next argument surveyed 
in this chapter: Gooodin’s rationale on vulnerability and dependence.
98
Vulnerability and dependence
An influential argument on global justice from the utilitarian 
perspective is that advanced by Robert Goodin, according to which a new 
foundation for social obligations is recognised based on the concept of 
social responsibility toward vulnerable agents, both domestically and 
internationally (Goodin, 1985b, 1988, 1990a, 1995, 2003a, 2003b). Using 
the methodology of reflexive equilibrium, the author claims to show that 
the precepts of common sense morality, including special duties, derive 
from the general obligation to those who are socially vulnerable. From this 
re-interpretation, a new series of individual and collective duties are 
derived, including international ones, which require the reallocation of 
political responsibility between single actions and collective actions within 
a scheme of co-operative organisation.
The ultimate objective of Goodin’s theory consists in the liberation 
from the condition—or better from the threat—of vulnerability, which is 
contingent on a state of dependence. Such dependence is characterised, 
according to Goodin, by four conditions: 1) an asymmetrical balance of 
power, 2) the subordinate party’s need of vital resources, which are 
provided by the relationship; 3) the necessity of the relationship, because 
of its provision of resources; 4) the exercise of discretionary power over 
the resources by the superordinate (Goodin, 1985b, 195-6). From the 
perspective of the consequentialist objective of security—i.e., one in which 
attention is not paid to past responsibility for the creation of dependency, 
but rather on how to eliminate it—two strategies are paramount: empower 
the vulnerable and prevent the possibility of dependence. However, 
complete alleviation of dependency is not possible, and principally not in 
the international field, so a reasonable compromise must be found between 
independence and interdependence.
Goodin presents the normative conclusions of his arguments through 
the formulation of a number of foundational rules of social order. Among 
these, significantly relevant for their application to the international 
domain are the ‘principle of group responsibility’ and the ‘principle of 
individual responsibility’. According to the first.
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“if A’s interests are vulnerable to the actions and choices 
of a group of individuals, either disjunctively or 
conjunctively, then the group has a special responsibility 
to (a) organise (formally or informally) and (b) implement 
a scheme for co-ordinated action by members of the group 
such that A’s interests will be protected as well as they can 
be by that group, consistently with the group’s other 
responsibilities” (Goodin, 1985b, 136).
Conversely, the ‘second principle of individual responsibility’ asserts
that:
“if B is a member of a group that is responsible, under the 
Principle of Group Responsibility, for protecting A’s 
interests, then B has a special responsibility (a) to see to it, 
so far as he is able, that the group organises a collective 
scheme of action such that it protects A’s interests as well 
as it can, consistently with the group’s other 
responsibilities; and (b) to discharge fully and effectively 
the responsibilities allocated to him under any such 
scheme that might be organised, insofar as doing so is 
consistent with his other moral responsibilities, provided 
the scheme protects A’s interests better than none at all” 
(Goodin, 1985b, 139).
Such principles are part and parcel of a normative re-interpretation of 
state institutions in utilitarian terms. Once these principles have been 
accepted, it is plausible to concede to the state the right to act coercively in 
order to make sure that each individual’s role within the scheme of civil 
co-operation is respected. The core of this argument resides in the 
recognition of the pragmatic advantage in terms of maximisation of general 
welfare provided by the sectorial allocation of collective responsibility to 
various agents. Where the individual often fails in his solitary action, the 
state—through a division of labour and social co-ordination—can achieve 
better results. Nonetheless, despite thus being primarily the instrument for 
the allocation of responsibilities, the state is still endowed with a kind of 
subjectivity in that it embodies values and objectives, and has the capacity 
for deliberate action. An important aspect of Goodin’s thought is the 
reckoning that in so far as in the ultimate analysis responsibility remains in 
the charge of individuals, be they governors or associates, versions of
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collective super-organism are avoided. Thus, two alternatives are 
exclusively presented to the individual: where a state mechanism exist, 
there is a duty to co-operate within it under the threat of coercion; where it 
does not exists, then the individual has a duty to try to establish it. In the 
latter case, a major commitment consists in the participation in public 
campaigns to disseminate a new political sensitivity and eventually to 
promote democratic reform of international organisations (Goodin, 2003a). 
In this case, in fact, e v ^  when some defect, a duty persists “to co-operate, 
with whoever else is co-operating, in the production of the best 
consequences possible given the behaviour of non-cO-operators"(Regan, 
1980, 124).
In regards to the two most frequent objections raised against 
utilitarianism, i.e., that it would require either too little or too much 
(alternatively, demand and permit too much), Goodin’s theory shows 
particular promise with respect to the ‘too much’ charge as it concerns the 
domain of international ethics. The version of ‘government house 
utilitarianism’ sketched by Goodin does not demand too much, in as much 
as it does not command heroic action but only that social tasks be 
distributed in a reasonable way through a co-operative scheme. Similarly, 
at the international level, Goodin argues that in dealing with a situation 
where a super conscientious state could feel duty-bound to heroic sacrifice 
because of the non-compliance of other actors, the appropriate solution 
relies on the expansion of our traditional conception of state institutions.
“The solution, presumably, is just more of the same. Just 
as enforcing compliance domestically with a co-ordinated 
scheme reassures super-conscientious individuals that they 
will not have to carry an intolerable burden all by 
themselves, so too enforcing compliance internationally 
with a co-ordination scheme can reassure super- 
conscientious nations that their burdens will not prove 
intolerable. Just as the enforcement of such a scheme 
domestically can be justified in terms of the legitimacy of 
compelling people to play their required parts in schemes 
for the discharge of shared duties, so too can enforcement 
of international schemes be similarly grounded” (Goodin, 
1990a, 146).
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The nucleus of Goodin’s critical analysis regarding international 
ethics is found in its disputation of the normative priority traditionally 
accorded to nationals and the correlative special duties (Goodin, 1985b, § 
VI, 2; 1988). Through an examination of the major competing theories, 
Goodin argues that the most defensible principle in this regard is shown to 
be that of assigned responsibility, which is grounded on the notion of 
vulnerability and dependence. Such a theory of responsibility reinterprets 
the concept of special duties as a derivative sub-case of the general social 
responsibility. In this way, special duties maintain a functional role within 
a specialised division of labour which is justified by limited information 
and psychological weakness, but do not acquire a full moral autonomy. 
Hence, territorial distinctions hold only an organisational meaning and
patriotic duties remain valid only as prima facie obligations. On this,
Goodin affirms:
“the assignment of responsibility will never work 
perfectly, and there is much to make us suppose that the 
assignment embodied in the present world system is very 
imperfect indeed. In such cases, the derivative special 
responsibilities cannot bar the way to out-discharging the
more general duties from which they are derived. In the
present world system, it is often □ perhaps ordinarily □ 
wrong to give priority to the claims of our compatriots” 
(Goodin, 1995, 287).
Goodin’s set of arguments represent a powerful theoretical support 
for any consequentialist proposal on international ethics. His recognition of 
the ideal of non-vulnerability and the principle of welfare maximisation 
leads to the proposal for the expansion of the political system to the 
international level through a multilevel scheme of political co-ordination. 
Goodin’s proposal has had a significant influence on the present study, yet 
points of contrast remain between them concerning, among others, the 
issue of a greater respect for agent-relative values (which relates again to 
the possibility, accepted by Goodin, of interpersonal comparison of utility) 
and that of the specific features of the hypothetical international system as 
shaped on the federal ideal. In particular, Goodin’s discussion of the 
international division of ethical labour seems to lead toward a club-based
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notion of division which would entail a degree of exclusion in that 
marginalized citizens would be delegated a subaltern status (Goodin & 
Pettit, 1986; Goodin, 1988, 1996a). From his point of view, stateless 
citizens could be preserved from exclusion through the establishment of a 
residual responsibility standing beneath rather then above the others clubs’ 
authorities. “Precisely because they are members of no club, they have 
claims against all clubs” (Goodin, 1996a, 366). The present proposal is 
distinct in that it suggests the creation of a meta-club with universal 
membership, i.e., an overarching authority to the extent of avoiding 
exclusion, rather than a diffusive and residual responsibility that would still 
leave the disadvantaged non-members in an inferior position in comparison 
with full members. These points will be expanded in the next two chapters, 
before that, however, the presentation of the last major utilitarian argument 
on international ethics remains.
Reductionism
The last utilitarian thesis presented in this survey is that of Derek 
Parfît. Parfît’s reductionist argument—equally promising and unexplored 
in the international domain—bears particular relevance for the issue of the 
state’s collective identity (Parfît, 1984). The entirety of Parfît’s reasoning 
on moral agents and their identity stems from the observation of the 
common-sense understanding of the state. Parfît asserts:
“Most of us believe that the existence of a nation does not 
involve anything more than the exercise of a number of 
associated people. We do not deny the reality of nations.
But we do deny that they are separately, or independently, 
real. Their existence just involves the existence of their 
citizens, behaving together in certain ways, on their 
territory” (Parfît, 1984, III, 15, 116: 340).
This notwithstanding, when in common speech we refer to France, 
for instance, our reference is not to individuals as such but to that network 
of relationships that is considered to constitute a nation; if instead our 
reference were to a specific government, group of citizens or territory,
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then, should these elements mutate, we could no longer assign an identity 
to France. This confirms for Parfit that we can refer to something even 
when ‘it* does not have the integrity of an autonomously existing entity 
(Parfit, 1984, appendix D: 472).
Parfit’s reductionist argument rests on the similarity between state 
and person, which he explicitly takes from David Hume^®. In the Treatise, 
the Scottish philosopher maintained:
“I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing 
than a republic or commonwealth, in which the several 
members are united by the reciprocal ties of government 
and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who 
propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its 
parts” (Hume, 1740 [1973], I, IV, § VI: 261).
From this perspective, a person is to be interpreted only within a web 
of associations; just as with a state, an association, or a political party, what 
counts is the relations between the different members. Through a 
weakening of the essentialist conception of the self and the confirmation of 
the interpretative importance of the relation Parfit refers to as ‘R’ (i.e., the 
connection and/or psychological continuity due to the right kind of cause) 
(Parfit, 1984, II, 12, § 90), Parfit proposes, in an indirect way, a series of 
interesting considerations for the field of normative international political 
theory.
Together with illuminating the problem concerning the moral status 
of the state organisation—i.e., that it exists only by dint of the relations of 
its constitutive elements—Parfit’s theory is also fertile on the issue of 
spatial-temporal partiality. Were a more impersonal conception of the right 
accepted and internalised, one would see one’s own future selves as having 
a greater resemblance to others’ future selves; one would no longer take 
one’s own personal borders to be impassable, and this insight could also be 
applied to national borders.
40 Recent interpretations o f Hume, however, tend to stress the importance o f the image of 
personal identity Hume depicts in the II and III book o f the Treatise (as oppose to the 
Parfitian focus on book I), where the features of moral character account for a stronger, or
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“If there is nothing more to a nation than its citizens, it is 
less plausible to regard the nation as itself a primary object 
of duties, or possessor of rights. It is more plausible to 
focus upon citizens, and to regard them less as citizens, 
more as people. We may therefore, on this view, think a 
person’s nationality less morally important” (Parfit, 1984, 
in , 15, § 116: 340).
Hence, such double reduction to constituent elements (from the state 
to the citizens who constitute it, and from the citizen to the individual who 
is continually (re)constituted in relation to others) implies a triple 
conclusion: first, states cannot any longer be considered the principal 
agents in the international arena; second, states lose their moral and legal 
characteristics such as rights and duties; and third, attention is turned 
primarily to individuals, in particular for what concerns distributive justice.
As a consequence, Parfitian theory also presents a number of 
innovative aspects concerning the issue of distributive justice (Parfit, 1984, 
III, 15, § 111-118). The reductionist point of view, in fact, generates a 
twofold effect on the re-allocation of goods. In abandoning a systematic 
adherence to personal unity and in spreading goods over various 
(potentially infinite) selves, the extension of the distributive principle is 
increased, but its weight diminished, as the links between different selves 
become more attenuated. As a consequence, the recognition of the 
impossibility of compensation increases, insofar as a profound interior fact 
related to personal identity is missing, which imposes, from a moral point 
of view, a balancing between different parts of life.
Much as a strong temporal identity among different selves is missing, 
so among states over time a firm spatial and temporal association among 
citizens fades away. In Parfit’s opinion, this explains and justifies prima 
facie counter-intuitive interpretations of inter-state distributive justice such 
as those cases in which current well-being has to be balance against 
compensation for past injustice. Given the case of two nations with the 
same immediate level of suffering in their citizens but with an unequal
less reductionist, conception of personal identity (Baier, 1991, 129-52; Russell, 1995, 108, 
n.24; Lecaldano, 2002).
105
capacity to benefit from aid, even if it be the case that the state that can 
benefit most from that aid is also the state with a history less burdened by 
injustice and pain, the aid should go to the nation most able to benefit from 
it. Parfit argues that it would be unreasonable to help the nation that could 
take the least advantage of aid and consequently produce a minor overall 
increase in well-being, only on the ground that this would compensate for 
past injuries. In conclusion, the objective of an historically informed 
egalitarian distributioitof pain among various nations is thus meaningless, 
insofar as nations are not commonly considered significant moral units 
with strong historical continuity (Parfit, 1984, III, 15, § 116: 341).
The nature of international utilitarian ethics
From the previous examination a number of common topics can be 
identified that permit drawing the boundaries of the overall utilitarian 
proposal on international ethics. These concern the nature of international 
morality and the extent of ethical-political obligations, and, in particular, 
the issues of the legitimacy of the state in the light of supranational rights 
and duties of individuals. These topics form the scope of this section, while 
the theoretical limits of these formulations is discussed in the next and last 
section.
In dealing with international moral dilemmas, contemporary 
utilitarian scholars reach conclusions that require, in general, an 
enlargement of the traditional sphere of moral sensitivity, an assumption of 
global responsibility, and measures of well-being redistribution beyond 
national borders. Even more than in classical utilitarianism, these scholars 
maintain a common progressive attitude in relation to established common 
sense. They argue for an approach contesting traditional moral guidelines, 
which are revealed to be inadequate in the current interdependent world 
context. In failing to meet the challenges of international affairs, 
conventional, community-based precepts in fact risk being self-defeating 
and can precipitate social disasters with high welfare costs spread world­
wide. To counter this, a denationalised reallocation of political duties
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within a re-reading of national borders in instrumental terms is the shared 
response of the international utilitarian political project.
In this, these proposals dispute the two major theoretical and political 
shields against international obligations: the mainstream creed of state 
sovereignty and the conventional objection on grounds of cultural 
relativism (Dower, 1983, 44; Barry, 2001a, 499-500). Sovereignty is re­
interpreted in an instrumental, Humaen way, according to which state 
authority can be regarded as deriving from an assigned duty within a larger 
scheme of world-wide allocation of responsibilities directed at the 
maximisation of world well-being condition. When the prospect of a 
comparatively higher cost to international well-being is evident, then the 
prima facie legitimacy of the state must abide to the superveniency of the 
ultimate universal objective and give way to supranational claims with 
respect to prioritisation of aliens’ interests. Cultural relativism is, 
conversely, accepted but not in its extreme forms. Pluralism and cultural 
differences are welcomed as sources of well-being rather than constraints, 
but their relevance is restricted to a secondary domain of political attention. 
Personal and community preferences are therefore recognised as prima 
facie valid moral claims, provided they are part of a wider co-operative 
scheme that guarantees minimal conditions to every human being. A 
primary universal concern aiming at the protection of vital interests, with 
alleged transcultural validity, in fact takes normative precedence over 
secondary cultural claims.
This leads to reinterpretations—at times heterogeneous—of a 
number of central elements of modem ethical-political theory in favour of 
a conception animated by a cosmopolitan and universalistic spirit, which 
reserves to states a limited political-administrative function. In this vein, 
normative political meaning is encouraged such that state sovereignty is 
interpreted within a wider grand image of a co-operative international 
system. The traditional concept of national citizenship is revised according 
to a more comprehensive perspective, entailing different levels of political 
participation and correlative social entitlements as part of a cosmopolitan 
membership. Human rights are valued, but only in conjunction with a 
renewed attention to corresponding human duties in the charge of a diverse
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series of political agents, including individuals and collective entities. 
Finally, the legitimacy of special duties is downgraded to an indirect 
assigned authority, which receives normative validity depending on its 
consistency with a superior scheme of global duties aimed toward the 
pursuit of world well-being.
In sum, the output of contemporary international utilitarianism 
constitutes a significant component of the ongoing revival of 
cosmopolitanism in international ethics that began in the seventies. In 
moving to the global sphere of action, these scholars offer a sophisticated 
version of that theory of utility that has been applied to the domestic 
domain with great influence (despite recent criticisms) in the last two 
centuries since Bentham’s formulations. Although these utilitarian 
arguments have shown a weak profile in the contemporary debate— 
possibly also on account of the lack of intense internal dialogue among 
utilitarian scholars—the approach of such proposals shows promise as 
being able to play a major role in future discussions. This said, however, 
there are a number of problematic or underdeveloped aspects in these 
proposals that need to be tackled if the promise of international 
utilitarianism is to be realised.
Conclusions: an agenda for future investigation
Two limitations are most evident in the formulation of contemporary 
international utilitarianism from the present perspective, limitations with 
regards to the ethical-political and the international-political component of 
such a theory. The issues of agency and multilevel dimensionality 
represent the two major challenges that utilitarianism, as well as any other 
theory of international ethics, must offer a valid response to in order to 
prove its viability as a theory of global justice. Toward such a task, this 
study submits that the utilitarian arguments presented so far offer valuable 
but partial answers, which need to be revised and further developed in 
order to provide a more robust vision of consequentialist global justice. 
Without disregarding their value on other issues such as the universal and 
interaction-independent character of their prescriptions or their sensitivity
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to individual welfare, this thesis argues that a two-fold development of the 
international utilitarian theory is necessary for attaining normative 
consistency. First, a new understanding of political consequentialism has to 
be adopted which in being epistemologically more sensitive takes into 
greater consideration agent-relative values. When this is accepted, the 
normative focus shifts to the primacy of freedom of choice and political 
participation, which promises a more consistent and less indeterminate 
teleological argument. Second, a new understanding of multilevel political 
agency and participation is required which entails a complex conception of 
agency as choice-maker vs. choice-bearer and as individual vs. collective 
agent. From this, a new depiction of both cosmopolitan citizenship and 
cosmopolitan institutions can be unfolded which prescribes an all-inclusive 
political system framed on differing jurisdictional levels embedded in a 
federal model of global democratic participation.
In particular, concerning the first principal weakness of the 
contemporary international utilitarian arguments, the notions of moral and 
political agency they proposed are considered to be neither sufficiently 
sophisticated nor inclusive enough to meet the ethical challenges of current 
international affairs. Firstly, a more subtle conception of the 
epistemological constraints, which denies the viability of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility beyond a minimal level, needs to be pursued. This 
conception would allow for the recognition of agent-relativity and 
pluralism through respect for individual and collective choices. Following 
from this, a double notion of political agency in terms of responsible and 
vulnerable agents could be developed in order to deal exhaustively with the 
issue of liability and harm at the global level. And finally, an all-inclusive 
political perspective could be elaborated, which in being constrained to 
respect individual freedom of choice would imply the inclusion of all 
individuals as members of a universal and multilayered constituency.
In being consequentialist, utilitarianism is not pre-conditioned in the 
selection of the political subjects to be taken into ethical consideration. 
While up until a few years ago the absolute protagonist in international 
relations was the sovereign state, today the situation has changed and a 
number of other actors need to be acknowledged as active on the
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international scene; these include individuals, civil associations, 
corporations, and international organisations. In this regard, 
consequentialism can prove its theoretical ability to include a wide 
spectrum of social reality, insofar as it considers any subject liable, i.e., 
with an obligation to act, depending on his capacity to influence the 
outcome of any given situation in terms of well-being production. Despite 
the individual being recognised as the ultimate moral reference, he is not 
made the sole locus of political responsibility, rather, a series of different 
agents are to be called to action in a synchronic and pluri-level scheme of 
co-ordinated politics according to a global theory of welfare maximisation.
A parallel argument on responsibility concerning the damages to the 
agents bearing the weight of decisions has to be developed in the negative 
contours of agency. In this, consequentialism can be useful in offering a 
refined, double notion of action and omission (Bennett, 1980b, 1980a), 
which needs to be coupled with the equally relevant distinction between 
individual and collective action. Accordingly, practical cases such as a) 
those with imperceptible effects, b) those of partial compliance like 
prisoner’s or the contributor’s dilemma, or c) those with a low degree of 
probability, can generate dramatic consequences with global reach when 
considered in aggregate terms. An enlarged perspective on moral action, 
able to revise the interpretation of the five errors of moral mathematics as 
listed by Parfit (Parfit, 1984, § 3), thus represents the objective of 
international consequentialism in this regard. In the domain of international 
affairs, the single most studied utilitarian example of this casuistry is likely 
Singer’s image of a child drowning in a pond with many people all around 
relying on the others’ intervention and so not acting themselves (Singer, 
1972). Even in those cases where a prima facie international duty to assist 
people in need is charged to international organisations, the individual still 
maintains a responsibility based upon an obligation to contribute to the 
maximisation of the outcome. This obligation manifests itself in a variety 
of ways including pressure on the government as a citizen, on private 
corporations as a consumer and share-holder, and on international 
organisations as a member of civil associations.
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Consequently, the issue of multilevel political dimensionality should 
also be rethought. A major fault of contemporary utilitarians, in fact, 
consists in the lack of a full proposal for a supranational political structure. 
Hints in this direction can be found in their writings, but no comprehensive 
proposals are fully developed. Without such a multilayered political 
organisation, the moral and political management of different kinds of 
problems which pertain to distinct realms of action would be ineffective. 
An issue such as globakenvironmental degradation, for instance, offers a 
clear case that cannot be dealt with properly through state or interstate 
procedure, and that rather requires handling by a supranational political 
institution. The evolution of the utilitarian tradition toward what seems its 
most natural landing place, a full moral and institutional democratic 
cosmopolitanism, thus sets out the obliged direction for the future 
development of consequentialist ethics applied to international relations. 
Addressing this task forms the content of the rest of this thesis.
I l l
IV
Consequentialist Cosmopolitanism: Ethical and 
Political Aspects
“Human nature is not a machine to be built after 
a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for 
it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself 
on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward 
forces which make it a living thing” (\6 l, 1859 [1962],
188)
“Trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each 
other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find 
these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful 
and straight □ whereas those which put out branches at 
will, in freedom and in isolation from others, grow 
stunted, bent and twisted” (Kant, 1784 [1991], V: 46)
From Plato’s Republic to Rawls’s Theory o f Justice, political theory 
has always been characterised by a predominant consideration of the 
domestic sphere of socio-political interaction. This stubborn concentration 
on the individual and domestic domains of justice has perhaps contributed 
to the reluctance of political thinking to address inter-community 
normative issues, thus simultaneously generating the phenomenon of 
international political exclusion. Modem theories of political philosophy in 
particular have suggested a number of different combinations of legitimate 
relationships between the individual and the state, but have mainly failed to
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expand their arguments to the wider vision necessary to realise an inclusive 
theory of international political justice. The repeated challenges to such 
limited perspective generated by recent global transformations have, 
however, put increasing pressure on both the traditional socio-political 
structure of the nation-state and the conventional political concepts 
underpinning it. Arguably, the tenaciousness of this limited focus has 
contributed to the intensification of the debate surrounding international 
ethics in the last thirty years, in which universalistic theories have 
contested the conventionally assumed exclusivity of the binomial 
individual-state.
Within this context, the significance of cosmopolitan theories 
consists in the emphasis they put on both the moral importance of the other 
major level of political action—the global—and the need to reshape the 
balance between the proposed third level and the two established levels of 
political analysis. Arguing directly against group-based theories such as 
communitarianism and nationalism, which typically recognise the political 
priority (at times even absolute) of a discrete community, cosmopolitanism 
holds that the scope of justice should ultimately be global, since a proper 
account of the moral personality cannot but be universalistic and all- 
inclusive. As shown in the previous two chapters, among cosmopolitans, 
utilitarian scholars in particular have offered a number of significant 
specific contributions to the understanding of global issues of justice, but 
have failed to provide a comprehensive cosmopolitan theory. Although 
they have produced studies on relevant issues, such as the duty to relieve 
poverty or the right to self-determination, they have given insufficient 
attention to the more general normative framework of global justice.
Whilst holding to the terms within which this debate has been 
framed, this chapter aims to provide the core argument underpinning an 
all-inclusive version of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. A reworked 
consequentialist argument on individual well-being is presented that, in 
view of the epistemological constraints pertaining to interpersonal 
comparisons of utility, concentrates instead on the core ideals of freedom 
of choice and control over the political system. On this basis, a non- 
exclusionary cosmopolitan conception of global justice is outlined that
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deploys on differing political levels a single but indirect criterion of justice: 
the principle of the maximisation of the world well-being condition. 
Accordingly, the theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism unfolds over 
three applicative levels (individual, state, and world), each analysed using 
three conceptual filters (value, rules, and agency), all of which are unified 
through an appeal to the principle of the maximisation of the world well­
being condition.
This chapter begins by setting out the epistemological foundations 
and a renewed consequentialist conception of well-being as centred on the 
notion of freedom of choice. In order to clarify this normative stance, a 
number of normative comparisons with major theories of justice, including 
utilitarianism, contractarianism, autonomy-based theories, and Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s capability approach are outlined. From this, the chapter then 
proceeds to a presentation of the fundamental rationale of the conception of 
global justice from the consequentialist cosmopolitan perspective, which in 
being all-inclusive recognises a double universal entitlement concerning 
the guarantee of vital interests and political participation. The next chapter 
presents an outline of the institutional and international characteristics of 
the proposal and concluding remarks on the whole proposal are presented 
thereafter.
Epistemological foundations: limits on interpersonal
comparability
A fundamental epistemological consideration concerning the 
limitations on interpersonal comparisons of utility distinguishes 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism from other theories of justice. The issue 
of comparability is highly contentious both in moral and economic theory, 
especially after the dramatic influence of logical positivism on Anglo- 
Saxon social sciences in the thirties. While moral theories such as 
utilitarianism and contractarianism have generally accepted the possibility 
of comparing and aggregating utilities of different persons for the sake of 
redistribution, economics has shown a more ambivalent (and rather 
sceptical) attitude toward this possibility, most of the time limiting its
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consideration to the ordinal criterion of Pareto superiority^ i. According to 
the perspective of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, if the profound fact of 
cultural pluralism at the international level is to be respected, interpersonal 
comparisons have to be considered legitimate only at a minimal level.
Traditionally, the possibility of comparing different persons’ utilities, 
intended as descriptive analysis, has been proposed according to three 
distinct methods: behaviourism; introspective welfare comparison; and 
introspective ‘as i f  choice. While the first focuses directly on a person’s 
observable states and relies on the observation of common behaviours such 
as physical or verbal body expressions, the second and third methods 
deploy a mental experiment, namely to put oneself in another’s shoes, 
roughly speaking. The welfare comparison reflects on hypothetical 
questions about expediency, such as “would I feel better off as a person A 
in a situation x or as a person B in a situation y?” The ‘as i f  method, 
conversely, generates counterfactual situations in which even normative 
considerations can be included as factors influencing the choice between 
two different personal situations (Sen, 1982a, § 12).
The possibly most influential critic of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility was Lionel Robbins, who argued in 1935 that no comparison is 
scientifically viable, in that “introspection does not enable A to measure 
what is going on in B’s mind” (Robbins, 1935, 140; 1938), and thus that 
the act of comparing needs to be considered an essentially normative 
exercise"^ .^ While this argument on the inaccessibility of others’ minds
The debate on the issue o f comparability has been intense over the years. For a general 
survey see (Elster & Hylland, 1986; Elster & Roemer, 1991), Major protagonists o f the 
debate have been: (Pareto, 1896-97, bk, II; Von Neumann & Morgenstem, 1944, 16; 
Arrow, 1951, 9; Little, 1957; Jeffrey, 1971; Hammond, 1977; Narens & Luce, 1983; 
Davidson, 1986; Gibbard, 1986; Sheng, 1987; Hausman, 1995). Among the utilitarians, 
Harsany and Hare have supported the ethical meaningfulness of interpersonal 
comparisons, cardinally intended on the so called ‘judgement o f extended sympathy’ 
(Hare, 1952; Harsanyi, 1955; Hare, 1981; Harsanyi, 1987).
Before Robbins, levons had argued along similar lines: “Every mind is thus inscrutable 
to every other mind, and no common denominator o f feeling seems to be possible. But 
even if  we could compare tiie feelings of different minds, we should not need to do so; for 
one mind only affects another indirectly” (levons, 1871 [1957]). Compare also Griffin: 
“What is needed for comparability is something less than such strong assumptions about 
fairness but something more than simple matters of fact. [...] So interpersonal 
comparisons are value judgements in this sense: they are part and parcel o f a complex 
normative exercise” (Griffin, 1986,120; Scanlon, 1991).
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applies explicitly only to the methods of introspective comparison, the very 
same observation undermines the method based on behavioural 
observation when it is applied cross-culturally. Drawing on anthropological 
studies of the last centuiy, it is not difficult to bring to mind cases where 
strikingly different cultural interpretations have been made of similar 
behaviours, such as the ritual meaning of death-related actions or, more 
prosaically, the diverse understandings of social ties in different 
communities (Hatch, 1^83; Cook, 1999).
A counter-argument to this anti-comparative and anti-patemalist 
stance points out that if the possibility of utility comparison is denied at the 
/«/er-personal, it must also be denied at the m/ra-personal level. It 
continues by claiming that the logical extension of the proposed 
invalidation of interpersonal comparisons is that, in so far as all choices are 
based on a generalisation of the past without which no long-term personal 
integrity can be conceived, the very notion of rational self-interested 
choices itself should be denied (Parfit, 1984; Gibbard, 1986, IV). To be 
sure, at the personal level we necessarily rely on some sort of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility (Little, 1957, 54; Davidson, 1986, 195), however, 
one has to respect the difference running between personal liability and 
public responsibility. What I contest is the viability of such interpersonal 
comparisons of utility as sufficiently reliable tools for public policy in an 
international context of differing systems of social meaning. In the self- 
regarding sphere of action, individual fallibility is a private matter of 
concern, while in the political sphere, the fact of pluralism constrains 
public policy, and especially international public policy, to respect 
individual choice in recognition of diversity. In this latter instance, the 
reliance on imprecise approximations should be reduced as much as 
possible to protect differences^^.
An all too scarce consideration of these insurmountable 
epistemological difficulties has been one of the major flaws of a
Sen identifies at least five sources of variation or classes of differences concerning 
well-being: 1) personal heterogeneity; 2) environmental diversity; 3) variations in social 
climates; 4) differences in relational perspectives; and 5) distribution within the family
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considerable part of ethical theory, and of utilitarianism in particular. As 
mentioned in chapter I, a large part of the recent criticism of the utilitarian 
school relates to this insufficient consideration of the epistemological 
constraints on comparability. In fact, since the first classical Benthamite 
formulations on pleasure to the more contemporary statements on revealed 
preferences, utilitarians have always relied heavily on comparability and 
cardinal utility ordering, even in their indirect prescriptions. In so doing, 
however, a number of serious ethical problems have been incurred, 
including the lack of respect for the separateness of persons and the 
sacrifice of minorities for the sake of majorities. The revised 
consequentialist proposal advanced here, allows instead for the avoidance 
of these problems, in so far as it envisages an agent-relative interpretation 
of well-being, which in being epistemologically un-demanding produces a 
strong liberal and anti-patemalistic international pohtical theory.
From the point of view of consequentialist cosmopolitanism these 
epistemological constraints cannot be legitimately overcome in a project of 
international ethics, which must take into account both the fundamental 
pluralism of social meanings and the fundamental demand for equality 
which so determine contemporary international affairs. To be sure, 
pluralism is here simply presumed as one of the major tests for 
international ethics, in that as no definitive comparison can be effected, no 
definitive dissimilarity can be determined either. All that can be 
determined is that neither an absolute homogeneity nor an absolute 
heterogeneity can be identified. It is this indeterminacy that shapes the 
intention of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. Consequently, since 
diversity cannot ultimately be proven, the requirement to respect and 
guarantee individuals’ own conceptions of a good life rests on and 
constitutes the prescriptive content of a normative pluralism that 
accommodates the demands of a presumed empirical pluralism. Only at a 
very minimal level concerning the vital interests of individuals, as it will be 
explained later in this chapter, can an interpersonal and transcultural 
ground be found which allows for effective comparisons to be used in
(Sen, 2000b, 70-1). Additionally, Pogge suggested a sixth one: 6) socially caused
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public policy. For the rest, an alternative political strategy has to be 
individuated as a valid means for international ethics to deal with value 
indeterminacy. In what follows, an alternative account of well-being as 
freedom of choice is thus presented, which while maintaining its 
independence from the traditional account of interpersonal utility 
comparisons adopts an epistemologically viable metric that allows for 
interpersonal comparisons of capabilities for purposes of political justice.
Normative foundations: well-being as freedom of choice
Consequentialist cosmopolitanism, as a goal-based ethical theory, 
aims at the promotion of the good, which is assumed to reside in a 
comprehensive conception of individual well-being. It consequently 
defines the right after the good as the maximal goodness. Accordingly, an 
action-guiding principle is warranted only in so far as it complies with the 
test of universalizability, i.e., can be expected to produce the best outcome 
in terms of general well-being. On a more profound, meta-theoretical level, 
then, the ultimate foundation of the consequentialist approach per se relies 
on a principal consideration: simplicity. Differing from deontological 
theories, which purport to both honour and promote values, the objective of 
consequentialism is only to promote those values that foster well-being^'^. 
In comparison with non-consequentialist theories, consequentialism scores 
better in terms of simplicity since it does not need any further argument to 
justify honouring the value above that of promoting it. Thus, “where 
consequentialists introduce a single axiom on how values justify choices, 
non-consequentialists must introduce two” (Pettit, 1993b, 238). Moreover, 
the latter need to endorse ad hoc justifications to identify those values that 
are to be honoured rather than promoted (Harsanyi, 1979; Hare, 1981; 
Kupperman, 1981; Riley, 1988; Goodin, 1990a; Pettit, 1993b, 1993c; Hare,
heterogeneity (Pogge, 2002a).
“A good will be a goal for an agent or agency if and only if  the task is to promote the 
good: to maximise its expected realisation. A good will be a constraint for an agent or 
agency, on the other hand, if and only if the task is not necessarily to promote it, but to 
bear witness to its importance or to honour it” (Pettit, 1997, 97-8).
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1999; Hooker, 2000; Hooker et a l, 2000)45. This single value justification, 
in association with the epistemological constraints examined in the 
previous section, bears a number of important consequences on the 
formulation of the theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism as a 
proposal for international ethics.
This axiological foundation entails leading the theory toward three 
central assumptions of contemporary ethical discourse: normative 
individualism, egalitarianism (alternatively interpreted as the anonymity 
condition), and universalism. While the first holds that the unique or most 
relevant agents to be taken into account in the normative exercise are 
individuals, the second maintains that individuals should fundamentally be 
considered as equals in the relevant aspects, and the third claims the scope 
of moral consideration to extend to include all humans, wherever they 
live46. Consequentialist cosmopolitanism also relies on these terms. It 
embraces normative individualism in that it considers the single human 
agent the principal recipient of the good^^, but it also implies universal 
egalitarianism, in so far as the aforementioned epistemological constraints 
impose respect for each individual sphere of action as a potential generator 
of well-being. This last consideration brings us to the core distinguishing
45 Similarly, Sen argues the following in support o f consequential evaluation: “In contrast 
with consequence-independent deontology, or trade-off-barred deontology, broad 
consequential evaluation has considerably more reach and range, in being able to 
accommodate diverse moral concerns that have claims to our attention. In comparison 
with permissive kinds o f deontology, broad consequential evaluation can claim to have, at 
least, a more explicit—and somewhat more integrated—framework o f judgement 
evaluation” (Sen, 2000a, 480).
4^ The first two steps, nicely combined in the Benthamite expression “everybody to count 
for one, nobody for more than one”, are deemed uncontroversial in analytical ethical 
theory (Pettit, 1993a, 23-25). Their origins date from the Greek concept o f isogony (i.e., 
equality of birth), passing through the Christian conception o f brotherhood equality later 
embodied in the law of nature.
4^ With respect to individualism, two additional assumptions o f the theory of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism concerning freedom and identity should be made 
explicit. Moral agents are considered free from strict causal determination and so able to 
make deliberate and independent moral choices. Natural determinism is thus rejected. 
Moreover, agents are primarily considered to be individuals and, secondarily, collective 
agents such as states or international organisations. ‘Sub-individual’ selves are not 
included in the category of possible moral agents, in that they are deemed to be too locally 
biased in their cultural self-image, and subsequently not viable for a project o f  
international ethics. Thus, disaggregation of personal identity as a chain of contingent 
selves à la Parfit is also rejected, and a normative (rather than ontological) individualism 
explicitly recognised as a starting assumption of this project.
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political element of consequentialist cosmopolitanism: freedom of choice 
as the metric for well-being.
As determined by respect for epistemological limitations, the 
consequentialist justification illuminates a crucial issue of the political 
theory proposed here, i.e., the ground on which the assessment of the 
political principles advanced should be made. According to 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism, due to the unavailability of reliable 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being, such indicator of well-being can 
only be indirectly and causally identified in the individual capacity for 
choice between different life options. Underpinning this is the best-judge 
principle, according to which each person should be free to decide on 
matters that primarily affect him alone, for the best judge of what is for the 
good of a person is always that person himself. Accordingly, this theory 
maintains a prima facie^ agent-relative theory of the good, in that it holds 
that uniquely when agents are in a position to freely choose their preferred 
course of action through a process of informed and effective personal 
deliberation, can genuine well-being be presumably attained. Personal 
choices, rather than some specific theory-laden conception of the good, are 
thus taken to be the best (albeit indirect) expression of the individual’s 
interests, i.e., what will make the individual generally better off. In this 
vein, “human development is first and foremost about allowing people to 
lead the kind of life they choose—and providing them with the tools and 
opportunities to make these choices” (UNDP, 2004, V). Of course, the 
causal connection between a person’s autonomous choice and that person’s 
well-being carmot but be empirically subject to exceptions. However, 
despite the fact that such relations can only attain the status of a reasonable 
presumption with statistical force, and not scientific certainty, the strength 
of the present point is no less, in that a reasonable presumption suffices for 
the role the metric has to play in this argument.
This combination of the consequentialist principle with the 
recognition of the epistemological constraints generates a new version of 
consequentialism which is distinct from other teleological theories in 
offering the potential for simultaneous inclusion of agent-neutral and 
agent-relative values, without the addition of further normative principles.
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Following the path first explored by Sen (but see the comparative 
discussion of his theory in the next section), consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism claims to offer a proposal which is able to respond 
critically to a number of the major attacks made to the consequentialist 
paradigm in the last thirty years. Such a task is delivered by the 
differentiation of central features such as criterion of right and decision 
procedures or first order and second order principles only through the 
deployment of the ^consequentialist principles and epistemological 
considerations. In this sense, while the consequentialist criterion of the 
good here adopted remains grounded in the universalist and objective 
agent-neutral principle of promotion well-being, because of inevitable 
epistemological constraints, the decision procedure of the theory relies 
‘restrictively’ on a subjective agent-relative mechanisms anchored to 
fi’eedom of choice"* .^ Moreover, the coexistence of a second order 
consequentialist principle (the final arbiter) and different prima facie non- 
consequentialist, agent-relative, and procedural principles as first order 
rules (the intermediate applicative rules) is envisaged (Jackson, 1991). 
Hence, through such indirect normative strategy consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism remains on an axiologically ‘simple’ basis which being 
consistent is more easily defensible^^.
Thus, unlike in most other contemporary theories of justice, well­
being is not directly individuated here in such specific elements as 
happiness, preference satisfaction, income, wealth or other kind of 
resource, since they are assumed to be not measurable in a trustworthy way 
and thus not viable social tools for political public policies. Instead, 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism identifies well-being indirectly in the
For similar consequentialist strategies that have highly influenced my views see (Sen, 
1982b; Pettit & Brennan, 1986; Hardin, 1988), for the original discussion of such indirect 
strategy to be found in Butler (Butler, 1726 [1983], § sermon XII, section IV, § 31).
To the objection that such a double strategy endorses the deception of self and others, 
in that in implementing a principle in a specific agent-relative way one cannot genuinely 
pursue the agent’s good but only instrumentally and deceivingly so, a response based on 
Hare’s two-level theory can be offered (Hare, 1981). No deception is implied in having a 
two-level moral life in which we ordinarily apply first order common principles that are 
nevertheless backed by first order moral considerations to which we appeal in difficult life 
circumstances. Love and fiiendship are no less genuine, despite the fact that we at times 
consider them in light of universal moral principles.
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presumed outcome, the unspecified by-product of the agent’s fireedom of 
choice, where, more analytically, choice is identified as the opportunity to 
choose among each subset of the set of alternative options^O. This 
opportunity, intended as the capability^ ^  to choose freely à la Sen, is 
characterised by two principal features: content and context independence 
(Pettit, 2001a, 5-6). The value of the capability of choice has to be content- 
independent, i.e., decisive regardless of which of the relevant options is 
preferred, in that we would be otherwise obliged to think that fi'eedom 
means adapting our preferences appropriately (Berlin, 1969, xxxviii). 
Additionally, the capability to choose also has to be context-independent, 
i.e., decisive regardless of the parametric decisions of the other agents, in 
that fi’eedom would otherwise dominated by the goodwill of those around 
us (Pettit, 1997, § 1.2). These consequentialist considerations lead to the 
general prescription to maximise the individual capacity of choice as the 
most effective—and epistemologically sound—strategy to achieve the 
promotion of the general w e l l - b e i n g ^ ^
The present description of the capability to choose fieely is also 
consistent with the kind of republican freedom as individual (non­
dominated) power of choice recently re-elaborated by Pettit (Pettit, 1997, 
2001a). In his view, freedom as non-domination represents a third type of 
liberty, which integrates both freedom as non-interference (negative 
fieedom), as in Bentham (Bentham, 1781 [1988])^^, and fieedom as self-
For other points o f view on the concept of choice: (Broome, 1978; Dworkin, 1982; 
Sen, 1985; Scanlon, 1988; Sen, 1988; Reeve, 1990, 115-117; Dowding, 1992; I. Carter, 
2001a). Note that the characterisation o f well-being as freedom o f choice meets the three 
criteria commonly required on any conception o f well-being, as expressed by Scanlon, in 
that it represents a general consensus, allows for the fact o f individual variation in taste 
and interests and is result-oriented (Scanlon, 1979, 655-6).
 ^^  In the rest o f the text, the terms capacity and capability (of choice) are used 
interchangeably, despite minor differences existing that do not affect the central thrust of 
the notion as deployed here.
The notion o f well-being as freedom of choice is here intended principally as the 
normative basis for a political principle fostering emancipation and autonomous self­
development o f individuals, and in this sense it has to be understood as a minimal social 
project. Beyond that, however, I am inclined to think that such a principle has to be 
connected to the ultimate ideal o f aesthetic self-creation as full employment o f individual 
capabilities. This connection is not part o f the present study.
But see a different, more comprehensive interpretation o f the notion of freedom in 
classical utilitarianism (Kelly, 2001).
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mastery (positive freedom), as depicted by Berlin (Berlin, 1958)^^. 
Freedom of choice has then to be interpreted not simply as non-actual 
interference, but as absence of mastery by others. An agent is free to 
choose on his life options when he is not exposed to the arbitrary power of 
the dominating party, when the others are unable to interfere arbitrarily and 
at will in his own affairs (Pettit, 1997, 22). Since it is possible to be 
dominated without being interfered, the freedom required for individual 
pursuit of genuine wellbeing has to coincide with being in the position to 
enjoy non-domination—escape coercion—in any circumstance.
Freedom as non-domination is, however, just one face of the 
consequentialist interpretation of freedom of choice, which remains a goal- 
oriented normative theory and therefore yields an instrumental 
interpretation of freedom. In this sense, freedom of choice is indeed a 
crucial component of the model of consequentialist ethics here presented, 
but this is because it is necessary for promoting individual well-being, not 
because of its independent value. Before developing this point further in 
the next section against other contemporary theories of justice, however, an 
objection which aims at the core of the relation between freedom of choice 
and well-being, and the definition of well-being itself, needs to be 
examined.
This objection to a choice-based notion of well-being stresses that the 
link between well-being and personal choice is only contingent, that well­
being is not achieved (or achievable) through free choice, or vice versa that 
choices are not conducive to (or motivated by the pursuit of)^^ well-being.
According to Pettit, both liberties have limited political significance. The traditional 
understanding o f negative freedom—being let alone by others— which focuses on un­
coerced choices thanks to the absence o f external obstacles (intentional intervention plus 
coercion o f a credible threat), carmot distinguish between unimpeded and un-dominated 
choices (allowed by the dominator’s goodwill). On the other side, positive freedom, 
conventionally seen as self-mastery and positive control o f one’s own actions and life, 
instead, carmot collectively accommodate the liberal values o f individualism in that it 
fosters a populist attitude which endangers minorities.
On this. Sen maintains that “a person’s choice may be guided by a number of motives 
o f which the pursuit o f personal well-being is only one. The well-being motivation may 
well be dominant in some choices, but not in others. Moral considerations may, inter alia, 
influence a person’s ‘commitment’. The mixture o f motivations makes it hard to.form a 
good idea o f a person’s well-being on the basis o f choice information only” (Sen, 1985, 
188). See also (Sen, 1977).
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Were this remark effective, a consequentialist argument should re-direct its 
focus directly on well-being or on other strategies concentrated on more 
significant phenomenological aspects of well-being. My response to this 
begins by delineating a distinction between a) cases in which the agent is 
autonomously making a choice of not choosing or of apparently self- 
harming and b) those cases in which the agent is not capable of choosing 
freely. From this, different considerations follow which rebut the objection 
in opposite ways. While in the case of a) the value of freedom of choice is 
restated through the disputation of restricted and unjustified notion of, 
respectively, free choice and well-being, which violates the 
epistemological constraints on the interpersonal comparability of utilities, 
in b) it is confirmed through the failed practical implementation.
In particular, four challenging personal cases can be considered in 
the analysis of the two subsets of the objection. For the first set: al) A 
person with masochistic and suicidal preferences; and a2) A person with 
moral motivation and ideological (externally motivated) reasons, which 
could lead him up to dying as a consequence of non-choice, as in the cases 
of heroes, martyrs, Socrates or Jesus. For the second subset: b l) A person 
who has to face so many options that she remains paralysed and unable to 
choose, such as the story of Buridan’s ass and the donkey incapable of 
choosing (Sen, 1997, 765); and b2) A child or a mentally ill person who is 
not able to choose autonomously (Sen, 1985, 204). As we will see the 
relation between well-being and free choice in each of the four cases 
remains ultimately constant, despite the prima facie variants.
Considering al), the masochist thinks that in choosing self-harm or, 
at the extreme, suicide he achieves his well-being (nothing changes, of 
course, if it is somebody else who harms the masochist, since we suppose 
the consensual relation between the two). To oppose this by maintaining 
that such is a case of free choice which is not conducive to well-being, one 
has to offer first an alternate, substantive conception of well-being, and 
second to impose it on the masochist, without his consent. This is only 
possible through interpersonal utility comparisons, but since we have 
denied the epistemological plausibility of such a possibility, any attempt to 
circumvent it remains an ideological imposition that is detrimental to well-
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being promotion. Equally, considering a2), we can imagine a religious 
fundamentalist, a civic hero, or a radical philosopher who chooses to 
renounce doing something which could promote their (supposed) well­
being or, at the extreme, save their life, but only at the cost of disowning 
their own principles. This is a typical case of choosing to not choose, in 
which the agent autonomously decides for attitudes that would seem to be 
the exact opposite of well-being-seeking choice-making. After more 
careful observation, however, it can be discovered that such virtuous 
conducts are (and indeed can only be) valued e contrario by the possibility 
of not so acting. Fasting is valuable only in so far as individuals could eat; 
it is the choice of not eating that makes right the act. The well-being of 
these persons is dependent on their capability to choose (not to choose) 
according to their value. Again, denying them the possibility of so 
choosing and acting would require an unjustified interpersonal assumption 
on well-being, thus representing an ideological imposition that is 
detrimental to well-being promotion.
The b) cases are different, in that they are not cases of mislead 
assessment of the value of freedom of choice or well-being, but cases of 
failed practical implementation of the capability to choose freely. 
Considering bl), we have to resolve a situation in which a person faces a 
decision between two or more options without knowing which one to 
prefer. Although either of the two options would be beneficial to her well­
being, just with slightly different degrees, she is so undecided as to which 
to choose that she is incapable of arriving at any conclusive thought. 
Circumstance like these are indeed quite frequent and invite the admission 
that at least in these cases we should not consider free choice to be an 
effective conductor of well-being or, the other way round, that well-being 
is more easily achievable through devices other than free choice. Similarly, 
b2) presents the case of those who are not capable of autonomous decision­
making, e.g. a young child or a mentally ill person. Despite the scientific 
difficulties in the exact assessment of mental illness, I assume that a broad 
consensus can be taken for granted on the very possibility of considering a 
specific kind of mentally ill person as incapable of autonomously choosing 
for themselves. The same applies, more uncontroversially, to young
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children. Now, on the provision that the agents under scrutiny are not able 
to choose, and so are not capable of deciding for themselves about their 
future, both b l) and b2) are cases in which freedom of choice, I admit, is 
not the best strategy to achieve well-being. Thus, for these special cases, 
other strategies focused only on the well-being aspect (rather then well­
being and agency freedom) have to be identified. These, however, 
constitute failures only of pragmatic implementation; they not only do not 
confute the general vajidity of the principle of freedom of choice, but 
rather confirm it in that they are based on the principle of freedom of 
choice itself.
Having responded to oft-mentioned objections to the value of 
freedom of choice, I can now proceed to present the other elements of the 
consequentialist cosmopolitan theory of justice. I will delineate them 
through a comparison with other contemporary theories of justice in order 
to draw the boundaries of the present proposal in a clearer way.
Contrasts with autonomy-based, utilitarian, and contractarian 
theories of justice
The core of this consequentialist proposal for global justice is 
individual freedom of choice. As mentioned, the capability to choose freely 
is fundamentally valued for its contribution to individual well-being and 
thereby to the maximisation of the world welfare condition. Such prima 
facie, agent-relative theory of the good, which is based on the capability of 
the individual to choose their preferred life options, has then to be 
delineated through the coupling of a consequentialist appeal to the 
promotion of well-being with an acknowledgement of the epistemological 
constraints on interpersonal comparability. The general prescription 
deriving from these considerations consists then in the duty to maximise 
the individual capacity of choice. This use of an extended and indirect 
version of consequentialism is what most characterises the ethical proposal 
of consequentialist cosmopolitanism against other competitor theories such 
as autonomy-based theories of justice, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s ethic. In this section, a number of normative
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comparisons will be drawn with the first three kinds of theories of justice, 
in order to specify the point of contrasts between the present proposal and 
the general ethical-political framework of the current discussion. The 
capability approach will be analysed in the next section.
The recognition of the instrumental value of freedom of choice as an 
agent-relative feature of the consequentialist reasoning marks a profound 
difference with theories which foster freedom on the grounds of autonomy 
per se (Kant, 1797 [1991]; Berlin, 1969; Raz, 1986, § V; Carter, 1995, 
1999; I. Carter, 2001a). These theories maintain an intrinsic and absolute 
value for personal self-determination. It is not what is directly or indirectly 
generated by the process of autonomous choosing that counts, but the fact 
of the process in itself. In opposition to this, from the consequentialist 
view, autonomy is granted only a vicarious, indirect, and non-specific 
value which ultimately resides elsewhere: in individual well-being, 
regardless of the specific actions that may produce that welfare. More 
specifically, autonomy is primarily valued not for its essential contribution 
to well-being, but rather because there are no better working alternatives 
for public policy decisions. The priority accorded to autonomy is thus an 
inevitable result of taking seriously the epistemological constraints on 
utility comparability, on the presumed incommensurable diversity of 
human natures, and the recognition of the consequentialist value of 
individual well-being^^.
In opposition to utilitarianism, consequentialist cosmopolitanism as a 
political theory endorses the view that it is possible to provide welfare to 
individuals only indirectly through the empowerment of their capabilities 
(Narveson, 1972; Brittan, 1988b, § II; Hardin, 1988, § 3; Brittan, 1990; 
Reeve, 1990; Hardin, 2003). This stance is notably distinct from both 
classical and contemporary utilitarianism insofar as it denies the 
possibilities of interpersonal comparisons of utility and subsequently
Despite a fundamental difference remaining concerning the ultimate justification of 
individual freedom, the consequentialist characterisation of freedom of choice overlaps 
with the conditions identified by Raz for autonomy. In his account, they are: 1) 
appropriate mental abilities; 2) an adequate range of options; and 3) independence. From 
these, Raz determines a set o f political duties intended as guarantees of: 1) support for the
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upends the institutional need for the crucial devise of aggregation. This 
amounts to more than simply moving from decision procedures to criterion 
of rightness, as fostered by most indirect utilitarianism (Brink, 1986, 421, 
425), in that what is denied is not our efficacy in calculating and 
impartially pursuing utility but rather the very epistemological viability of 
aggregating utilities. Thus, the political rules prescribed by a 
consequentialist cosmopolitan system should not be considered as 
redistributive technical devises based on declining marginal utility, but as 
means to promote each individual capacity for well-being pursuit 
separately. In fostering the individual capability to achieve free choice, 
such rules aim therefore only at the provision of assistance to each 
individual in search of an enhanced quality of life, and thus imply respect 
for the publicity requirement and for the separateness of persons, as 
preached by Rawls (Rawls, 1971, § 30).
However, in opposition to resourcist contractarianism (Rawls, 1971, 
1982), consequentialist cosmopolitanism holds that a focus on 
commodities as the primary condition for well-being enhancement 
represents a limited strategy that does not respect pluralism. The 
identification of a set of resourcist goods, which are deemed to be either 
intrinsically or instrumentally good to pursue any other end, shows a 
serious theoretical limitation in that it does not take into account the social, 
cultural or genetic diversity of human agents, and their subsequently 
different capacities to take advantage of such resources. In so doing, the 
resourcist approach does not treat equally the recipient agents. Contrary to 
this, consequentialist cosmopolitanism focuses on the minimal capability 
of the individual to choose freely among different life options; however, in 
that, it includes a consideration of the agents’ potential to make effective 
use of the goods at their disposal. In this respect, the present theory follows 
the teaching of Sen’s theory of capabilities (Sen, 1992; 2000b, § 3); the 
relevance of Sen’s theory to the present research is such that a section in 
itself is required to bring the contrast into focus. Such a section follows.
development o f personal abilities; 2) the creation of an adequate range o f options for
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Contrasts with the capability approach
While traditionally belonging to the deontological domain of ethical 
discourse related to autonomy, the notion of freedom of choice has recently 
expanded its spectrum of deployment to include the consequentialist 
paradigm. In the antinomy between procedure and outcome (or input and 
output legitimacy), self-determination through personal choices has 
conventionally been associated with the first rather than with the second 
element. This affirmation remains valid overall even if we take into 
account relevant exceptions such as John Stuart Mill. Recently, Sen has 
proposed a reinterpretation of the relation between two cardinal concepts at 
stake here—well-being and freedom—which has significant relevance for 
the issue of the agent’s choice as entailed in the consequentialist 
cosmopolitan theory. A contrastive comparison is thus much in order.
While representing two strands of the same consequentialist 
paradigm, consequentialist cosmopolitanism and the capability approach 
are distinct from other major variants such as utilitarianism in that they are 
agent-relative and thus centred on the individual freedom of choice. 
Traditional consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism are 
characterised, as discussed, by an agent-independent structure that takes 
into consideration the final states of affairs rather than how they are 
generated by the various actors. This allows for public aggregation but also 
for the well-known criticisms on the separateness of persons. Against this, 
the two theories under consideration here are animated by a different 
normative objective: ‘to square the circle’ by combining consequentialist 
evaluation with a number of apparently (or traditionally considered to be) 
deontological intuitions related to the respect for agent-relativity, such as 
rights and personal values.
Despite these similarities, consequentialist cosmopolitanism and the 
capability approach are nonetheless distinct in that they are based on two 
different foundational strategy and epistemological assumptions that 
produce differently defensible and yet compatible normative justifications 
of the primacy of freedom of choice as embedded in a consequentialist
choice; and 3) non-coercion and non-harm (Raz, 1986,371 and 407-8; 1994, § 1).
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framework. While the former warrants the centrality of freedom of choice 
through the combination of the consequentialist principle with some 
constraining epistemological requirements, the latter combines the 
consequential evaluation with an account of positional objectivity, i.e., the 
parametric dependence of observation and inference on the position of the 
observer. Both theories reach similar conclusions recognising the 
importance of agency freedom, but, this section argues, the normative 
strategy of the latter suffers a number of weaknesses which renders its 
justification less stable. In opposition, consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
claims to offer a more consistent account of a consequentialist ethical 
approach which is able to accommodate some of the criticisms raised 
against Sen’s version of consequential evaluation, and is thus better suited 
to the challenges of global justice. In what follows, I first briefly sketch 
Sen’s theory and then present two criticisms.
Sen’s approach to the consequential-evaluation of public schemes of 
justice is based on the notion of fimctioning capabilities. Functionings 
represent central elements of the state of a person. They include things like 
“activities (as eating or reading or seeing), and states of existence or being, 
e.g., being well nourished, being free from malaria, not being ashamed by 
poverty of one’s clothing or shoes” (Sen, 1985, 197-8). These fimctionings 
are central in the measuring of how well off people are. But more 
importantly it is the individual capability to attain a certain set and level of 
fimctionings that counts as the indicator of the overall quality of life of the 
agent. Public schemes of justice should thus be arranged in such a way as 
to promote maximally the fimctioning capabilities of individuals (Sen, 
1980, 1982b, 1985, 1988, 1992; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993; Nussbaum, 
2002).
Two interdependent normative notions are central to the capability 
approach: well-being and agency. Beginning from the notion of well-being. 
Sen expands his reasoning to include the recognition of agent-relative 
values such as freedom, motivations, and rights. In particular. Sen’s 
starting point consists in the observation that the primary feature of a 
person’s well-being is the fimctioning vector that he or she achieves (as 
opposed to other traditional components of well-being such as happiness,
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desire fiilfilment, opulence, or command over primary goods). From this 
minimal description of the functioning vector, the argument moves toward 
the inclusion of the role of agency, in that it takes into account the 
individual ability to achieve valuable functionings. The shift of attention 
from the person’s actual functionings to his or her functioning capability 
has thus the effect of, inter alia, taking note of the positive freedoms in a 
general sense (the freedom “to do this” or “to be that”) that a person can 
enjoy. As pointed out by Sen:
“The supplementation of well-being by well-being 
freedom, in the case of responsible adults, involves a 
refinement in the assessment of the well-being aspect of a 
person. But well-being freedom is only a specific type of 
freedom, and it cannot reflect the person’s over-all 
freedom as an agent; we have to turn to the notion of 
agency freedom in that context. It is hard to see how any 
part of this plurality (involving both well-being aspect and 
the agency aspect of persons) can fail to have some 
intrinsic importance” (Sen, 1985,205 Italics added).
Well-being and agency are, in Sen’s account, embedded in the 
‘consequential evaluation’, which he “sees as a discipline of responsible 
choice based on the chooser’s evaluation of states of affairs” (Sen, 2000a, 
477). Three different issues characterise consequential evaluation: 1) 
Situated evaluation as opposed to the invariance requirement; 2) 
Maximising framework as opposed to optimising; 3) Non-exclusion of 
states components as opposed to arbitrary limits (e.g. utilities). It is Sen’s 
theory of consequential evaluation, and in particular the first point 
according to which a person need not ignore the particular position from 
which she is making the choice, which will occupy the critical remainder 
of this section.
The first limit of the capability approach concerns the problem of 
impartiality among different points of view, and enquires why we should 
judge as right each agent-relative point of view. On this, it will be observed 
that Sen’s theory legitimises the promotion of different goods to different 
agents in an intrinsically agent-relative way, and in maintaining the 
intrinsic rightness of this relation, it is vulnerable on the side of impartially
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judging the interpersonal rightness of this activity. The second limit 
regards the substantive account of human nature—and the correlated 
biased interpretation of human flourishing—offered by the capability 
approach, especially that in Martha Nussbaum’s version. It will be 
clarified on this point how the capability approach in being theory-laden 
and content-specific is condemned to being partial and thus inapplicable at 
the global level.
According to Sen’s interpretation of consequentialism, namely the 
discipline of consequential evaluation, social rules should aim to promote 
maximally a comprehensive outcome. The latter has to be understood as 
opposed to a (more traditionally intended) culmination outcome, à la 
utilitarian^^. Utilitarian welfarism in fact imposes on consequentialism a 
number of arbitrary restrictions that require states of affairs be judged 
exclusively by their utility potential. This is most commonly appealed to as 
the invariance requirement, according to which any moral consideration 
should be objectively related to the resulting state of affairs and not depend 
on personal variables. Against this. Sen is keen to recognise that the 
interpretation of a state of affairs has to be informationally richer in order 
to be intuitively respectful of our common sense. A state of affairs is in fact 
arguably composed not only of utilities related to that state of affairs 
(ultimate outcomes as utilitarian want), but also of actions in general and 
agent’s own actions and values in particular; e. g., motivations, processes 
of choice, realisation of freedom, fulfilment of rights and duties. In this 
sense, restricting the interpretative focus on outcome utilities is arbitrarily 
limited and thus unjustifiable. Hence, the consequentialist evaluation is 
offered as a technique to normatively interpreted social reality in a manner 
free from arbitrary limits. In order to keep the consequentialist evaluation 
as open as possible, then the recognition of evaluator relativity and 
positional objectivity plays a crucial role.
A political example offered by Sen himself helps to understand the interpretative limits 
that can be imposed by a reading exclusively focused on culmination outcome. “If, for 
example, a presidential candidate were to argue that what is really important is not just to 
win the fbr&coming elections, but ‘to win the election fairly’, then the outcome 
recommended is a comprehensive outcome, which includes a process consideration (not 
just the culmination outcome of winning the election—no matter how)” (Sen, 2000a, 492).
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The parametric dependence of observation and inference on the 
position of the observer is, for Sen, an unavoidable constraint that has to be 
taken into account. As much as “what we can observe depends on our 
position vis-à-vis the object of observation” (Sen, 1993b, 126), any moral 
observation should also be understood as primitively dependent on the 
position occupied by the evaluator, in that “the goodness of a state of 
affairs depends intrinsically (not just instrumentally) [...] on the position of 
the evaluator in relation to the state” (Sen, 1983, 114). And yet, this does 
not deny the possibility to reach an interpersonal consensus. It is possible, 
from Sen’s point of view, to produce a “trans-positional assessment- 
drawing on but going beyond different positional observations” (Sen, 
1993b, 130). Objectivity is thus to be identified in observational claims that 
are both position-dependent and person-invariant. “Position-relative 
impersonality requires that parametric note be taken of the respective 
positions of the different persons, but not of the exact personal identities 
involved” (Sen, 2000a, 486). In opposition to the utilitarian agency 
invariance restriction. Sen proposed an authorship invariance, which is 
claimed to be impersonal, as ethics requires, but not im-positional. This is 
however problematic.
The first limit of the capability approach resides exactly in the 
assignment of intrinsic value to the agent-relative perspective. As said, Sen 
maintains that “when the restriction [i.e., evaluator neutrality, RM] is 
relaxed but otherwise the hegemony of outcome morality is maintained, I 
shall call the approach ‘consequence-based evaluation’” (Sen, 1982b, 30). 
This move is motivated by the recognition that “a morality that insists that 
after killing his wife Desdemona Othello must regard the state of affairs to 
be morally exactly as good or as bad as others—and no worse than that— 
would seem to miss something about the nature of moral evaluation of 
states” (Sen, 1982b, 30). While this is a fair point on the need to take into 
account a personal evaluator point of view, a further problem remains 
unsolved: what kind of status does this point of view have to play in the 
moral reasoning, if the hegemony of the outcome has be to maintained? In 
particular, how is this personal evaluator point of view related to the 
impartial perspective in the service of justice, that is, the perspective that
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compares different points of view to assess the value of the overall 
outcome?
Assuming that “a consequence-based morality is evaluator neutral if 
there is a universal good that all agents are required to promote; and it is 
evaluator relative if different agents are assigned different goods” (Regan, 
1983, 93), two divergent prescriptions could be correspondingly 
recommended from a consequentialist perspective. Either every agent has 
the duty to promote_the good as comprehensively intended from an 
impartial point of view (which includes also personal evaluations) or he 
has the duty to promote the good from his point of view (which includes 
only personal evaluations). Alternatively expressed, these duties could be 
intended as demanding that personal evaluation be taken into account 
respectively in an instrumental or intrinsic way.
If the second interpretation of the duty is accepted, then a problem 
arises as to how to judge the justice of each agent-relative point of view 
from a third party perspective, how to judge impartially different points of 
view. A consequentialist perspective is in fact dependent on the single 
evaluation of the overall outcome (however intended, comprehensively or 
as culmination). According to consequentialism, we should decide the 
principles that govern our actions through the consideration of the overall 
value of the good (e.g. an informationally rich interpretation of well-being 
with personal attributes) promoted by their implementation. The notion of 
the goodness is thus the ultimate basis for assessing actions and principles. 
Now, if intrinsic value is assigned to each personal-evaluator perspective, 
no single ultimate value can be identified and consequently no overarching 
evaluation of different perspectives is feasible. If reasons of autonomy and 
those to promote the overall good are considered incommensurable, the 
possibility of accounting for moral requirements is ruled out^^.
A paradigmatically different response to this dilemma has been given 
by the contractarian theory, which is consistent with the assignment of 
intrinsic value to individual perspectives. According to deontological
A similar argument is developed by (Griffin, 1982, § 6; Kagan, 1984, 241-2; Brink, 
1986, 432).
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contractarianism, in fact, no overarching evaluation can be offered of the 
state of affair, in so far as only agent-relative reasons on a singular basis 
can be provided by individuals. In this regard, what is considered is not the 
overall value of the resulting state of affairs but the reasons that individuals 
have for accepting or rejecting these principles. This means that we have to 
consider only the ways in which these principles affect individuals with 
their personal reflective attitude, not their impact on the promotion of 
impersonal values. This amounts also to an incapacity to compare 
interpersonally the reactions of the reciprocally independent individuals 
without the appeal to an either external or minimally overlapping principle. 
Similarly, Sen’s theory assigns the promotion of different goods to 
different agents in an intrinsically agent-relative way, and in maintaining 
the intrinsic rightness of this relation, it fails on the side of impartially 
judging the rightness of this activity^^.
In a recent article on Sen, Scanlon raises a similar point on the issue 
of impartiality, which invites a different consequentialist answer:
“Contractualism thus naturally employs position-relative 
reasons, but does not require position-relative evaluation 
of the overall states of the world. This enables it to avoid a 
prima-facie problem that arises for a position-relative 
consequentialist theory. If the consequentialist idea of 
acting for the best is to provide a single standard of right 
action, it seems to require a single idea of what is best as 
its evaluative basis. There is thus a puzzle about how to 
formulate consequentialism on the basis of multiple, 
position-relative evaluative standpoints. Perhaps it 
becomes the view that what morality requires is for each 
person to act for the best, as judged from his or her 
position. I will leave open the question of how this is to be 
worked out” (Scanlon, 2001, 49).
Another way of interpreting the issue of impartiality consists in 
focusing the attention on the single agent rather than on an impartial point 
of view. If we take this position, it is fair to ask “why should each agent act
To be fair, in a recent article Sen takes a clear position for an impartial spectator point 
of view à la Smith (Sen, 2002), but it is interesting (and bizarre) that this clear statement 
is not explicitly linked to his previous work on the capability approach. Until this link is 
made explicit, the impartiality problem so far exposed remains.
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on his own point of view instead of some other?” (Regan, 1983, 105). Or 
alternatively enunciated, why should the single agent maximise the good 
from his point of view? Sen fails to offer a substantial account of why 
different agents should maximise the good according to their point of view 
simply because it is their interpretation rather than somebody else’s 
(Regan, 1983, 103). Again, the lack of an external and overarching point of 
view does not allow for both, as said, impartial resolutions of disputes 
between different points of view, and impartial assignment of agent- 
relative duties according to a consequentialist ethics.
Hence, Sen’s theory is on shaky ground for what concerns the 
impartial assessment of different points of view, in that it relies on an 
intrinsic assignment of value to agent-relative evaluation. The 
consequentialist cosmopolitan proposal presented in the second part of this 
paper is distinctive in that the ultimate good it prescribes remains 
objective—the maximisation of world welfare condition—but can only be 
promoted through the maximisation of individual—i.e., agent-relative— 
capacity for choice. Thus, the present proposal, in only being 
epistemologically and instrumentally agent-relative, can offer a consistent 
twofold response that includes both agent-relative and agent-neutral 
considerations, through an indirect method of identification of individual 
welfare.
The other limit of the capability approach I want to discuss regards 
an intercultural problem. Despite the minimal point of departure, i.e., the 
recognition of the diversity of human beings and the consequent 
importance of the capacity for freedom to achieve, the conclusions at 
which the capability approach arrives are culturally thick and thus yield 
problems on the intercultural side of justice. This culturally thick 
characteristic is more evident in Nussbaum’s than in Sen’s theory 
(Nussbaum, 1993; Sen, 1993a), but the point I want to raise applies to both, 
though in different degrees, and yields decisive normative disadvantages 
within the context of a world assumed to be profoundly multicultural.
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s theory of capabilities proposes a substantive 
account of human nature—and a correlated biased interpretation of human 
flourishing inspired by Aristotle (Crocker, 1992; I. Carter, 2001b, 67-9;
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Donatelli, 2001, 116)—which in being theory-laden and content-specific is 
condemned to being partial and thus inapplicable at the global level. While 
a common, neutral ground can be determined in the evaluative space 
concerned with the vital capacity of individuals to pursue their personal 
choices and projects. Sen’s and Nussbaum’s further political pretensions to 
regulate and institutionalise individual entitlements beyond such an 
elementary level is destined to be flawed. Aiming at identifying a thick set 
of individual entitlements—beyond a minimal endowment—related to 
universal capabilities runs into trouble in that this task requires objectivity 
in a domain where objectivity is not available.
. In opposition to this, exercising epistemological self-restraint, 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism focuses only on a number of vital 
interests in terms of choice opportunities. In a world of incomparable 
differences, consequentialist cosmopolitanism’s promotion of a minimal 
international standard promising only the guarantee of politically vital 
capabilities, is better equipped to comply appropriately with the task of 
global justice, in that it is able to offer a more widely acceptable set of 
guarantees for individual freedom and pluralism. Respectful of our limited 
epistemological capacities, the strategy of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism promises to be almost as progressive world-wide as Sen’s 
and Nussbaum’s proposal, and yet is consistently more defensible against 
charges of paternalism and ethnocentrism.
Having outlined a number of preliminary comparisons with the major 
competing theories of justice, it is now time to expound the remaining 
content of the consequentialist theory of global justice in closer detail. I 
begin in the next section by providing fiirther elements concerning the full 
reading of freedom of choice, intended as the normative basis for a 
universal metric of justice.
Consequentialist global justice: a universal dual metric for a 
double conception of agency
In the previous sections the epistemological and normative bases of 
the consequentialist cosmopolitan proposal have been laid out. The
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coupling of the recognition of the constraints on interpersonal 
comparability with that of goal-based ethical imperatives has led to a 
restrictive interpretation of the notion of well-being as individual freedom 
of choice. In being both ultimately consequentialist and yet able to 
accommodate various agent-relative requirements, such a notion is fit to 
challenge a number of alternative theories of justice, including autonomy- 
based conceptions, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and the capability 
approach. Following from this argument, this section expands on the global 
dimension of the present proposal and identifies a precise metric serving as 
a universal measure able to re-interpret consistently the issue of 
responsibility and vulnerability in the domain of global ethics. In doing 
this, such an identification serves also as a response to the usual concern on 
the supposed emptiness of consequentialism (Williams, 1973, 135; Gray, 
1983, 127; Griffin, 1992,120-1).
For its contribution toward the promotion of individual well-being, 
freedom of choice represents a crucial component of the consequentialist 
ethics which needs to be universally protected and enhanced. As we will 
see, this is to be pursued through a set of profound institutional reforms on 
several levels of political action world-wide. Before presenting these, 
however, what is important to stress here is the political principles which 
underpin such social-political project. The normative structure of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism, as a system of international applied 
ethics, involves the following three sets of principles (although only the 
first two are under scrutiny in this chapter): a) The ultimate 
consequentialist principle, i.e., the maximisation of world well-being 
conditions through the guarantee of freedom of choice; P) The intermediate 
principles, each referring to a specific applicative level, which contribute to 
the design of the political structure and institutions^® of a consequentialist 
global political system, such as, for example, the ‘human rights regime’
More particularly, institutions are defined as general patterns or categorisations of 
activity made up o f persistent and connected clusters o f (formal and informal) norms. 
These principles and rules, organised into stable and ongoing social practices that 
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations, are a central 
ingredient because o f their capacity and potential to promote reform and co-operation 
(Keohane, 1988, 383 and 393; Goodin, 1996b, 22; Hurrell, 2001, 38; Parekh, 2003, 11).
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and the principle of state self-determination; And finally, y) the immediate 
rules of action which derive from this consequentialist political structure, 
for instance, policies to guarantee the protection of human rights^ Given 
the ultimate consequentialist norm, the decisive criterion of validity for 
intermediate principles rests in the assessment of their long-term impartial 
socio-political performance with reference to the choice-based metric here 
adopted.
The metric adopted by consequentialist cosmopolitanism refers to a 
fundamental political entitlement of each individual to achieve and develop 
the status of independent choice-maker (Sumner, 1996, § 6-7)^^. In 
particular, in order to guarantee each individuals his or her personal 
capability to choose freely and thus to pursue his or her own well-being, a 
number of specific social and political actions are needed. They can be 
grouped in two principal categories pertaining to vital interests and 
political agency. A first set of rights concerns those vital interests that form 
an inevitable pre-requisite for any other meaningful choice. They can be 
formulated in a transcultural way and should consequently be implemented 
universally and considered as absolute trumps to protect agents’ 
a u t o n o m y ^ ^  The second set of legal entitlements regards, instead, the
This thesis does not concentrate on this third set o f rules. However, a brief 
consideration o f this more frequently applied set is worthwhile here. The strategy of  
concentrating on the individual freedom o f choice fits well with the general requirements 
of public policy-making, as interpreted by Goodin (Goodin, 1990a). Public decisions have 
to be general in character for reasons grounded in necessity and desirability. Concerning 
the first, public officials have only imperfect information in comparison with private 
individuals, “they know what will happen most often to most people as a result o f their 
various possible choices” (Goodin, 1990a, 142). But in order not to rely on the assumption 
that all individuals are equal in all respects, governors need to limit their action to the 
minimum and leave as much scope for freedom as possible. This focus on freedom of  
choice is not just out o f necessity, it is also desirable from a consequentialist point of 
view. Thus, laws that are general in form and therefore minimal allow a greater degree of 
latitude for the individual to organise his future toward the reduction o f uncertainties; 
moreover, citizens’ internalisation of social norms— most likely when mles are few in 
number and general in form—would also reduce the cost o f law enforcement.
The interest in achieving the capability of freedom o f choice in order to develop one’s 
own conception o f the good overlaps with the third Rawlsian high-order interest, which in 
his theory is closely connected with democratic citizenship. This is an interest “to protect 
and advance some determinate (but unspecified) conceptions o f the good over a complete 
life” (Rawls, 1993, 74; 2001, 192).
In this sense, consequentialist cosmopolitanism avoids the criticism o f Williams 
against consequentialism and utilitarianism according to which they would be “empty
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possibility of political participation in the public decision-making 
processes at each level of political action^. These rights are intended as 
citizenship prerogatives and should be guaranteed to each citizen at 
multiple levels, according to his or her degree of involvement in a given 
political sphere with reference to his or her particular and general interests. 
These two conditions of free choice are deemed to be fundamental to the 
enhancement of the individual capacity to control his or her life, and 
subsequently to promote his or her well-being, and are considered 
consequently as universal entitlements to be granted to each individual 
universally.
Vital interests and political participation represents then the dual 
metric of consequentialist global justice, in so far as they indicate the two 
sub-components of the universal right toward independent choice-making. 
In order to maximise the individual’s capability of choice, in fact, it is 
essential both to empower him of the appropriate skills and entitlements 
and to protect his autonomy from others’ arbitrary interference. These are 
factors that can profoundly affect the individual capacity for free choice, 
affecting elements such as the range of options presented as available, the 
expected payoffs that the agent assigns to those options, and the actual 
payoffs—the outcomes—that result from the choice (Pettit, 1997, 53). 
Since they are so crucial for the capability of the individual to chose, they 
are to be considered as prerequisites for the very possibility of choice, and 
thus as imperatives from a consequentialist perspective that aims at 
maximising well-being through individual freedom of choice. They can 
thus be denominated as primary goods, in that they represent a good that a 
person has instrumental reasons to want, no matter what else he aims at, a 
good that is required for any other value to be pursued.
vessels”, inevitably flawed by indeterminacy (Williams, 1973, 135; Gray, 1983, 127; 
Griffin, 1992,120-1).
^  A point made clear more than fifty years ago by Reves, recently reiterated by the 
cosmopolitan scholars. Reves asserted: “Democratic sovereignty o f the people can be 
correctly expressed and effectively instituted only if  local affairs are handled by local 
government, national affairs by national government, and international, world affairs by 
international, world government” (Reves, 1947,126). See also (Pogge, 1992, 58; Held & 
McGrew, 2000, 33).
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A key concern of consequentialist cosmopolitanism is the scope and 
the form of the political system and the correlative method of assessing 
different institutional schemes in relation to freedom of choice. The 
guarantee of vital interests and the political participation of individuals 
play a crucial role here, as has been made clear, but they can indeed be 
interpreted in several ways and generate correspondingly different 
institutional frarneworks. In this regard, for a theory of global justice to be 
viable two elements need to accommodated and consistently integrated: 
universality and multilevel dimensionality. This chapter, and this section in 
particular, aims to make the case for an ultimately universal consideration 
of ethical-political agency in order to offer an alternative to all those 
theories that limit the scope of normative consideration within the borders 
of a given community. The case for a multilayered interpretation of such 
universal character, conversely, will be discussed in the next chapter, as in 
opposition to straightforward theories of radical cosmopolitanism 
according to which no intermediate or national level of political 
consideration needs to be taken into account.
In this respect, an initial consideration to be illustrated concerns the 
scope of the political project. In holding an open and impartial conception 
of moral relevance, according to which all morally significant 
consequences affecting all morally significant persons should be taken into 
account, consequentialist cosmopolitanism maintains a universalistic form 
of consequentialism. This amounts to an extension of the ultimate scope of 
the ethical project to the entire world and consequently to the 
acknowledgement that the best moral code is one in which the observance 
of the political system would produce the best consequences in terms of the 
increase of world well-being conditions, i.e., in global terms, impartially 
assessed. Since the latter refers to the well-being functions of every person, 
the morally ideal world is, in conclusion, identified as that which 
maximises, through a scheme of public rules, the capability of choice of all 
world citizens.
Two social principles are inherently entwined with the notion of 
freedom of choice and the capability for self-determination as presented so 
far: responsibility and vulnerability. From a political point of view, they
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play a crucial role as normative considerations that shape the political 
system according to a reciprocal relationship. The first principle affirms 
that fi*eedom means fitness for responsibility, and that in order to enjoy 
fully the value of freedom one needs to be ready to be held responsible for 
the consequences caused by her action (Sen, 2000a; Pettit, 2001b, § 1). The 
second maintains, conversely, that freedom means avoidance of 
vulnerability, and that in order to enjoy fully the value of freedom one need 
not be held under the sway of external factors that could deprive him of 
opportunities (Goodin, 1985b). Clearly, they shed light on two 
interdependent normative claims, and yet they are often considered 
disjunctively at the international level. In this vein, it is common 
international thinking to consider responsibilities ending at the borders of 
one’s own state and vulnerabilities abroad not counting as evils to be 
repaired. In opposition to this, consequentialist cosmopolitanism holds a 
universal and reciprocal consideration of these two principles, in that they 
are implicitly required by the adoption of the freedom of choice ideal.
As a consequence, the characterisation of moral agency here 
envisaged is centred on the double recognition of the role of both choice- 
maker and choice-bearer. These two categories are the inevitable tools 
enabling a concrete normative implementation of the principle of 
responsibility and vulnerability. Choice-maker is here intended as the agent 
who is in the position to choose, decide, and carry out actions producing 
consequences on others. Choice-bearer, conversely, is the agent who bears 
the burden of the consequences of the action chosen, decided and carried 
out by somebody else (Held, 1991, 201). When these two categories are 
conceptualise as universal agents they produce an enlargement of the 
traditional notions of responsible and vulnerable agents, and identify new 
vulnerable political subjects and allocate special responsibilities beyond 
those traditionally charged to states or individuals.
Conclusions
Taking off from the conclusions on the limits of the work of 
international utilitarianism, this chapter has presented the principal ethical
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and political aspects of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. Aiming to meet 
the ethical challenges of current international affairs in terms of political 
inclusion, this chapter begun by pursuing a more subtle conception of the 
political good, which in being aware of the epistemological constraints on 
interpersonal comparisons of utility allows for the recognition of pluralism 
through respect for individual choices. Fundamental to this is a notion of 
well-being in terms of freedom of choice, which produces a dual metric in 
terms of guaranteeing vital interests and political participation. Following 
from this, a notion of political agency in terms of choice-makers and 
choice-bearers is developed in order to deal exhaustively with the issue of 
responsibility and vulnerability at the global level. Through a number of 
critical comparisons with alternative theories of justice (utilitarianism, 
contractarianism, autonomy-based, and the capability approach) the ethical 
and political aspects of the theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
have been outlined.
These ethical-political principles, however, would provide for only 
an incomplete political project, if left to stand on their own. Without the 
recognition of their roles within a wider system of international political 
theory encompassing crucial aspects of international political action such 
as multilayered and collective dimensionality, these normative principle 
would most likely fail to address the issue here at stake—international 
exclusion. In order to avoid such a failure, it is necessary to understand 
their political significance and usage, viz. how they influence the shaping 
of the political system on several layers. It is necessary to move the 
discussion to the institutional part of the present proposal. This will occupy 
the next chapter.
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Consequentialist Cosmopolitanism: Institutional 
and International Aspects
“I can choose only a strategy, not an outcome”
(Hardin, 2003, 1)
“Rules which are desirable to obtain and not 
unreasonable to wish” (Sidgwick, 1891 [1996])
Left to stand on their own, the ethical-political principles 
underpinning the normative proposal of consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
expounded in the previous chapter would provide for only an incomplete 
political project. Without the support of an institutional framework 
specifically fitted to the global context, such a project would inevitably 
suffer from the weaknesses—inefficacy and exclusion—which 
traditionally affect modem political thought as a discipline of self- 
contained jurisdictions based on domestic interaction. To remain true to its 
first universalistic principles, consequentialist cosmopolitanism thus needs 
to provide a multilayered and yet unified scheme of political justice as 
embedded in a multilevel institutional stmcture. Setting out such 
alternative approach and indicating its full international development form 
the task of the present chapter.
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The chapter begins by drawing up the institutional framework of 
consequentialist democracy as centred on the freedom of choice and its 
political correlate of participatory rights. From this, a methodology for 
comparing different institutional schemes of justice is developed based on 
proximity to the ideal of universal individual entitlements concerning vital 
interests and multilayered political participation. Such institutional 
framework fundamentally serves a moral aim: compliance with 
responsibilities. The issue of national and international responsibility thus 
occupies much of the central part of the chapter, and is considered in its 
multiple aspects with particular regard to individual demandingness, 
institutional duties, collective liability and non-ideal circumstances. 
Finally, details on the three-level political structure of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism are presented, together with a discussion on the 
relationship between social theory and censorial jurisprudence, and a 
rejection of the related objection concerning the lack of a global demos.
Institutional framework of consequentialist democracy: 
participatory role and procedural assessment from a global 
perspective
Consequentialism, and especially utilitarianism, has traditionally held 
a conception of agent-neutrality according to which all agents are required 
to promote a universal, interpersonally comparable good. As mentioned, 
this, along with the aggregative devise of the utilitarian theory of justice, 
has provoked the greater part of the criticism of consequentialism over the 
last three decades, with objections based on various notions of agent- 
centred prerogative-restrictions. One response to these criticisms of 
consequentialism consists in the attempt to develop an evaluator-relative 
consequence-based morality, as originally suggested by Sen (Sen, 1982b, 
1982a, 1983); and the distinctions explicated earlier, consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism follows the same overall direction of investigation of 
Sen, in that it aims ‘to square the circle’ by combining a broad 
consequentialism with a number of apparently deontological intuitions 
related to agent-relativity. This aspect is nowhere more evident than in the
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institutional-political framework based on participation and prioritisation 
of procedures proposed here.
The contrast between the different use that consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism makes of input and output legitimacy and that of other 
theories should be noted here with reference to a pluri-level deployment of 
agent-relative consequentialist principle. Once the epistemological 
constraints have been taken into account, the consequentialist principle of 
the promotion of goodness of outcomes needs to be made sophisticated 
enough to include consideration of the rightness of procedures and other 
agent-relative elements, if an effective strategy for well-being promotion 
through freedom of choice is to be individuated. The concentration on 
institutional guarantees of freedom of choice and autonomy □ primarily in 
terms of individual substantive rights and procedural rights to 
participation □ should not thus be mistaken for a drift toward 
deontologism. Such a strategy in fact relies on an indirect method that is 
grounded in the recognition that “the chief reason society cannot simply 
judge the rightness of particular outcomes by their utilities is that, even at 
egregious costs, institutions for doing so would be [epistemologically, RM] 
unreliable” (Hardin, 1986, 47). When severe limits to information and 
public cognitive capacities are taken into account, there is no inconsistency 
in envisaging the coexistence of a second order consequentialist principle 
(the final arbiter) and different prima facie non-consequentialist, agent- 
relative, and procedural principles as first order rules (the intermediate 
applicative rules). In this case, the latter are, then, warranted as long as 
they are presumed to produce □ indirectly □ a maximising outcome in the 
long term, regardless of any deontological, a priori or essentialist principles 
of justice.
The identification of political participation with institutions derives 
from the prior development of an answer to the question of what 
institutions ought to be regarded politically right for a society. 
Underpinning this answer is the assumption that the existence of freedom 
of choice is the normative metric used for judging the equal shares of the 
good to which each individual is entitled. In order to assess the political 
system best suited to pursuing this goal we have then to investigate which
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institutional setting would promote freedom best; which institutional 
framework would facilitate the situation in which there is more freedom of 
choice enjoyed than would otherwise be the case. In particular, a 
consequentialist analysis of the effectiveness of the institutional framework 
in ensuring the individuals to be actually free to choose and pursue their 
own ends is even more necessary when envisaging a multilayered system, 
as problems and conflicts of co-ordination can arise between differing 
prescriptions and guarantees at different levels of political actions. A 
typical case of this would be the indiscriminate warranting of a certain set 
of rights at the national level (e.g., the use of natural resources), and the 
conflicting claims that foreign peoples could advance in response (e.g., 
claims grounded on damage from worsening of environmental conditions). 
Resolving such cases as these demands a re-conceptualisation of the main 
political notions and institutions determining the field of international 
ethics; a re-conceptualisation to be developed through the use of a singular 
principle and an adequately sophisticated method for the comparison of 
institutional frameworks.
The method adopted by consequentialist cosmopolitanism to 
compare feasible alternative institutional schemes is one that measures 
procedural and participatory guarantees of the primacy of freedom of 
choice, rather than direct outcomes^^. Differently from other methods of 
comparison which make extensive use of some sort of interpersonal utility 
comparisons, the present account is committed to valuing bundles of 
goods, i.e., legal-institutional entitlements, only indirectly with reference to 
their contribution to individual achievement of free choice-maker status. In 
this, such a conception is not purely recipient-oriented, in that it takes into 
consideration the causal relation between the institutional scheme and 
(indirectly through the capability to choose) individual benefits. According
This discussion on the comparison of institutional schemes of justice is much in debt to 
Pogge's and Pettit’s work on this issue (Pogge, 1992, 1995; Pettit, 1997; Pogge, 2002b, § 
I; 2002a). The present perspective is however distinct from theirs in its different 
consideration o f the interaction-factor, as discussed in a following section of this chapter. 
For institutional design see also (Goodin, 1996c; Hardin, 1996). Beyond the moral 
attributes and the ‘goodness to fit’, a number of general principles can be identified as 
desirable for any institutional setting, which include revisability, robustness, sensitivity to 
motivational complexity, publicity, and variability (Goodin, 1996b, 39-43).
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to consequentialist cosmopolitanism, alternative institutional schemes 
should be assessed in terms of the access they accord their participants to 
the status of free choice-maker. Since the capability to achieve freedom of 
choice depends on the guarantees of both vital interests and political 
participation, these are the two principal variables on which the assessment 
of alternative institutional frameworks needs to be developed. Such 
guarantees provide the metric, or ‘currency’, through which the individual 
shares supporting comparative judgements about the justice of institutional 
schemes are defined in consequentialist cosmopolitanism.
In particular, this dual metric of vital interests and political 
participation entails the combined use of two distinct indexes to measure 
freedom of choice. The requirements of these two indexes must be satisfied 
simultaneously and no internal trade-off is allowed for moral and 
epistemological reasons. The ultimate criterion of justice consists then in 
the proximity of these guarantees to the ideal institutional setting described 
in this section, i.e., the most secure vital interests possible and the most 
direct political participation possible according to a principle of 
subsidiarity. While for vital interests the capability index as developed by 
Sen is certainly the most valid candidate (Sen, 1992), for political 
participation more traditional measures of freedom such as those provided 
by the Freedom House could be deployed initially subject to improvement 
(Freedom-House, 2001).
The principle of freedom of choice is bound to a democratic political 
participation that entails several applicative dimensions along different 
spheres of political actions. Much as agents at the individual level enjoy a 
fimdamental right to freely choose their destiny, so at the collective level 
groups are entitled to autonomously take decisions over their future. This 
signifies, consequently, that a legitimate exercise of political self- 
determination and self-legislation needs to be based on equal citizenship, 
insofar as only by equally and simultaneously retaining the status of 
legislators and subjects can citizens remain free to determine their fate 
(Rousseau, 1762 [1987], § I.vi; Mill, 1861 [1991]). The collective 
implementation of the principle of freedom of choice connects with the 
democratic principle of responsiveness, i.e., congruence between choice-
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makers and choice-bearers. In order to maximise the opportumties to 
exercise freedom of self-determination, i.e., to make the social outcomes 
systematically responsive to the choices of all affected citizens, the key 
mechanism for democratic legitimacy relies on the congruence between 
rulers and ruled (Dahl, 1971, 1; Held, 1995; Dahl, 1998, § 5.5; Przeworski 
et a l, 1999,4; Sen, 2000b; Goodin, 2003b, 1).
To that end the principles of democracy and the maximisation of 
freedom of self-detennination rely on the voting criterion of simple 
majority, which allows for the greatest possible degree of individual liberty 
and self-determination compatible with the existence of the social order. In 
fact, “if an order could not be changed by the will of a simple majority of 
the subjects but only by the will of all (that means, unanimously), or by the 
will of a qualified majority (for instance, by a two-thirds or a three-fourths 
majority vote), then one single individual, or a minority of individuals, 
could prevent a change of the order” (Kelsen, 1945, 286-7; Bobbio, 1999, 
§ V111.3). Further, all voices must have equal access to the decision­
making process, in that only through this mechanism can individual and 
collective freedom of choice be preserved and the world well-being 
condition maximised. Finally, the democratic correspondence between 
choice-makers and choice-bearers should, however, be universal in order to 
guarantee complete freedom to the individual. Such a congruence should 
cover all the relational dimensions in which individual life is embedded, 
i.e., one should be in the position to self-legislate within the entire range of 
activities one is involved, including both particular and general interest- 
related activities.
Traditionally, the refiexivity between choice-bearers and choice- 
makers is guaranteed at the domestic political level through a variety of 
democratic institutions. Primary among them is an elected parliament 
where all citizens can express their voice through pluralistic representation. 
The establishment of such a public and impartial institutional body through 
which individuals can form and propose their political agenda for society 
constitutes the premise of democratic life. At the core of this is the issue of 
political representation. When elected politicians mirror the composition of 
the electorate to the greatest degree, the electorate has the best chance of
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having their interests protected (Mill, 1861 [1991]; Manin et a l, 1999, 29). 
A government is compelled to be representative (representation here 
intended as congruence between interests and outcomes) th rou^  two kinds 
of political mechanisms: mandate or accountability. In both cases the 
principal political instruments in the hands of citizens are elections and the 
crucial information that put citizens in the position to carefully screen 
politician conduct. All this is widely recognised, both in theory and 
political practices, as the fundamental formal requirement for the 
legitimacy of domestic democratic government. And yet, when the 
discussion is moved at the international level the tone changes 
dramatically, for here the circumstances are said to be requiring different 
political arrangements, despite still provoking a much blamed democratic 
deficit. As we will see in the chapter on international institutions, an 
extension of the principle of democratic congruence to the international 
arena is normatively required in order to fill the gap or fracture between 
choice-takers and choice-bearers that is currently existing beyond national 
borders^^.
Contrary to the conclusions drawn by the interaction-dependent 
theories described in the first chapter, the consequentialist imperative 
determined in this thesis identifies a major social vulnerability in the fact 
of political ostracisation, and consequently demands the recognition of a
More related to the content o f potential public policies: there is a temptation to identify 
a more specified deployment o f freedom o f choice (beyond participation, anyhow 
intended) as an effective and unified measure of political performance. From the 
consequentialist perspective assumed here, these attempts are destined to fail because of  
their violation o f the epistemologicai constraints described in the first section of this 
chapter. Such an attempt is developed, for instance, by Pettit, who tries to tackle the public 
policy problem of how to balance the qualitative and quantitative aspects o f freedom of  
choice, given that extent and intensity represent separate dimensions of freedom. The 
solution offered by Pettit is based on the delineation o f indifference curves in the space of 
intensity and extent. In order to reduce the intrinsic indeterminacy of such a mechanism 
(viz. high intensity and low extent can be exchanged for low intensity and high extent) 
Pettit relies on a number o f assumptions and observations which are supposed to cut down 
the number of options available, giving priority to intensity over extent (Pettit, 1997, 103- 
6). Despite this being an interesting attempt, its conclusions cannot, however, be shared by 
the present proposal for the reasons mentioned. The identification o f such indifference 
curves, in fact, requires interpersonal comparisons which are highly implausible 
epistemologically, above all, at the intemational-intercultural level. From the 
consequentialist cosmopolitan perspective, a much more restrained approach has to be 
favoured instead, one which deploys only the dual metric o f vital interests and political 
participation presented, but indiscriminately to all citizens o f the world, one all-inclusive.
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duty to improve the fate of deprived foreigners even if interaction were 
only possible but not yet developed. A universal duty to co-operate toward 
the promotion of political interaction-cum-inclusion is identified, insofar as 
this interaction is assumed to deliver a twofold benefit as based on two 
different kinds of circumstances. On the one hand, exclusion fi*om a 
profitable interaction means a net loss of opportunity to take advantage of 
the gains thereby generated that are divided among the interacting agents 
only. On the other hand, ostracism also implies the absence of power to 
influence the outcomes of this interaction, whose (indirect or 
unforeseeable, present or future) externalities are often to be borne even 
from the non-interacting parties. Thus the duty of cooperative interaction 
exists in the form of a duty to build up relations in order to create and 
facilitate channels of co-operation and help, and does indeed exist in the 
inclusive form of reducing the degree of exclusion present both in the 
economic and political spheres of international affairs^^.
Grounded on these observations is the subsequent identification of 
the political objectives with the need to ensure the possibility of inclusion 
for those who have not been able to partake in advantageous interactions, 
and the need to close the gap in representation for those suffering from 
complete political exclusion. In order to tackle both phenomena, the first 
political action must be to minimise the political distance between the 
decision-making centres and the actual/possible agents bearing the 
consequences of those decisions. In response to such international lacunae 
this proposal insists on a concentration on legal entitlements to 
enfi*anchisement and political participation, as embedded in an 
appropriately framed system of multilayered political accountability in
Accordingly, global interdependence should be seen as a supporting factor for any 
cosmopolitan argument, one perhaps contributing to the un-discriminatory and de­
compartmentalised promotion of well-being through the diffusion of knowledge and 
practical capacities needed for a project of international political theory, but not one that 
constitutes an a priori requirement for a consequentialist rationale of global justice. 
However, while this thesis maintains that global interdependence has only an auxiliary 
role on the justification of global justice, it also recognises the indubitable factual 
connection between the recent phenomenon o f a global consciousness o f interdependence 
(Keohane & Nye, 1977) and the simultaneous resurgence of universalistic ethics (Beitz, 
1979) over the last thirty years.
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which individuals are empowered to realise and protect their freedom of 
choice.
Following from this, the present proposal develops a principle of 
inclusive democracy granting political power within the decision-making 
process of public rules to all citizens of the world, regardless of whether or 
not they are directly effected by a determined set of actions. As in the 
(conventional) domestic model of democracy, citizens are included in the 
political structure as members of a public constituency, rather than as 
stake-holders of particular interests, and thus elect representatives with a 
general or non-constrained mandate. Independent from whatever particular 
stake they may have, individuals are entitled to take part in all public 
decisions because these public choices deal with public or general interests, 
which may or may not directly affect them, but on which they should be in 
the position to have a voice of consent. While room for exception should 
be left for those disputes entailing partial interests where specific actors 
have special status, such as labor agreements, the general principle of 
universal inclusion should be kept firm as the fundament of democratic 
practices. Consequently, within the proposed system, agents, qua political 
agents, cannot simply withdraw from their responsibility on grounds of a 
low degree of interaction; they cannot abandon the forum of international 
accountability hiding behind the veil of exclusionary interaction. For 
underpiiming this system is not only a principle of harm avoidance, but 
also one of well-being promotion. The commitment to action remains 
independent from the level of social connectedness, in that it imposes an 
obligation toward others even in cases of non-contact (non-interaction and 
non-harm).
Following from this clarification of the normative criteria for the 
assessment of the institutional framework of the system promoted here, a 
delineation of the correlated issue of international responsibility is due. 
This is particularly significant because of its key importance to the three 
principal disciplinary fields at stake here. A fair treatment of the normative 
discussion on international responsibility in fact entails the consistent 
combination of three distinct debates: the ethical discussion on
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demandingness, the political dispute on the site of distributive justice, and 
the international political diatribe on ideal and non-ideal theory.
International responsibility: an interdisciplinary crux shared by 
overdemandingness, ideal/non-ideal theory, and the site of justice
Consequentialist cosmopolitanism envisages a system of political 
obligations in terms of guarantees for a set of political entitlements 
grounding freedom of choice. The normative basis of this consists in the 
promotion of well-being through freedom of choice, whereas the political 
devices deployed are determined in terms of accountability. This is due to 
the double conception of political agency on which this proposal is based; 
i.e., a conception determined through the opposition of choice-bearers as 
vulnerable and choice-makers as responsible. It is upon the ground of the 
consequentialist principle of responsibility □ according to which 
responsibility for the state of the world falls on the agent in proportion to 
his capacity and position to effect it □ that each time different actors are 
singled out for their effectiveness in producing positive outcomes. Thus, 
the understanding of consequentialist cosmopolitanism on the issue of 
agents’ responsibility is multiple and by degrees. It entails the 
identification of both individuals, such as citizens, and general 
collectivities, such as governments, as responsible, depending on their 
capacity at each political level to influence the final outcome of any course 
of action in which they are involved. At the global level, responsible agents 
are principally international institutions, within which cosmopolitan 
citizens are embedded. At this level, in fact, many actions (such as the 
protection of billions of individual rights) can only be carried out by 
collective agents rather than by mere individuals.
As a consequence of the identification of responsible with the agent 
(individual, collective, or multiple) who is in the best position to effect the 
promotion of well-being, the conception of duties here expounded also 
responds to the vexed objection of overdemandingness conventionally 
raised against consequentialism. According to this, consequentialism 
would demand too much fi*om the moral agents and in so doing would not
153
grant the legitimate private room for the individual pursuit of personal 
interests. In demanding sacrifices which are ordinarily considered 
meritorious but not strictly required, consequentialism would become 
supererogatory. In response to this, consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
maintains that an important part of the total normative burden at the 
international level is home by collective institutions, whose net of 
responsibilities, on the one hand, promises to be more effective than the— 
even co-ordinated—individual actions, and on the other, alleviates much of 
the moral workload which usually oppresses the single agent.
Institutions, and a fortiori, international institutions, are key actors in 
delivering international policies regarding the establishment and the 
preservation of freedom of choice, whereas individuals are most of the 
time incapable of promoting significant reforms and are left with only the 
possibility of resistance. Without public institutions, individual moral 
burden would indeed be unbearable in that individuals would be endlessly 
called to redress evil situations without having the appropriate capacities 
and power. Conversely, within institutions, the agent’s duties are reduced 
to the iterative obligation to comply with the partial task (part of a wider 
scheme of collective co-ordination) assigned to him. In this way, the moral 
negligence often blamed on individuals for what concerns collectively- 
caused harm (May, 1992, § 5-6) is rebutted and an institutional 
responsibility assigned to the effect that the whole problem is addressed 
through a distribution of liabilities. A key contribution of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism is exactly this: that it offers the practical means to address 
the enlarged field of moral responsibility it recognises and yet legitimately 
refuses the moral megalomania according to which a single individual is 
made directly responsible for the fate of the entire world (Shue, 1988, 696- 
7).
So far, the model of ideal-theory presented would seem complete and 
satisfying: The new international social environment exacerbates a number 
of moral dilemmas and calls for their address. The individual alone is 
incapable to accommodate such moral demands, but fortunately political 
theory is able to offer a normative project according to which collective 
agents, i.e., political institutions, are envisaged to comply with such
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international moral duties. In a perfect world, an ideal one, individuals 
would take their share of responsibility in terms of support for public 
institutions and for the rest would be free to pursue their particular 
interests. So far, so good, but international reality is not ideal. The situation 
is such that international institutions, when existing, are deficient and often 
incapable of delivering effective measures for the promotion of well-being. 
The lack of appropriate institutions and the scarce compliance with the 
existing ones form the two major problems to be faced at the international 
level. In facing these problems, the further challenging problem arises as to 
what kind of responsibility an individual in such non-ideal circumstance 
bears and if this amounts to overdemandingness.
Despite being for the most part concentrated on presenting a project 
o f global ethics as ideal-theory, the present proposal needs nonetheless to 
take a position on the issue of non-ideal theory for at least two crucial 
reasons. First, non-ideal theory partially overlaps with the domain of ideal 
theory (see the discussion on the site of distributive justice below) so that 
the latter cannot be fully understood and justifies without an—even if 
cursoiy—examination of the former^^. Second, applied ethics such as 
global ethics needs to take into consideration actual circumstances to avoid 
projects which would otherwise be socially sterile. Hence, global ethics has 
to elaborate a normative stance on the issue of international responsibility 
in the present circumstances, which needs to address the objections on 
overdemandingness in a non-ideal situation. Three intertwined dichotomies 
are at stake in this debate on international responsibility: monism/dualism; 
ideal/non-ideal theory; and individual/collective responsibility. In this 
section I will only discuss the first two, whereas the third will be examined 
in the next section.
To begin with, a note of clarification on the specific meaning of 
public institutions in play in this particular discussion is required. 
Differently from the general definition of institutions adopted earlier by 
this study, according to which under the term institution were included
For an examination of the difficult relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory, 
which here is discussed only briefly, see (Phillips, 1985; Apel, 1992, 63-72).
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both formal and informal clusters of stable norms, the following discussion 
has a narrower focus which targets formal public institutions only. This 
coincides with Rawls definition of institutions as “a public system of rules 
which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, power and 
immunities, and the like” (Rawls, 1971, 55). Rawls’s discussion, however, 
applies only to certain kinds of public institutions, which bear a particular 
importance in terms of individual life-prospect. He holds that “the primary 
subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way 
in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and 
duties and determine the division of advantages from social co-operation” 
(Rawls, 1971, 7).
One way to tackle the issue of overdemandingness and non-ideal 
theory is through the dispute on whether the principles of justice that apply 
to institutions and to individuals are different in kind or not (respectively, 
dualism or monism)^^. This issue is relevant for the public debate on 
justice for reasons referring ultimately to the possibility of a society being 
just if the normative function of public institutions is respected, regardless 
of the behaviour of the individuals beyond the reach of such a function. On 
this, while philosophers such as Rawls and Pogge maintain the individual 
principle of justice to be different from the institutional ones (dualism or 
pluralism), other such as Cohen and Murphy deny it (monism), though 
from distinct perspectives. Consequentialism and the present proposal tend 
to toward the latter position.
Rawls holds that individuals have a two-fold (natural) duty: “to 
support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to them” and 
(alternatively or simultaneously, depending on the circumstances) “to 
further just arrangements not yet established” (Rawls, 1971, 115 and 333- 
7). The intuition underpinning this position is that once they have 
managed, or are fully committed, to establish just institutions, individuals 
can legitimately pursue other objectives independent from those for which 
the institutions are envisaged. Beyond complying with their fair share of
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duty under an institutional scheme, they should be let free to advance their 
ends within the overall framework of coercive structures. This dualist 
stance has a certain degree of reasonableness while we remain in the 
domain of the ideal-theory as full-compliance, as agreed above, but 
becomes much more controversial when non-ideal conditions form the 
social-political background of the case. International affairs present a 
situation of non-ideal theory.
Two examples will help to make the case clearer. Suppose, first, 
there is a general consensus on the evil of world poverty (but suppose, 
falsely, that such a poverty is not life-threatening) and that the recognition 
of this moral observation consequently generates an international duty to 
alleviate it. Under these circumstances two principal poverty reduction 
strategies are conceivable as related to the present discussion: either a 
direct attack on poverty through individual and NGOs beneficent actions, 
or an indirect long-term plan to foster an appropriate international 
institution building process. Which strategy should be prioritised? (Singer, 
1972, 1977; Murphy, 1998). The second case is similar. Suppose a 
situation arises of partial compliance with an existing institutional practice. 
Suppose an institution exists that, with full compliance by its members, 
would be effective in reducing poverty. But also suppose that some of the 
members free-ride. Should the remaining ‘good’ members compensate (do 
more than their fair share) the burden left uncovered? How binding is their 
residual responsibility when others have already defaulted? (Goodin, 
1985b, 140-1; Goodin & Pettit, 1986, 675; Pogge, 1995).
Both cases show the limits of an intrinsically dualist approach. In the 
first case a dualist would suggest going for the long-term institution 
building process. In the second, he would justify the good member in 
abstaining from compensating for the burden left by the free-riders. In both 
cases, such considerations would be generated by a reasoning that does not 
take into account the promotion of the well-being in a consequentialist 
manner. In fact, it is at least possible that the total amount of well-being,
This is, in brief, the academic debate on the site o f  distributive justice  (Rawls, 1971 ; 
Pogge, 1992; Rawls, 1993; Cohen, 1997; Murphy, 1998; Cohen, 2000; Murphy, 2000; 
Pogge, 2000).
157
defined as freedom of choice, produced by the dualist strategies to be 
inferior to that produced by the corresponding alternatives. This relates to a 
fundamental problem about the inevitable continuous upgrading of the 
systems of justice in which an intrinsically dualist approach results. It is 
possible to interpret the situation in which the individual can promote well­
being more through individual than institutional action as due to the missed 
upgrading of a non-ideal situation toward an ideal one. If this interpretation 
is adopted, then, the need for a continuous political revision of the public 
institutions can be seen as a matter of maximal urgency, in order to re­
allocate responsibility among agents in an optimal manner (Goodin & 
Pettit, 1986, 673). Non-ideal situations in fact occur not only because 
human societies are improving only slowly toward more just forms of 
social organisation, but also because social reality is continuous changing 
and producing new unjust situations. Assuming this, an intrinsically dualist 
position is caught up short by its incapacity to guide the necessary 
upgrading mechanism which inevitably has to deal with non-ideal 
situations.
These observations about the limits of an intrinsically (or non­
instrumental) dualist position lead by contrast to the consequentialist 
solution, according to which the ultimate and trumping principle to guide 
the selection for alternative policies has to be the promotion of well-being. 
Dualism and its institutional correlate are acceptable, but only as first order 
principles to be assessed by the ultimate consequentialist norm.. Dualist 
institutionalism, thus, can be warranted only under the condition that its 
deployment is more conducive to the promotion of well-being than 
alternative courses of action. When institutions can be established to right 
an unjust situation, the solution of consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
consists, as shown in the section on individual level below, in the 
prescription of a maximin rule to guarantee universally a set of rights to the 
protection of such interests together with those of political participation. 
When appropriate institutions cannot be immediately created, then, a 
sensitive balance has to be struck between normative principles and 
empirical considerations, and most probably short-terms actions coupled 
with long-term political projects. In both cases, acknowledging the
158
distinction between vital and secondary interests and the centrality of the 
dual metric of justice presented above, individuals are demanded to 
sacrifice their secondary interests to the effect of promoting collective 
actions to tackle others’ deprivation of vital interests and political 
participation. In this sense, ideal and non-ideal theory must be consistent, 
but nevertheless remain distinct.
In this section, a characterisation of the institutional aspect of 
consequentialist international responsibility has been presented, with a 
particular focus on the individual duties in both ideal and non-ideal 
circumstances. The next section completes such a presentation through the 
examination of the consequentialist method to assign individual and 
collective responsibility to different international political agents. 
Differently from the cases discussed so far, in this case the focus is on the 
extent to which the individual can be blamed for actions or omissions of 
the collectives to which he belongs rather than the collective body in its 
entirety.
Cosmopolitan political agency: individual and collective
Not all in our moral existence refers to individual actions. A great 
number of morally relevant consequences are in fact the result of actions 
taken or omitted by collective agents. This is true above all where 
consequences with an international dimension are concerned. Despite the 
decisive cause of any more act ultimately being singular—i.e., caused by 
an individual step—the responsibility of certain kinds of actions is not 
assigned to individuals uti singuli, but uti universi—i.e., a corporate 
body^O In such cases of corporate responsibility, the reward or punishment 
is conferred on the collective entity and no individual is considered guilty 
as a single, private agent, though he can still be affected by the collective 
reward/punishment in an indirect way as member of the group. This is 
exemplified in instances of state war or corporate bankruptcy. In such
This is still consistent with the general assumptions of analytical ethics, universal 
personalism and valuational solipsism, in that the ultimate point o f moral reference
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cases legal liability is typically associated with the public and collective 
agent rather than any specific individual, and yet in the ultimate analysis, it 
is the individuals who pay the price, receive the punishment. This being the 
case, a normative question arises as to what extent this conventional 
association is plausible fi'om a moral point of view. Conversely, to what 
extent is this association a refined rhetorical tool to exempt one fi'om 
individual responsibility or, baldly stated, to wash one’s hands? In this 
section, the credibility^ of this ethical distinction is investigated with 
reference to the case of international or cosmopolitan political agents. The 
core issue under scrutiny is thus determination of individual vs. 
institutional responsibility. First the dichotomy individual vs. collective is 
examined, then the components of collective agency are analysed: 
responsibility and accountability.
The notion of political agency necessarily entails two distinct aspects 
of the concept of moral agency—the individual and the collective. Not 
surprisingly, the differing acceptance of the validity of these aspects is 
especially stark when responsibility is considered transnationally. While 
the extension of the concept of individual moral agency from the domestic 
to the international domain is, from a normative point of view and that of 
public opinion, rather straightforward—e.g., in the case of human rights— 
the collective and institutional aspects moral agency appear, at least prima 
facie, more controversial. Thus, while cosmopolitan citizenship as regards 
the case of refugees is commonly accepted as imbued with transnational 
ethical-political value, international or cosmopolitan institutions as full 
moral agents are much more contested. According to Lewis, an especially 
certain ethical principle is that no one can be responsible for the conduct of 
another. From this, he derives that if insurmountable difficulties in 
attributing responsibility to the individual arise, then rather than revert to 
the ‘barbarous’ notion of collective or group responsibility we should give
remains the individual both as well-being recipient and as final single judge (Pettit, 1993a, 
22-30).
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up altogether the view that we are accountable in any distinctively moral 
sense (Lewis, 1948, 3)^ .^
Broadly speaking, the point of contention concerns the viability of 
the domestic analogy as a mechanism for attributing responsibilities to 
collective agents at the international level (Suganami, 1989). In opposition 
to this possibility, states or international organisations have often been seen 
as bodies with a special moral status, which conventionally allows for the 
exemption from standard norms of action Das in the realist tradition of 
thought. Clarifying the moral status of institutions Dbe they states or 
international organisations □ is, however, of extreme importance in the 
global domain, since a number of morally determined international actions 
can only be delivered by collective bodies, such as intergovernmental or 
supranational institutions. Environmental crises, international migratory 
flows, and humanitarian interventions are all examples of situations 
requiring co-operative institutional management rather than individual 
commitment. The apportioning of moral responsibility toward protection of 
the vulnerable at the collective level forms therefore a major priority on the 
normative agenda of global p o l i t i c s ^ ^
In opposition to most realist assumptions on governmental moral 
agency, consequentialist cosmopolitanism claims that it is indeed viable to 
assign moral agency, and corresponding responsibility, collectively to 
institutions, beyond the traditional individual attribution. The first step in 
this assignment consists in the clarification of the general notion of 
collective moral agents through the individuation of the principal features 
of institutional agency in the capacity for moral deliberation and action.
The individual stance on responsibility connects with the ontological position o f  
eliminativism, according to which ascribing judgements, intentions, and general mental 
properties to social groups represents just a summative and metaphorical way to ascribe 
them to the individual members of the group (Quinton, 1975; Bratman, 1999). For a more 
sympathetic discussion on the importance o f We see (Searle, 1995; Toumela, 1995; 
Rovane, 1997; Pettit, 2001b, § 5).
Despite the domination of the individualistic paradigm, the literature has grown above 
all after WWII above all in legal studies. For a first reference see (Gomperz, 1939; 
Kelsen, 1945, 355-63; Jasper, 1947 [1961]; Lewis, 1948; Feinberg, 1968; Held, 1970; 
French, 1972, 1974, 1984; Goodin, 1985b, 134-44; Stone, 1985; Thompson, 1985; 
Jackson, 1987; May, 1987; May & Hoffman, 1991; May, 1992; Postema, 1995; 
Runciman, 1997; Goldman, 1999; Kutz, 2000; Erskine, 2001; O'Neill, 2001; Arendt, 
2003; Erskine, 2003; E. Kelly, 2003; Erskine, 2004; Miller, 2004).
161
and the condition of effective freedom to exercise this capacity (O'Neill, 
1986b, 2001). More specifically, the following characteristics have to be 
met by collectivities or institutions in order to qualify as moral agents. A 
collective agent, also referred to as a conglomerate collectivity^^, has an 
identity that is more than the sum of the identities of its constitutive parts, 
i.e. it is not exhausted by the aggregate of the identities of the members, 
and therefore extends over time and conceives of itself as a unit. This agent 
also has an internal organisation and/or a decision-making structure with 
differently defined roles and an executive function that allows for the 
allocation of power within the organisation. And finally, this collective 
agent holds to different, often more stringent, standards of conduct than 
those standards that apply outside the collective body (French, 1984, 13- 
16; Erskine, 2004,26).
This restricted definition of collective agents has been adopted for its 
particular political relevance, in that it allows including political 
organisations, such as states and international institutions, in the moral 
exercise of allocating responsibilities. Notwithstanding their social 
relevance, random collections of individuals (e.g. bystanders around the 
pond where a man is drowning) are, for the moment, excluded from 
consideration for their minimal applicability to the determination of the 
political context (Held, 1970). Thus, only cases of conjunctive, rather than 
disjunctive, collective responsibility are discussed here. Quite the opposite 
of the case of bystanders, in fact, the institutional co-operation of 
individual agents acting as a political organisation represents a key 
distinguishing factor here^^. Once these characteristics are identified in any 
political institution under scrutiny, precise political responsibility can be 
assigned more effectively.
The varying membership characteristic is in contrast with the other principal type of  
collective body, the aggregate collectivity. In this, a change in membership will always 
entail a change in the identity o f the collection.
Such institutional characterisation is consistent with the general procedural sensitivity 
of the present version o f consequentialism. It has thus to be intended as opposed to 
another kind o f description usually deployed for assigning collective responsibility which 
refers to diffused solidarity and common values, such as in the case o f families or mob 
(May & Hoffman, 1991, 2-3).
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Collective political responsibility can be broadly understood by 
pointing to a fundamental dichotomy between atomistic and organic or 
structuralist interpretations of social organisation, according to which 
either single individuals or the entirety of the group are, respectively, to be 
made nominally accountable for a group’s actions (Wolf, 1985, 269-70). 
While the first aspect of responsibility leads to an indictment of an 
individual perpetrator (e.g., a specific public officer) according to a notion 
of exact and direct liability, a further specification can be elaborated 
concerning the second aspect, which, in going beyond a strictly legalistic 
and individualistic model, enlarges the current social dimension of political 
respohsibility.
The structuralist interpretation of social organisation can be specified 
in two sub-meanings of collective responsibility: separatim and 
collegialiter. When culpability is assigned separatim it refers to non-direct 
actors held accountable through a vicarious and distributive liability. That 
is, the sum total of members’ responsibilities—including the proportional 
recognition of special institutional roles are assigned to the whole 
collective on the ground of a previous authorisation from the members. 
This kind of responsibility assumes all of the members be held liable even 
though not all of them are personally and directly at fault, in that this is 
considered a burden associated with group membership. If one wants to 
avoid such a burden he need only opt out of the group, possibly seeking 
asylum in another (Feinberg, 1968, 683; Warner, 1991, 62-9; E. Kelly, 
2003). Conversely, when culpability is assigned collegialiter it is 
apportioned in a non-distributive and corporate way to the entire 
collectivity or institution, intended as distinct from and superior to 
individual components. In this case, the collective institution, and not its 
single members, is blamed and obliged to make reparations or accept 
punishment, despite the fact that it is the combined actions of individuals 
that produces the faulty result in question (French, 1974, 282-5; Erskine, 
2001 70-4; 2003, 2004).
With regard to this, consequentialist cosmopolitanism fosters a third, 
alternative understanding of institutional responsibility, in which moral 
responsibility is multiple, by degrees and crucially embedded in
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democratic refiexivity. This entails the identification as responsible of both 
‘non-acting’ vicarious members—such as citizens—and general 
collectivities—such as governments and other political organisations 
properly structured—depending on their capacity to influence the final 
outcome of each course in which they are involved^^. At the global level in 
particular, responsible agents are principally international institutions 
within which cosmopolitan citizens are embedded. While the stress on the 
capacity to influence the social outcome, rather than a priori criteria, 
characterises the present approach as consequentialist, the fi*aming of 
moral agency and political responsibility on several layers of social actions 
including the global, represents a defining characteristic of the 
cosmopolitan project. At least fi’om Kant, the idea of enlarging the domain 
of political liability (and not merely political power) to a field which is 
neither domestic nor inter-state has been at the core of supranational 
models of world organisation. The identification of the extant 
interdependence of global issues, global agents, and global responsibilities 
is consistent with this idea and brings clarity to it.
Within this delineation of collective responsibility, the centrality of 
democratic refiexivity should also be stressed for a reason concerning the 
political character of institutional moral agency. Intended as a normative 
ideal, democratic congruence remains central in order to distinguish a 
political association from an economic enterprise. In fact, a number of 
significant features can be identified that mark the difference between 
these two kinds of collectives. While in the economic corporation the main 
(single) motive for participation is self-profit bound within an exclusive 
and hierarchical structure; in the political-democratic collective other 
motives can also be individuated, including a (perhaps thin) sense of 
solidarity embedded in an impartial and inclusive institutional structure. 
This suffices here to dispute claims about a common identity of the model
Analytically, four cases o f responsibility are possible when an organisation O and one 
or more agents A are at stake (Stone, 1985, 244). With regards to a misconduct occurred 
in an organisational setting, responsible can be; 1 ) 0  but not A; 2) Both O and A; 3) A but 
not O; 4) Neither O nor A. The present proposal has analytical potential to cover all of 
these cases, since it allocates responsibility to different agents— choice-makers—
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of state and that of a private corporation, and also serve as a warning on the 
excessive use of this parallel when shaping the model for collective moral 
agency (contra French, 1984; Runciman, 2000; Erskine, 2001).
From what has been argued, a dual international duty can be 
identified, which is charged to a number of political agents depending on 
their capacity to accomplish the objective of the duty. These include: 
supranational institutions, supranational collective bodies, states and 
individuals. An initial duty consists in the obligation to create the political 
opportunities within which the system of consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
can be pursued. This obligation consists in trying to establish or reform 
international institutions so as to make them able to effectively tackle the 
problems for which they are created; e.g., in the case of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism, fitting them with the relevant capacities to tackle global 
issues (Held, 1970; Goodin, 1985b, 136-9; Erskine, 2004, 39-40)^^. 
Through this, such institutions would be endowed with the practical 
capabilities which are necessary in order to comply with their mission. 
Hence, the case for considering them as moral agents would be even 
clearer. As Wolf argued: “the point is that although organisations lack the 
capacity to be motivated to adopt moral goals and constraints, they have 
the capacity to be guided by them. Since they have this capacity, there 
seems no reason not to insist that they exercise it” (Wolf, 1985, 282). From 
this initial duty arises a second that applies only in cases concerned with 
already existing international institutions. In such cases, there is an 
obligation on the relevant members of the institution to take active part in 
the decision-making process of the organisation (in a minimal sense at 
least: i.e., voting) in order to influence the result.
In order to clarify the substance of this second duty, however, it is 
necessary to tackle the issue of accountability. It is only through the correct
depending on their capacity to influence the social outcome imposed on the victims—  
choice-bearers.
Underpinning this duty is the consequentialist approach to the issue of omission. From 
a goal-based perspective no fundamental distinction can be made between a positive 
action and a negative omission. They both produce consequences that affect the overall 
social outcome, and they both must be taken into consideration in the moral assessment of 
the circumstances. Clearly, this is in contrast with those legalistic approaches that grant 
innocence to those agents who have not positively committed a voluntary offence.
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normative framing of this issue that a viable institutional guarantee of 
democratic congruence can be individuated and appropriate mechanisms 
for the division of ethical-political labour be unfolded. In this respect, the 
coupling of the procedural argument with that on democratic participation 
as a tool for welfare promotion leads to the identification of 
representation—through direct elections—as a fundamental requirement 
for institutional accountability. Only through the minimisation of the 
distance between those who take the decisions and those who bear the 
consequences of those decisions can the individual’s capacity for free 
choice be maximised. The respect for individuals’ will is in fact directly 
proportional to the proximity of individuals themselves to their 
representative. But not only are a limited mandate and the possibility of 
close scrutiny essential to the effective implementation of individuals’ 
choices, but it is also fundamental, on the other side, to oblige the violator 
of the institutional mandate to give account of his wrongdoing, and 
eventually to be punished proportionally.
In this regard, the present consideration of accountability 
complements the issue of responsibility presented above. A traditional 
dilemma concerning the issue of accountability of institutions regards the 
possibility of imputing the right parties, and only them, as responsible for 
any specific action produced by the institution, while at the same time 
recognising the normative value of majority voting as liability creator. In 
this case, it has to be noted, the relationship under scrutiny is not that of 
empirical causality, but that of normative imputation, which establishes a 
link between a fact and a criminal category, and between a crime and a 
responsible party. On the issue of imputation, as linked to that of political 
agency, the response of a consequentialist approach consists in stressing 
the importance of democratic participation and procedures.
A duty to partake in the decision-making process is the normative 
tool that allows for the clarification of the imputation within collective 
organisations in terms of causal responsibility for the outcome (Goldman,
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1999)77. If the institutional channels for democratic congruence are 
guaranteed, then every member of the institution becomes responsible for 
the final decision taken by the representative assembly, in proportion to the 
ratio voter/representative. In this sense, the individual should be ready to 
bear the cost of the collective decision, in so far as he is a full constitutive 
member of the collectivity. From another point of view, this means that no 
easy excuse can be legitimately advanced for completely refusing one’s co­
responsibility on a specific public decision, if this decision is taken through 
a fair and democratic process of deliberation. Individual responses such as 
‘Not in My Name’ during a war conflict are to be rejected if not 
accompanied by a pro-active oppositional engagement in the political life 
of one’s own country78. In this latter case, the protest could be seen as a 
political struggle to influence the next elections, under the assumption that 
participation through voting is fulfilled. And yet, it seems difficult to find 
convincing political grounds on which to criticise the decisions taken by a 
qualified majority through fair and democratic procedures. Conversely, if 
no democratic procedure is established, then no individual-as-part-of-a- 
collective responsibility can be imputed, and only individual liability can 
be attributed for specific actions or deliberation, as in the case of an 
oligarchic or tyrannical regime.
Having examined a number of aspects of the institutional proposal of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism, it is now time to move the discussion on 
to the presentation of the political structure as shaped by the 
consequentialist principles. In the next section, more details are thus 
presented on the multilayered political structure of the system envisaged. 
In presenting such a scheme, a number of critical objections are discussed, 
including the issue of jurisdictions and that of the lack of global demos.
77 This remains valid despite the phenomenon of the so-called “donkey vote” (i.e., being 
legally obliged to vote, the elector chooses the easier option, the first candidate of the list), 
which can anyway be tackled through different ‘deliberative’ strategies as elaborated by 
Fishkin (Fishkin, 1991; Fishkin & Laslett, 2003).
7^ For a different view see Arendt who attributes metaphysical responsibility also to the 
opposition (Arendt, 2003, 149 and 157-8).
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The multilayered political structure: social theory and censorial 
jurisprudence
In line with the focus on freedom of choice, the basic 
consequentialist cosmopolitan political proposal consists in a threefold 
political focus on institutional guarantees and rights as the means through 
which to implement the maximisation of the world well-being condition. 
These are: a) at the individual level, the protection of a set of minimal 
universal interests insofar as they work as individual socio-political 
capabilities to freely determine one’s own personal life, plus the political 
rights guaranteeing participation as a citizen of public life in each sphere of 
political action; b) at the state level, the protection of a set of collective 
interests as the foundation of a state’s capacity for free self-determination; 
and c) at the global level, the protection of a set of international means that 
are needed to rule global phenomena. According to consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism, only through a simultaneous and consistent 
implementation of such tri-level legal-institutional guarantees can a 
political system satisfy the criteria of legitimacy in terms of the 
maximisation of general well-being, and offer an adequate and viable 
political response to a multi-layered social reality^^.
The problem of jurisdictions represents a controversial challenge for 
any kind of multilayered political system, including consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism. It requires finding an appropriate mechanism for 
determining a) which institutional sub-units and level of action should be 
recognised and endowed with authority, b) how the different levels of 
political actions are inter-linked, c) which level has priority over the others, 
d) and where exactly the boundaries between the different domains of 
actions should be drawn. The first element that needs to be highlighted 
from the present perspective is the determination of the layers as grounded 
on a criterion of ethico-political relevance in terms of affect on freedom of 
choice, i.e., each level is distinguished by its impact on a specific sphere of
From a different perspective but on the same normative point, Onora O’Neill has 
argued repeatedly and forcefiilly on the importance o f institutionalising the relationship 
between right-holder and duty-bearer. Institutions must, not just can, be established in 
order to make sense of the political category of rights (O'Neill, 1996, 131-2).
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freedom of action. While in the state level all those actions are included 
that primarily affect the individual freedom of choice as collectively 
expressed through state policies, at the global level, the actions at stake are 
all those having a world scope that transcends national boundaries. Of 
course, spillover effects and overlapping boundaries always exist, but a 
differentiation between primary and secondary jurisdictional priorities can 
be depicted as a way to mark normative boundaries. In this sense, a 
relatively clear-cut distinction between jurisdictions can be delineated, 
though one that inevitably remains subject to political revision through 
public debate, and that while maintaining difference still maintains such 
jurisdictions as inter-linked. For it is correct to contest the traditional 
demarcation of boundaries associated with the primacy of state sovereignty 
toward the recognition of inter- and trans-national dimension of political 
(Goodin, 2002), but it is equally misleading to suggest an unqualified de- 
compartmentalisation, that no boundaries can be drawn at all and every 
action has to be considered a global event, as if it were a butterfly wind 
beat in the theory of chaos.
As introduced in the previous chapter, a major challenge for 
international political theory consists in outlining a jurisdictional design 
able to be sociologically significant—i.e., able to include relevant impact 
factors of current life interaction—and yet normatively consistent—i.e., 
ultimately universal in kind. As often is the case, it is a matter of 
diversifying the empirical focus so as to catch the multiplicity of social 
reality, while at the same time unifying this diversity through axiological 
principles in order to avoid fragmentation and ethical indeterminacy. Once 
the universalist character of the political principles in use is ascertained, 
the remaining task of accommodating multilevel dimensionality is pursued 
through the above categorisation of three principal levels, which are 
deemed to be the most critical domains in terms of affecting individual 
capacity of choice^®. In particular, in taking the global domain into full
This is not by any means intended to suggest that the other levels o f political analysis 
such as the regional, interstate and local are meaningless. They are important but 
considered currently less significant in relation to world well-being conditions, and 
consequently excluded from the discussion for practical reasons of time and space. They
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account the present proposal marks a profound point of divergence from 
other more traditional political theories. And yet, this tri-partition is kept 
normatively consistent through the deployment of a single principle of 
justice—the maximisation of world well-being condition through freedom 
of choice—differently applied at the various levels of political action 
through the principle of subsidiarity.
Subsidiarity constitutes an important point with regards to the 
relationship between The jurisdictions, in so far as it allows for co­
ordination and dispute-solving among the different levels of action. This 
principle “regulates authority within a political order, directing that powers 
or tasks should rest with the lower-level sub-units of that order unless 
allocating them to a higher-level central unit would ensure higher 
comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving them” (Follesdal, 
1998, 190). Underpinning this norm is the normative recognition that 
decisions should be taken as close as possible to the individual whose 
freedom of choice is affected, i.e., the participation of the individual in the 
decision-making process should be as direct as possible. This means that 
political decisions should be kept as Tow’ as possible, and be moved up to 
the national and global level under a condition of minimal intervention, 
i.e., only when this is necessary to tackle effectively the scale and effects 
of the problems at stake, and so to allow procedurally for wider democratic 
participation of different actors involved. At the same time, however, an 
ultimate authority has to be established to allocate competencies. This 
authority must be positioned on top of the jurisdictional scale in order to 
solve disputes and facilitate co-ordination. It is, in fact, only through an all- 
inclusive world system that the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries can be 
implemented democratically, avoiding the problem of political exclusion. 
As explained in chapter VII, a project of global constitutionalism is thus 
needed to complete the global mechanism of subsidiarity.
could, however, be integrated in the proposed proposal without modifying the 
fundamental rationale underpinning the whole project. It would be a matter o f adding 
more levels o f political participation through further refinement of the model. For a sketch 
o f a different, more comprehensive view see (Archibugi, 2004).
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This political multidimensionality is crucial for the project per se, but 
also serves to discredit those versions of strong cosmopolitanism, often 
associated with both contractarian and utilitarian views, that show unease 
in accommodating differentiated claims of justice at different levels of 
political action. A note is thus necessary to explain why a first order global 
impartialism, some would say a ‘consistent cosmopolitanism’, does not 
make the present argument for a multi-level political system unnecessary. 
Proving this point also serves to rebut as inadequate for the present 
international circumstances a related objection, based on an argument for a 
straightforward global scheme of justice (Beitz, 1979, § III)^^ In a similar 
but opposite vein, Scheffler argues that contractarian international 
proposals are inherently badly equipped to deal with current global affairs 
“because of their explicit focus on the individual society as the relevant 
unit of justification and their tacit reliance on the category of the nation­
state” (Scheffler, 2001, 33). As suggested in the previous chapter, the 
reliance of contractarian theories of justice on the interaction paradigm 
proves to be a weakness in a double sense. It can, in fact, only lead either 
to a community-based ethics which hesitates to recognise international 
duties beyond group-interaction or, at the opposite end, to a 
straightforward global scheme of redistributive justice which does not 
allow for the framing of diverse political layers through a division of 
ethical-political labour. In sum, the notion of interaction-based justice as 
oppose to beneficence represents a less plausible candidate for designing 
the multilayered political system much needed by the international 
circumstances of justice, for it does not allow for a subtle differentiation of 
political engagement.
By contrast, a multilevel political fi*amework alternative to this 
straightforward impartialism can only by warranted by a consequentialist 
principle when coupled with empirical considerations such as 
vicinity/particular knowledge or sentimental attachment. Given the current
^1 For other similarly straightforward versions of contractarian cosmopolitanism see 
(Barry, 1973; Danielson, 1973; Amdur, 1977; Pogge, 1989; Barry, 1998) and the stringent 
critique that Miller directs against them (Miller, 1998). Diametrically opposite but equally
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social structure, it is plausible to reckon that major aspects of individuals’ 
life projects are anchored in a multilayered set of social domains. And yet, 
while there are people whose lives are increasingly (or fully) transnational, 
there are still many who spend most of their life in their place of birth, with 
only minimal positive contact with the world at large, despite being to 
some degree affected by decisions taken abroad. Imposing a radical and 
global change to such a social reality, in order, for instance, to implement a 
straightforward scheme of redistributive justice would be, not least, 
incredibly costly in social terms. A better strategy then consists of shaping 
a political system able to trace social interaction, as it is currently 
structured, and to bridge the widening gap between responsibility and 
vulnerability. Rather than recommending epistemologically dubious, large- 
scale redistribution, political theory needs rather to figure out institutional 
settings that allow for full democratic congruence between choice-takers 
and choice-bearers. Only by guaranteeing the conditions for free choice in 
each current sphere of socio-political action can the best opportunities for 
personal development be offered and the world well-being condition 
maximised. This leads to a particularly important point of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism on the nature of the relation between social science and 
normative theory.
The meeting of social science with censorial jurisprudence represents 
an utterly significant point of distinction of the present political proposal, 
both because it clarifies a core internal mechanism of the theory, and also 
because it serves as a rebuttal of the oft-heard objection on the lack of a 
global demos—allegedly a necessary social basis for any project of 
international democracy. Once again, presenting the two extremes of the 
challenge here at stake can best depict the point. While any political theory 
needs to track social reality in order to reckon the problems of the ‘people’, 
it also needs critical distance in order both to identify the circumstances of 
injustice and propose political methods to right them. If political theory is 
to be viable, it needs to strike an appropriate balance between these two 
objectives; it must be neither too mired in social reality, nor too ethereal
failing to recognise political multi-dimensionality are Rawls’ position (Rawls, 1971, § 58;
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and divorced from individuals’ sensitivity. Traditionally, consequentialism 
pays attention to both elements, for its prescriptions are always calibrated 
on a fine compromise between principles and circumstance, different 
authors using different scales, at times progressive and conservative.
With regards to this, the elaboration of classical utilitarianism 
provides a number of insights to tackle appropriately this issue. While 
Bentham is considered the divulger of the distinction between expository 
and censorial jurisprudence and a great champion of reformism, he was at 
the same time sensitive to the actual social circumstances to which his 
political and legal proposals were to apply. His consideration of habit as a 
crucial category for political theory tells how keen he was on endowing his 
socio-political theory with empirical relevance. Moreover, in chapter II, we 
saw his international prescriptions, which clearly show his methodology of 
striking a balance between a fundamentally universalistic principle and the 
political situation of his times. Similarly, Sigdwick was in principle a 
supporter of international federalism but ended up fostering more moderate 
causes on the basis of social observations of the lack of cosmopolitan 
sentiments.
While acknowledging the terms of these positions, the present 
perspective presents different political prescriptions insofar as it takes into 
account both the changes in social reality from the 19^ *’ century and the 
normative relevance of the principle of adaptation as in contrast to that of 
habit. On the one hand, the historical evolution in terms of the increased 
social and political democratic interaction beyond borders and the 
subsequent greater civil awareness from Bentham’s times is indisputable. 
Not that today’s interaction is fully democratic, for the fracture between 
individual political awareness and individual social and economical 
actions—i.e., the democratic deficit discussed earlier—is still extremely 
evident, but there is growing recognition of the injustices at the 
international level. On the other hand, principles of consequentialist justice 
require a revision of those intermediate political principles that do not 
maximise the general/universal promotion of well-being. Consequently, a
1999), Gauthier’s (Gauthier, 1986, § IX), and Buchanan’s (Buchanan, 1995).
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political project of adaptation should be envisaged with a two-fold 
objective: promoting a better outcome in terms of freedom of choice, 
universally intended, and fostering a change in social attitude concerning 
international issues of justice. With particular reference to the latter, 
participation in political life produces, as suggested by Mill (Mill, 1861 
[1991], § III), a new political awareness and creates new social attitudes. In 
this sense, taking a more direct and active part in the decision-making 
processes of international institutions through voting could indeed 
generates a new global political thinking based on the awareness of being 
part of a wider shared system extending over several layers.
The objection on the lack of an international or even global demos 
has consequently to be rejected for at least two fundamental reasons, one 
normative and the other socio-political. First, while it is plausible to admit 
the importance of a civic democratic culture to sustaining an institutional 
set-up, it is equally or even more important to recognise the normative 
necessity of such public political structure in order to close the democratic 
gap between choice-takers and choice-bearers. This is fundamental at the 
international level in order to protect vulnerable agents and guarantee the 
independence of different weak actors who would inevitably succumb in 
an unregulated anarchical space dominated by hegemonic players. Second, 
without aiming to tackle the endless political science diatribe on whether 
the individual comes before public institutions or vice versa, it is important 
to stress that participation in public political life constitutes a crucial 
moment for individuals to shape a civic attitude of recognition of public 
interests. The development and flourishing of a demos can then be 
understood most often to be a consequence rather than a cause of public 
institutions. Hence, the creation of international democratic institutions 
could have a notable ‘pedagogic’ and civic role to play in the maturation of 
a more consistent ethical and political habit of individuals seeing 
themselves as part of a heterogeneous, multilayered, and global demos 
(Weinstock, 2001).
Based on these considerations and on the consequentialist 
methodology for the comparison of institutional schemes of justice 
expounded above, this research works on the recognition that the current
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world system Dhere intended primarily as political institutions covering 
economical, social, legal, and cultural grounds □ does not maximise the 
world well-being condition, as defined in terms of the metric of fireedom of 
choice, i.e., vital interests and political participation. Due to the current 
phenomenon of international exclusion discussed in chapter I, the well­
being of world citizens is in fact severely deprived. As a response to this 
immoral state, a consequentialist cosmopolitan code is recommended in 
order to a) critically update the interpretation of our current world system; 
and b) propose new normative principles, as constitutive of a all-inclusive 
moral world, able to improve world well-being conditions. Before 
exploring in the next sections the specific normative content of such 
consequentialist cosmopolitan code, it is necessary to examine further the 
formal characteristics of the tri-partition that shapes its structure.
Consequentialist cosmopolitanism is concerned with the socio­
political rules and practices that fundamentally influence the world well­
being outcome. These rules and practices are identified through the 
scrutiny of some action types, which are grouped in three sets, each 
corresponding to a single level of political action—individual, state or 
world. These three levels, which are the recipient categories of the first 
order political rules whose legitimacy is under question, are unfortunately 
very seldom presented together. From the consequentialist point of view, 
however, it is essential to handle all three simultaneously, insofar as only 
by so doing, is it possible to provide a comprehensive normative treatment 
of the world social system in accordance with the ultimate principle of the 
maximisation of world well-being conditions.
While the first substantive set of vital interests (as determined in the 
following section on the individual level) pertains to the first level of 
political action—the individual level—the second formal set of 
participation rights is more concerned with the second and third levels— 
the state and the world. These three levels refer to three main categories, 
each one representing a realm into which action types related to 
standardised states of the world may be placed. In them, particular 
attention is devoted to the enabling of the agent’s power to choose through 
political structures and social institutions. The ethical-political concepts
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underpinning these structures and institutions are the primary focus of the 
critical analysis, as it is through them that the consequentialist critique 
promises to effect an increase, at least in terms of potential, in the general 
well-being.
The remainder of the chapter presents thus a more detailed outline of 
the theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism exposed so far. In 
particular, each of the three levels is analysed using three conceptual 
categories: value, rules, and agency, which correspondingly recall three 
topical themes of international ethics, i.e., pluralism, multilevel 
dimensionality, and moral agency. The section on value consequently 
detects the relative good which is to be pursued in a specific realm; the 
section on rules indicates those prescribed contextual rules most conducive 
to the maximisation of world well-being conditions in a specific domain; 
and the section on agency identifies the relevant moral positions of choice 
makers (the responsible) and choice bearers (the vulnerable). It should be 
remembered, finally, that since each level has to be normatively consistent 
with the other two, a double co-ordination must be implemented between 
the different jurisdictions. Hence, while the axiological co-ordination needs 
to be strictly mono-directional, insofar as normative primacy is attached to 
individual well-being; fi*om a political point of view, it must be shaped by 
the principle of subsidiarity and by a superior authority to allocate 
competences (Goodin, 2 0 0 3 a)^2 Xo increase the readability of what 
follows, a synoptical overview of the three levels is presented in the 
following table 1.
This serves also as a response to the vexed question on the axiological priority of 
actions when dealing with a political reality; a question organised by the concentric circles 
question I  from above or from below? from the external or from the internal?
(Nussbaum, 1996, 9).
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Table 1. Summary of the three levels of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism
Values Rules Agency
Responsibility Vulnerability
Individual •  Choice-based 
individualism
•  System of 
individual 
rights
•  Maximin for 
vital rigjits
•  All
(aggregately)
• Individuals
State Internal • Group
flourishing
•  Minorities and 
groups rights
•  Special duties
•  States
•  Local 
collective 
bodies
• Individuals
•  Local 
collective 
bodies
• Individuals
External •  State
autonomy
•  Self- 
determination
•  Non­
intervention
•  Special duties
•  International 
institutions
• International 
collective 
bodies
• Individuals
• States
•  Individuals
Worid •  Global 
concern
• Cosmopolitan 
democracy
• Humanitarian 
universal rules
•  Supranational 
institutions
• Supranational 
collective 
bodies
•  States
• Individuals
•  Humanity
• Supranational 
collective 
bodies
• Individuals
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Individual level
Value. Individual well-being mediated through individual choice 
capability represents the value focus of both the ultimate consequentialist 
rule of well-being maximisation, and the specific value category of the first 
level intermediate rules. In fact, in embodying the basic assumptions of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism, moral individualism also informs the 
ultimate aim of this theory, represented by the maximisation of the 
capacity for choice □ something strongly shaped by the social-institutional 
arrangements. According to this, individuals’ potential to choose depends 
on the scope of the set of choices effectively available; principally, the 
existence of the wanted goods, relevant information and the relative social 
power of the agent (Dowding, 1992). Since individuals are regarded in an 
anti-patemalist way as the best judges of their own interests, given the 
necessary conditions, an equal presumption of rightness is accorded to 
every choice, and the ultimate reference for assessing moral cases rests on 
the empirical consequences affecting the agents’ possibility to choose and, 
ultimately, on individual well-being. Only a posteriori, then, is it possible 
to think about formal laundering mechanisms to be implemented in order 
to facilitate co-ordination and co-operation between conflicting choices 
(Goodin, 1995, § IV).
Once the basic value of individual well-being, mediated through 
choice possibilities, is assumed, a number of vital interests can be 
analytically deduced as objective priorities to be guaranteed in order to 
allow each individual to develop and choose freely among life options. 
Health, education, and security^^ constitute the minimal elements 
necessary to enable the individual capability for free choice-making; they 
are therefore equally the prerequisites for playing an active role in the
On such a minimal level a broad consensus can be traced among different schools of  
thought. See: (Doyal & Gough, 1986) for human needs; (Elfstrom, 1989) for basic wants; 
(Scanlon, 1979; Rawls, 1982; Barry, 1998, 148) for primary goods; (Shue, 1980; Miller, 
1999) for basic rights; (Sen, 1980, 1993a; Nussbaum, 2002; Sen, 2004) for capabilities. 
An internal utilitarian debate also produced different versions, which nonetheless all share 
common elements. See (Bentham, 1781 [1988]; Mill, 1859 [1962]; 1861 [1962], V; 
Singer, 1979; Gray, 1983, III, 1; Elfstrom, 1989; Goodin, 1995). Moreover, detailed
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political system, and thus, in the ultimate analysis, in one’s own life 
(Habermas, 2002, 199-202; Nussbaum, 2002, 128-30). These are “basic 
interests, which must be respected or served if a minimally acceptable 
condition of life, in any setting, is to be possible” (Lyons, 1977, 126), 
inasmuch as one’s potential well-being primarily depend on having the 
social assets that avail one of these vital well-being interests^"*. “Persons 
enjoy significant autonomy to the degree that their choices are not entirely 
dictated by an effort to secure their basic needs” (Raz, 1982, 115). Such 
primary capabilities, constitutive of a person’s autonomous being, 
represent a basic element for any well-being evaluation (Sen, 1992, 39) and 
are therefore claimed to be universal in kind, although their specific 
interpretations are necessarily culturally determined and must take into 
account the social inclusion/exclusion variable (Goodin, 1996a). Once the 
vital interests are identified, public rules intended as political means 
allowing for their guarantee represent the next theoretical challenge.
Rule. The optimal rule to maximise individual well-being at the 
individual level is, according to consequentialist cosmopolitanism, a 
universal system of legal individual rights, with a special proviso 
concerning the guarantee of vital interests. Within this conception, rights 
are instrumentally understood (in opposition to autonomy-based 
approaches à la Raz) as the primary material conditions of interest 
formation and realisation, and consequently as the basis for personal 
entitlements within which individuals form and pursue their own 
conceptions of well-being (Gray, 1983, IV, 2; Hardin, 1986; Kelly, 1990, 
75; Riley, 1998; Ferrajoli, 2001).
While the general system of rights has to be mainly state-based, in 
that they concern targeted legislation and implementation, the more limited 
set of fundamental interest rights, whose protection must be universally 
guaranteed, requires a caveat. Given the current world social situation in 
which the worst-off lack the opportunity to enjoy vital interests, the second
accounts of these three elements can be found in numerous publications of international 
organisations such as the World Bank, UNDP, and OECD.
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order consequentialist principle prescribes a proviso consisting in a first 
order world-wide maximin^^ rule to the effect of universally guaranteeing 
such minimal rights. The envisaged legal setting thus requires a system of 
rights in which strict lexical priority is given to the global protection of 
vital rights and a general normative framework of choice-based 
consequentialism, shaped both by individual freedom of choice and 
□ more substantive □ domestic schemes of justice^^. The guarantee of 
vital interest rights, asTnuch as that of other more traditional rights, has to 
be considered as legally binding, and its violation as legally punishable. 
The lack of a minimal level of health, education, and security thus have to 
be considered illegal; with such (re)considerations similar to those made 
with regard to slavery in the 19^  ^century.
Vital well-being rights have to be intended as substantially different 
from any other available good in terms of choice possibility, insofar as they 
are the fundamental presuppositions for individual decision-making. 
According to the underpinning value theory, in fact, the marginal well­
being produced by any secondary choice function cannot be directly 
compared, and has then to be understood as so severely discounted with 
respect to that of primary choice that the possibility of a trade-off is 
unavailable. Any advantage in terms of a lexically prior principle has 
therefore to override any disadvantage in terms of lexically inferior ones. 
Vital interests are then to be met universally through a scheme of world 
rules, with the institutional requirements of consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism compelling the consideration of the whole category of the
In a formulation different from but consistent with mine, Barry identifies basic 
interests as “things that everybody would wish to have or avoid having, and would give up 
almost anything else to have or avoid” (Barry, 2001b, 284-6; 2003, 19)
According to which the condition o f the worst-off has priority over other, better 
conditions in the decision on the institutional setting to be adopted.
To see how the maximin and the Rawlsian difference principle overlap with 
consequentialism in some cases refer to (Hardin, 1988, 134), and also (Arrow, 1973; 
Gordon, 1973; Harsanyi, 1975; Dasgupta, 1982; Narveson, 1982). The mle o f maximin 
and the principle of consequentialist cosmopolitanism are assumed to be equivalent in the 
case o f  vital interests. The maximin rule can be taken as a sub-category, a limiting case, of 
the general average consequentialist principle, and used for its clarity in stressing the 
proviso o f the absolute priority o f satisfying vital interests. Once these vital interests are 
met, the general consequentialist cosmopolitan setting o f individual rights is intended to
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worst-off, i.e., ruling out case by case method (Goodin, 1995, §1 and 16; 
Hooker, 2000, §8)87. since these vital well-being rights are “everyone’s 
minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity” (Shue, 1980, 
19), a global responsibility has, thus, to be allocated and special state- 
located duties allowed only as long as they are not detrimental to the 
universal satisfaction of vital interests. In line with this, the international 
implementation of the maximin rule to guarantee vital interests promises 
an incomparable increase in the actual and future trend of world well-being 
conditions, in so far as it universally empowers individuals to achieve the 
status of free choice-maker.
Agency. In order to complete the rationale of first level, a double 
conception of agency is to be outlined, requiring both the allocation of 
responsibility in relation to the guarantee of fundamental entitlements, and 
the recognition of vulnerability with regard to the deprivation of vital 
interests. The principle of vulnerability, centred on a forward-looking 
responsibility anchored to the capacity to influence an outcome (Goodin, 
1985b, § 5), generates the political identification of both classes of agency, 
as well as the corresponding political sanctions.
The first category, that of vulnerability, comprises, accordingly, all 
those individuals who cannot avail themselves of the enjoyment of the vital 
interests autonomously. Within this group, individuality is the key element 
in need of attention; states and other collective bodies having only a 
derivative value. Conversely, the class of choice-makers, or those 
responsible, includes all agents, primarily institutions, capable of 
influencing the outcome. A multilevel and synchronic commitment of 
responsibility is therefore required by this cosmopolitan scheme of justice, 
through a net of intermingled duties co-ordinated by a principle of
regain its predominance. For the lexical priority o f vital rights as the cornerstone o f a 
liberal system o f security and freedom see (Dworkin, 1984; Riley, 1998).
87 The use o f a rule to establish a system o f individual rights, in combination with the 
qualitative difference o f the vital interests, should eliminate the objection, usually raised 
against Rawls, about the counter-intuitiveness o f such maximin rule. Critics argue that 
preferring to improve the basic condition o f “one” worst-off should not be at the expense 
of the detrimental effects on a huge number o f people. See for instance (Arrow, 1973; 
Harsanyi, 1975).
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subsidiarity^^. Individuals are also required to acknowledge their own 
potential to harm, in line with the various political levels of action, and 
subsequently their actual responsibility. Along with individuals, all 
collective agents (such as NGOs, MNCs, and supranational organisations), 
in a position to effectively guarantee the protection and implementation of 
policies of vital interests, are called to action. In sum, consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism entails a radical revision of the centrality accorded states 
and individuals, insofar as they considered only two among many diverse 
international ethical agents. In order to complete this picture of the 
consequentialist cosmopolitan proposal for international ethics, an 
examination of the remaining two levels is, however, still needed.
State level
Value. At the state level, consequentialist cosmopolitanism 
prescribes the pursuit of two principal values: group flourishing and state 
autonomy, concerning respectively the internal and the external spheres of 
the state realm. Consistently with the values of the other two levels, they 
represent the instrumental goods that are indirectly most conducive to the 
ultimate good of individual well-being through collective freedom of 
choice.
The public domain has particular significance for the quality of life 
of individuals, insofar as society for the most part shapes individuals’ 
moral and personal identity in a process in which personal choice is 
combined with personal discovery. In more existential terms, culture can 
be seen as what remains when all the rest is lost. So much so that without a 
lebenswelt in which to affirm their identity, individuals’ lives would be 
firagmented and disoriented; their choices would be unconscious and most 
unlikely to be conducive to satisfaction (Frost, 2001). At the same time, a
This kind o f responsibility has to be intended by degrees depending on the relevance of 
one’s position within the chain between action-maker and -bearer, and has to be assessed 
aggregately, not iteratively (Hooker, 2000, 166), Finally, it has to be also intended in its 
omissive version. An agent is responsible, thus, even when harm is produced by inaction, 
i.e., he is accountable for both his direct (foreseeable and desired) and oblique 
(foreseeable and not desired) intended consequences (Hare, 1999, 153-4; Hooker, 2000, 
§5).
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critical perspective is crucial, and having at one’s disposal several contexts 
of choice in addition to the context original to one is even more beneficial 
to the possibility of free choice (Sommer, 2004), for identity is not a zero- 
sum game (UNDP, 2004, 2). This hermeneutic-normative reasoning 
applies both to individual and state (and sub-state) identity, the two being 
highly determining factors for an integrated individual well-being.
In this sense, the societies are intended instrumentally as providers of 
contexts of meaning for choice-making, and thus an essential pre-requisite 
for individual autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995). Accordingly, state and sub­
state attachment is regarded more as a resource than a constraint from a 
cosmopolitan point of view, provided it consistently harmonises with 
impartial rules and mutual respect (Marchetti, 2003a). Consequently, while 
it is wrong to endow the nation-state with a special ethical primacy (Miller, 
1995, 1997), it would be equally unwise to imagine that it could be entirely 
discounted, as some cosmopolitans are tempted to claim (Monbiot, 2003, 
12 and 43). With the ethical significance of collective bodies always 
deriving from their capacity to enrich the lives of their individual members 
(Hare, 1957; Elfstrom, 1989, 31-35), the value of the state itself should not 
but hQ, prima facie, national.
In answer to the challenge of demonstrating its capacity to integrate 
the state level within the universal scheme of political ethics (Brown, 
1998), and so recognising the relevance of local socio-cultural claims, 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism offers a familiar utilitarian response. In 
chapter II it was noted that a constant feature of the utilitarian school of 
thought since its beginnings, is the consideration of the state as a benefits 
provider while at the same time framing this normative interpretation 
within a wider picture of universal justice. John Stuart Mill, in particular, 
succeeds in being at once a universalistic utilitarian and a defender of the 
state by structuring his argument on different levels (Mill, 1835-40 [1991]; 
Mill, 1861 [1991]). While at the individual level he is firm in protecting 
individual freedom, he simultaneously recognises the right to self- 
determination at the state level, as a right which can be justified from a 
universal point of view (Varouxakis, 2002, § 7). Consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism similarly structures its political system on several levels
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through the use of a single criterion of justice and a number of intermediate 
and indirect rules, such as the following.
Rule. With regard to the political rules of the second level, 
consequentialist cosmopolitan reasoning implies a right to self- 
determination and a converse duty to non-intervention in the external 
sphere of state, as well as a duty to respect multiculturally the rights of 
minorities and groups in its internal sphere. Limits to these rights, 
including those concerning special duties, are marked by an entrenchment 
in the rules of the first (individual rights system) and the third 
(cosmopolitan law) level. The ultimate criterion for assessing each rule and 
the whole system remains the capacity to increase fi*eedom of choice and 
thereby world well-being conditions. Such balancing mechanism that 
serves to solve the conflicts arising between the differing levels thus 
remains flexible but not indeterminate. Since, grounded on a global 
principle of justice it is based on an impartial and universal principle, , it 
allows for the delineation of concrete guidelines which reduce political 
indeterminacy; though, as discussed in the previous section on social 
theory, inevitably depending also on political dialogue. Examples of this 
machinery are discussed in the next two chapters as in the case of 
conflicting cases between migrants and receiving communities, or between 
different levels of competences within a world federal system. Here a 
general presentation of the second level is provided.
The cardinal assumption of this level, the principle of collective 
authenticity (Margalit & Raz, 1990, 457; Ferrara, 1999, § 7)^^, produces a 
rule which promises both to respect cultural differences and to maximise 
world well-being conditions, in as much as each group, taken as the best 
judge of its own collective goods, is in the position to autonomously decide 
over its own future. In fact, each socio-political organisation is assessed 
comprehensively, and each set of collective rules considered in terms of 
well-being maximisation. Whereas the presumption of the superiority of 
the principle of authenticity relies on the principle of non-comparability
For a different reading o f the principle o f self-determination as anchored to the idea of 
nationality see (French & Gutman, 1974; Miller, 2000b).
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and a fortiori on the principle of non-cognitivism, the legitimacy of the 
principle of state autonomy refers instead to historical evidence and to the 
ideal form of democratic government. This guarantees each “people” the 
right to political independence and autonomous implementation of social 
expression, ruling out external intrusion into domestic affairs. Despite 
recent criticism, both concepts are still viable, assuming they are updated 
consistent to a tri-level cosmopolitan system.
The related concept of special duties and special care, which ethical 
thinking has traditionally reserved for those “close to us”, also needs to be 
reinterpreted and limited in accordance with the first and third level rules. 
As much as consequentialist cosmopolitanism endorses respect for state 
autonomy, it equally respects the indirect legitimacy of special duties, 
provided they are intended as part of the larger obligation to a division of 
global moral labour. Consequentialist cosmopolitanism provides an 
indirect criterion of rightness for assessing special duties regardless of the 
sources of these ties. It consequently allows the preferential treatment of 
fellow citizens’ secondary interests only where foreign vital interests are 
not at stake (Sidgwick, 1891 [1996], 299 and 430-34; Brink, 1986, 423-27; 
Goodin & Pettit, 1986; Goodin, 1988; Elfstrom, 1989, 14-15; Jackson, 
1991,475).
Agency. Concerning the issue of political agency in this second level, 
the state represents the crucial although not singular political actor. 
Although the ultimate moral reference remains the individual, as a 
collective agent the state is endowed with a number of characteristics with 
significant moral dimensions, such as specific, effectively resourced 
capacities both in terms of rationality and knowledge, as well as crude 
power, which it can deploy in specific circumstances (O'Neill, 2001). 
These features make the state a moral agent of justice, both in terms of 
vulnerability and responsibility. What the individual, taken singly, cannot 
achieve, can in fact very often be achieved through the action of such a 
collective body.
With regard to the first aspect of agency, that of responsible choice- 
making, consequentialist cosmopolitanism requires that the duties of the 
second level are for the most part the responsibility of collective bodies,
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with the remainder residing with individuals. Where internal responsibility 
is concerned, the state (whose legitimacy, strength and accountability 
individuals have a duty to promote) normally acts as both a direct choice- 
maker and provider of a framework within which individuals and local 
collective groups operate. In the external area of responsibility, conversely, 
other actors are called to action, since the state is here the object of 
vulnerability. Supranational bodies are, thus, needed as super partes judges 
and guarantors of the implementation of the principles of non-intervention 
and self-determination.
Within the converse side of agency, that of vulnerability, the 
distinction between state’s internal and external realms needs equally to be 
repeated. As a consequence, both individuals and local collective groups 
are domestically classified as potentially vulnerable, while externally, the 
state itself is considered vulnerable to deprivation of its full capacity for 
self-determination. Since the agent whose well-being functions can be 
potentially damaged is, however, the individual, he or she remains the 
ultimate reference in this as well as in the last level of theory of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism, that of global political action.
World level
Value. At the third level, consequentialist cosmopolitanism identifies 
global concern as the value most conducive to the maximisation of world 
well-being conditions. Since the subject here is humanity at large, this 
entails an enlargement of the traditional sphere of moral consideration 
toward the recognition of global issues as full political problems and of 
humanity as political subject. This perspective suggests the development of 
a multiple and comprehensive individual identity as the ground on which to 
enhance the capacity for free choice-making, selecting and prioritising 
those identities that each individual values most. This inevitably leads to an 
appreciation of all humanity □ in opposition to parochialism □ in that it 
includes the assumption that only through the recognition of a multilayered 
hermeneutic exposure through diversified social interaction as based on an 
equal political standing, can the individual identity maximally flourish. The
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concept of humanity, accordingly understood as intrinsically linked to that 
of the individual, thus requires a demanding critical evaluation as to where 
one should bring to a halt the process of ethical and political opening 
beyond oneself. In fact, “at whatever point universalizability stops, one can 
raise the question: why stop there?” and argues against arbitrariness 
(Singer, 1988, 157; 2002).
At the same time, however, the cosmopolitan tendency toward all- 
inclusiveness does not entail the two ethical issues of motivational 
weakness and public deceit, which are stressed by nationalist scholars. The 
critical commitment to investigate the ethical status of the boundaries of 
one’s own community does not imply either the moral deficiency in terms 
of motivational weakness supposedly caused by the cosmopolitan 
detachment from social reality (Walzer in Carlehenden & Gabriels, 1997, 
120; Miller, 1997)^0, or that such an invocation of humanity hides a public 
deceit (Schmitt, 1932 [1996], 52). While not requiring the renunciation of 
local or state identity, consequentialist cosmopolitanism demands only the 
addition of a third factor of our identity as member of mankind, for our 
identity and our political agency are deemed to be multiple, thus extending 
much beyond our current passport.
The recognition of the world society as a ‘community of fate’ 
provides further evidence of the acknowledgement of humanity as a 
political subject (Held, 2000, 224-225). The intense global transformations 
that shape the fundamentals of the world system manifestly emphasise a 
number of common socio-political elements that closely link individuals 
from different places in the world, making them “unavoidably side by 
side”, as Kant anticipated more than two centuries ago. The escalating 
level of world trade, the huge migratory masses, environmental 
degradation and the spread of disease are all features of a shared future. 
Such a world-wide overlap of interests is more and more evident, with 
ordinary citizens increasingly conscious of how much their lives are 
influenced by global factors. Those who argue against the novel character 
of globalization do not sufficiently recognise the changes affecting first
For a reply to supposed flâneurisme o f cosmopolitanism see (Marchetti, 2003a).
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and foremost citizens’ awareness of how interdependent and intrusive 
global affairs have became and how much new global rules to tackle them 
are demanded (Franck, 1997).
Rule. At the world level, consequentialist cosmopolitanism requires a 
scheme of cosmopolitan democracy and universal humanitarian rules, 
insofar as those are the necessary elements, along with the rules of the 
previous levels, for the establishment of a comprehensive and consistent 
political system. In requiring the expansion of our ethical concern world­
wide, these factors demand that individual and state claims be aligned 
coherently to the universal requirements of mankind through a new ethical- 
politiôal equilibrium. The principle of self-determination has to be applied 
not only to the individual and state cases, but also to humanity at large.
Accountable mechanisms to regulate global issues, anchored in a 
cosmopolitical government, determine the agenda at this level. Political 
control is needed both for global phenomena that cannot be governed by 
traditional political forms of state and interstate organisations, such as 
international migration and environmental crises, and for local and state 
phenomena not sufficiently guaranteed by local and state authorities, like 
the abuse of human rights and local minorities. Both global and state 
domains need a degree of cosmopolitan management in order to safeguard 
the heterogeneity of world actors beyond the pure balance of power 
interests. As in the domestic sphere, in the international domain 
cosmopolitan governance is needed in order to foster civil coexistence, and 
not vice versa (Ferrajoli, 1999).
A new form of cosmopolitan politics is thus necessary to fill the 
growing gap between choice-makers and choice-bearers. Such a 
cosmopolitics should, however, be negatively determined □ shaped by the 
principle of global harm prevention (Linklater, 2001) □ with the scope of 
cosmopolitan institutions consequently limited to two main areas of 
competence: a) insurance, acting as the second guarantor of the possibility 
of genuine flourishing at both individual and state level, and b) regulation, 
through a world-wide scheme of co-operation to foster public and 
accountable management of global problems. The latter, in particular, is
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needed to supervise the increasing global externalities of international 
affairs, and it is not possible without a new interpretation of public agency.
Agency. Given the narrowness of the traditional state-centric 
conception of responsibility and vulnerability, world agency necessarily 
entails an enlargement of the current view of political agency. Only in the 
post war period has a new universalistic approach emerged Done 
principally based on human rights □ to dispute the classical realist 
interpretation of political agency and accentuate an unresolved tension 
between state legitimacy and cosmopolitan claims of justice.
World citizenship represents a crucial step toward an overhaul of the 
established system of agency through its integration of cosmopolitan 
institutions. Rather than acting directly on the agents’ well-being, 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism uses an indirect strategy consisting of 
empowering the potentially vulnerable with the political capability to 
influence the outcomes that affect them. This implies, far from deleting all 
the other forms of citizenship, a new concept of cosmopolitan citizenship 
according to which all political agents are entitled to multilevel citizenship 
and therefore able to influence all those decisions that on all political levels 
affect them. Simultaneously, however, agents are also made politically 
accountable for their actions that pertain to the global sphere and humanity 
as publicum (both directly, and indirectly as spill-over effects of their 
behaviour) with appropriate sanctions ordered against non-compliance with 
cosmopolitan rules.
In accordance with this, at the world level the class of action makers 
responsible for the international enforcement of cosmopolitan policies 
through a co-operative scheme, comprises: a) supranational political bodies 
such as a reformed UN and macro-region institutions; b) supranational 
collective bodies such as MNCs, INGOs (international trade unions, 
international churches, international associations and groups, and more 
generally the so-called global civil society), and international minority 
groups (Kurds, Basques, etc.); c) states; and d) individuals autonomously 
and within these collective bodies. These political agents all share a social 
responsibility toward the class of vulnerable agents. They are under a duty 
(weighted in accordance with their actual capacity to influence the
189
outcome) to preserve and maximise the independence of choice of the class 
of action-bearers.
Conversely, global choice-bearers, i.e., those agents who are 
vulnerable in their supranational status, include: a) first and foremost 
humanity broadly understood, comprising the entire present human species 
and, significantly, future generations; b) supranational collective bodies 
such as civil organisations, characterised by a transnational attitude in 
dealing with political issues; and c) individuals, insofar as they are the 
ultimate reference in terms of well-being.
In recognising this twofold characteristic of global agency, together 
with the relevance of international institutions where these two classes of 
agents can be at once accountable and guaranteed, consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism aims at re-establishing the congruence central to any 
democratic form of politics between decision-makers and decision-bearers 
at each level of political action. Only where this correspondence is 
universally respected, is the individual in fact in the position to self- 
legislate over the entire range of activities in which he/she is involved, and 
thus to exercise his freedom of choice. Only where this reflexivity is truly 
global can the phenomenon of international political exclusion eliminated.
Conclusions
The last two chapters have offered a cosmopolitan response to the 
original recognition of the lack of a comprehensive consequentialist theory 
of international ethics as an adequate response to the exclusionary 
challenges raised by current international affairs. The limited vision of 
many political theories, both communitarian and cosmopolitan, has been 
criticised through the adoption of a inclusive perspective that encompasses 
other significant aspects of political action in the contemporary world. 
Consequently, a new ethical-political approach has been suggested that 
recognises the most neglected international agents, as well as draws the 
three main extant levels of political action together in a new equilibrium. 
An innovative interpretation of global political agency, entailing differing 
degrees of responsibility and relative power at all levels of political
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decision-making, including the global sphere, forms the core of this 
political project, which is complemented by the proposal for a system of 
strengthened cosmopolitan government. Only through such a multi-level 
politics can the possibility of individual choice receive an impartial 
hearing, thus opening the way for maximisation of world well-being 
conditions. Hence, such political arrangements represent, for the time 
being at least, the appropriate compliance with the inclusiveness-related 
requirements of a consequentialist cosmopolitan theory of global justice.
The next two chapters present two detailed case studies of 
considerable relevance to the issue of cosmopolitan citizenship and 
individual freedom of choice, for they challenge two of most evident forms 
of international exclusion, i.e., exclusion from national and international 
citizenship. The two case studies concern thus a new horizontal 
interpretation of citizenship in the case of international migration and a 
new vertical one in the case of international institutions. While they 
primarily refer to the second, more formal tenet of freedom of choice □ the 
right to political participation □ they also contribute to shaping the 
political arrangements necessary for the implementation of fair policies to 
guarantee the first, more substantive component of freedom of choice 
□ the protection of vital interest. They entail the implementation of 
political concepts previously considered to apply only to the first two 
levels of political action, but which need to be expanded to the third in 
order to envisage a consistent global system of consequentialist justice. In 
this, they represent two clear instances in need of urgent critical thinking in 
international ethics.
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VI
National Policies or Migratory Cosmopolitanism? 
Choice, Horizontal Citizenship, and the Right 
to Movement
“The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a
tender beginner; 
the man for whom each country is as his native
soil is already strong; 
but only the man for whom the whole world is 
as a foreign land is perfect” (Hugo of St. Victor, 
quoted in Dallmayr, 2003, 1)
The traditional statist stance on migration, according to which the 
state retains an almost absolute discretion with regard to accepting 
foreigners into its own territory, represents one of the clearest examples of 
international exclusion. Underpinning this discretion is a creed of the 
statist-communitarian paradigm that insists citizenship intrinsically refers 
to membership in a limited political organisation 0 i.e., the state. 
According to this position, the very expression ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ 
is an oxymoron in so much as any attempt to expand the notion of 
citizenship beyond the limits of the community necessarily results in self- 
contradiction. And yet, this statist creed is increasingly contested both in 
practice and theory. At the practical level, more and more states recognise 
the possibility of multiple allegiances—i.e., recognise multiple passports—
192
and, in a different way, recent developments in international law chip away 
at state prerogatives as they show a tendency to grant increased legal 
relevance to universal human rights. At the normative level, discretionary 
admittance policies have recently been challenged by recommendations for 
a straightforward open border system where complete freedom of 
movement would be allowed according to universalistic principles. These 
two radical alternatives, statism and open borders, delimit the normative 
discussion on migration.
In contrast to both of these extreme positions, this chapter presents a 
proposal for a new reading of citizenship, and for its supranational 
institutional correlate in terms of migratory cosmopolitanism. Against 
state-centric logic, this chapter holds that while the concept of nationality 
is inseparable from the notion of a sovereign state, the concept of 
citizenship is not, insofar as it can be unfolded and spread out over a 
number of political spheres. Consequently, no normative obstacles impede 
the expansion of the traditional notion of polis to the entire cosmos. 
Cosmo-political citizenship is, thus, understood to have significant value 
and meaning. In opposition to the open borders theory, the argument 
presented here maintains that such arrangements would violate the 
principle of impartiality, and would consequently be less effective toward 
the promotion of world welfare.
An interpretation of cosmopolitan citizenship in terms of freedom of 
movement forms the core of this chapter. While the mainstream argument 
for global citizenship is primarily concerned with the capacity of political 
agents to influence, from their respective positions, those public decisions 
whose consequences extend beyond national borders (which is the topic of 
the next chapter), this chapter aims to study the other, less discussed, 
aspect of global citizenship which concerns not the scope of public 
accountability but the extent to which political agents are free to move and 
join different societies. Accordingly, the primary object of concern here is 
the individuals’ capacity to modify their personal choice possibilities 
through changing their place of residency: thus, to pursue control over the 
political system and, a fortiori, over their own future. Once the principle of 
control over one’s own life is endorsed, the issue of original residency
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becomes less significant for both aspects of global citizenship—i.e., 
transnational accountability and transnational movement. On this last 
account the treatment of migrants becomes a central test of the legitimacy 
of the political system.
In contrast to existing international law and national policies, 
migrants are recognised as cosmopolitan stakeholders entitled to rights that 
extend to different spheres of political action. According to the long-term 
emancipation project of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, the right to fi’ee 
passage is in fact considered a progressive entitlement of non­
discrimination which contributes to the maximisation of individual choice 
possibilities and, consequently, the world well-being condition. For it to be 
established the institution of an international organisation specifically 
focused on migration management is reconunended. The subsequent form 
of cosmopolitical governance of migration would, then, be effective, 
legitimate, and accountable, states would lose their absolute privilege of 
admission, and a more equitable method of allocating entrance permission 
and international responsibility would be implemented, able to eliminate 
some injustices of the present nation-led system.
This chapter starts by setting out the defining characteristics of 
migration and the political concept of citizenship, it then proceeds to a 
survey of current institutions and policies regarding migration. The core 
argument for the cosmopolitan interpretation of migration and citizenship 
is then introduced, and further determined in its general (migrants) and 
special (refugees) cases. Finally, concluding recommendations for the 
creation of a supranational institutional fi*amework are fbrmulated^k
^1 In line with a comprehensive and impartial perspective, the term migrants, and not 
immigrants or emigrants, will be used as primary reference here. The focus is, in fact, on 
people who travel (i.e,, leave a place, travel and reach another place), rather than just on 
people who aim to be accepted by somebody or who are escaping from some place, in 
this, the term migrant brings out the idea of such movement as a kind o f dialogue between 
cultures, as intercultural mediations. Through their personal experience on the edge 
between two or more cultural worlds, migrants are often the agents who are best equipped 
to open up possibilities o f reciprocal understanding.
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The relation between migration and citizenship
From the present perspective, migration is problematised with 
reference to the political, rather than sociological, meaning of movement. 
While the sociological interpretation relates to phenomena that are almost 
as old as society itself, the reference of the political reading has a more 
recent origin and is concerned with admission into a foreign political 
society. A strict definition of immigration, in fact, needs to rely on the 
modem concept of citizenship and therefore of the nation-state. A 
conventional and symbolic date used to signify the beginning of new 
nation-state model of active membership is 26 August 1789, the 
Declàration des droits de l ’homme et du citoyen. It is, in fact, from this 
formative period of the modem nation-state and its correlate of citizenship 
that the distinction arose between e-migration and im-migration and all the 
relative progressive discriminations that today mark the difference between 
political communities.
Mainstream scholarship on migration tends to identify two principal 
types of migrants: economic and political. Political recognition of this 
partition is recorded through the different treatment accorded to political 
asylum-seekers and socio-economical migrants in specific national and 
intemational laws. The classic example of this demarcation is the definition 
of the refugee under the Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol 
(entered into force in 1954 and 1967 respectively). Recently, however, this 
distinction has been subject to a series of criticisms from different political 
angles. What these criticisms all point out is that it is extremely difficult to 
disentangle the complex net of reasons that back both the decision to leave 
and the expectations for the future^^.
A typical case is migration due to civil wars. In such cases fleeing is motivated by both 
economic and political factors. The events that cause the problems are so heterogeneous 
that singling out one factor means missing a correct interpretation. Hence, for instance, 
discriminating between an Angolan asylum-seeker and an Angolan economic migrant is to 
neglect the fact that famines and livelihood crises in that country are intrinsically related 
to the political situation. But not just empirical considerations contest this distinction. 
Normative stances also stress the arbitrariness of the conventional priority o f treatment, 
asking: What justifies only accepting a hungry migrant on political grounds? (Pogge,
1997,15; Gibney, 2001).
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Citizenship, understood as the set of legal entitlements allowing for 
full community membership, represents the core element of democratic 
political theory. Conventionally, three different sets of citizenship rights 
can be distinguished according to their scope: civil, political, and socio­
economic rights (Marshall, 1950)^^. These entitlements, which are based 
on a fundamental principle of equality and reciprocity, are impartially 
guaranteed to every member of the community. Insofar as membership 
within the collective exercising self-governance is usually recognised as 
the minimal precondition of democratic life, the acquisition of this set of 
rights is, thus, considered crucial to effective participation in social and 
political life (Kymlicka & Wayne, 1994; Delanty, 2000, § 1-2).
There have been two major alternative principles governing the 
acquisition of citizenship: jus solii and jus sanguinis. While the first grants 
citizenship to everyone bom within the territory of the country, the second 
considers blood relationship as the determining distinction. These 
principles have been ‘inconsistently’ integrated with the practices of 
naturalisation and together they form the base of the traditional concept of 
allegiance, according to which loyalty is due to one’s own country 
regardless of any other kind of secondary responsibilities extending beyond 
borders. This stance is, however, increasingly under pressure; both from a 
normative point of view for its inconsistency with fundamental principles 
of impartiality, and as a matter of fact, as increasing numbers of states 
recognise the possibility of double or even multiple citizenship (Habermas, 
1992; Sassen, 1999; Habermas, 2002). Neither principle keeps its full value 
in consequentialist cosmopolitanism, which fosters a re-conceptualisation 
of the notion of citizenship through the recognition of several significant 
levels of political action, in all of which individuals have legal 
entitlements. Before going into this proposal in detail, however, it is
In recent years, there have been strong advocates for a further cultural component of 
citizenship, relying on the possibility of identification with a communitarian identity 
(Kymlicka, 1995, 2003). According to this position, the concept of nationality remains 
strictly related to that of citizenship, as in David Miller’s theory (Miller, 1988, 1993, 
1995). In opposition to this, the present study holds that the notion o f citizenship can be 
detached from that o f nationality.
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necessary to examine the origins and current institutional policies toward 
migration.
The origins and policies of current migratory institutions
Migration is commonly included in the list of the global issues, and 
yet is almost exclusively managed merely by national or regional 
policies^'^. This disconnect reveals a fundamental normative contradiction 
between claims that are universal to all humans and the communitarian 
entitlements upheld by mainstream political philosophy as well as national 
and intemational laws. The most blatant example of this contradictory 
logic at work is possibly article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 concerning the right 
to leave (but not to enter into) any country.
Intemational law has played an important, and yet discontinuous, 
justificatory role in keeping the legal setting of migratory policy domestic. 
Although recognition of the human rights regime has grown substantially 
over the last fifty years as it has slowly challenged national sovereignty in 
many aspects, the alien’s right to admission is still a solid prerogative of 
the state. But this has not always been the case. In the first stages of jus 
gentium, which were anchored to the tradition of the Law of Nature, in 
fact, the duty to admit the alien was accepted as standard; it was the 
expulsion of the alien that was considered exceptional. Vitoria, Grotius, 
and Pufendorf all recognise freedom of movement together with some 
minor reasonable limits. Minimal rational principles common to mankind 
supported a legal system in which domestic and interstate relations were 
consistently linked. The jus societatis et communicationis and the jus 
commercii were the driving principles of the scholars of the Law of Nature
The first intemational attempt to deal with this issue took place only in 1998 with the 
UN Technical Symposium on Intemational Migration and Development. Far from being 
an intergovernmental conference, this meeting represents a first feeble recognition o f the 
world relevance of migration (Castles, 1999). Only recently, the UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan called for the creation of a UN Migration Agency (24-11-2003), but the 
effective implementation of such a proposal still seems far in the future. Excluding the 
illegal intemational trafficking o f people, national policies remain therefore the most 
relevant current mode of management o f migratory flows.
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regarding movement of people (Vitoria, 1539 [1917]; Grotius, 1625 
[1925], 1, n , § X m  and XV; Pufendorf, 1672 [1934], 1, III, § lU). This 
theory remained the most fundamental of the (mainly moral) rules among 
states for a long period, although its epistemological assumptions were 
repeatedly disputed.
The dominion theory and its subsequent developments, in exact 
opposition to the principles of the law of nature, have formed a paramount 
historical and theoretical source of legitimacy for the current exclusionary 
attitude toward migration and citizenship^^. According to such a theory, 
citizenship was originally considered a good belonging to the state, whose 
right of property extends over its territory. The imperium on people, an 
expression of the dominium on the territory marked by the principle qui in 
territorio meo, etiam meus subditus est  ^ granted the state absolute power 
over the political and social existence of individuals within its domain. 
Later on, an important significant contractual variant was inserted into this 
tradition, which substantially modified the ethical-political justification of 
the state, but left intact the normative distinction between insiders and 
outsiders. With the American Revolution, and, above all, the French 
Revolution, in fact, citizens acquired an active part in collective decision­
making and in the exercise of sovereignty, but the fundamental power to 
determine civil inclusion remained strictly the group’s prerogatives. The 
universalistic law of nature coexisted with the domestic contractual 
framework, but a consistent and definitive synthesis was never established.
Until the beginning of the 20* century, this coexistence was well 
suited to the socio-economic circumstances. These principles, in fact, 
underpinned and legitimised a situation where both the country of 
destination and country of origin had a clear interest in favouring 
migration, as in the case of the migration from Europe to America. When 
the ‘golden age’ of free trade ended and a tougher, nationalistic, politics 
took the stage of intemational relations alongside protectionism, migration 
policies changed too. Suddenly, within a few decades most countries
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adopted entry limitations inspired by domestic political and economical 
ends. It was, in fact, the supposed protection of domestic labour markets 
and welfare systems that convinced governments to invent new forms of 
barriers.
Thus while for many centuries a substantial transnational flow of 
people characterised both the internal and the external image of many 
countries (Spencer, 1993), today the situation is very different^^. Current 
international customary law, which is consistent with the dominium theory 
of sovereignty, holds migration standards that are contrary to the original 
formulation of the jus naturae. While the formal difference consists in the 
switch from the moral to the legal status of law, the substantive change 
concerns the legitimate criteria for entrance. An absolute right to refuse 
admission is granted to the state. While sovereignty is threatened in other 
respects, legislating the admission of immigrants is one of the instances in 
which state prerogatives are most obviously still intact. Provided no 
relevant conventions or humanitarian measures are applicable^^, the refusal
For a contemporary discuss with two opposite views on the application o f the Law of  
Nature and the dominium theory to the case of migration, refer to (Finnis, 1980; Dummett, 
1992; Finnis, 1992).
In addition to the studies quoted elsewhere in this chapter, for a philosophical-political 
analysis o f the migratory phenomenon and the subsequent challenges to the traditional 
conception o f modem state refer to (Dowty, 1987; Bmbaker, 1989; Castles & Miller,
1993; Baubock, 1995; Weiner, 1995; Jacobson, 1996; Joppke, 1997; Cans, 1998; Cole, 
2000; Rubio-Marin, 2000; Meilaender, 2001; Zolberg & Benda, 2001). Conversely, for a 
socio-economical analysis o f the movement of people in terms of push and pull factors 
refer to (Berry & Soligo, 1969; Krugman & Bhagwati, 1976; Simon, 1988; Stark, 1991; 
Hollifield, 1992; Ghosh, 1997; Sutcliffe, 1998; Boijas, 2000; Ghosh, 2000b; Nayyar,
2002).
The UN Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cmel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); the International Convention on 
the Elimination o f All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); the UN International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (1990); and the Geneva Refugee Convention (1951) all impose some limits on 
state sovereignty, according to the principle o f non-discrimination. So do, other 
recommendations and non-binding documents from diverse international organisations 
related to the issue o f migration such as the UNHCR; ILO; lOM, and WTO. The EU 
system is a sui generis institution, for while granting complete freedom o f movement to its 
members, it is increasingly exclusionary toward non-members. It is important to remark, 
however, that these international agreements represent exceptional and external 
constraints on the original state entitlement to administer membership rights. In particular, 
they require the equal treatment o f the aliens once they are in the national territory. Yet, 
only very rarely do they comment on the admission itself, except in the case o f reunion of 
minors to parents and refugees.
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to admit the alien is never an illicit act. However, if an alien already 
resides in the national territory the right of the state to remove them is 
partially limited; accordingly, there is no absolute right to expulsion 
(Goodwin-Gill, 1978, 136; Nascimbene, 1984, § 6). The only agents 
toward whom the state has an international duty of admission are its own 
citizens.
Although the juridical status of migrants is very diverse from state to 
state, it is possible to identify general trends in the treatment of migrants 
once they are admitted. While they are usually entitled to civil and socio­
economic rights, their access to political rights is still very much 
constrained, as opposed to the domestic Marshallian trend (Guiraudon, 
2000). Difference in treatment depends on the different recognition 
migrants receive in each sector of public life. In civil and social terms, they 
are recognised as persons due to a progressive recognition of a sort of post­
national personhood anchored to human rights principles. Politically, on 
the other hand, they remain non-citizens or de-nizens, for the identity based 
character of political nationality has been exacerbated and “incorporation 
into a system of membership rights does not inevitably require [any more, 
RM] incorporation into the national collectivity” (Soysal, 1994, 3). An 
opposition between full members of state (citizens) versus rightful 
residents without all the rights has consequently been shaped in most of the 
receiving countries over the last decades (Parekh, 1993a; Dal Lago, 1999).
One way of re-interpreting the issue of immigration, as an historical 
development of the original dominium theory (through citizenship), 
consists in progressively drawing limits to state sovereignty according to 
international superior laws. Usually this interpretation implies considering 
migrants in the negative aspect as aliens, or non-citizens and non-subjects, 
the state being accepted as the only agent entitled to confer such privileged 
status (Nascimbene, 1984, § II). This approach typically corresponds to the 
image of concentric circles, according to which the starting reference is the 
group (or even the family) and from there progressive enlargements are 
envisaged. This mechanism inevitably generates exclusion, and the 
approach that this chapter advocates is diametrically opposed to it; it is, 
instead, cosmopolitan and all-inclusive from the beginning. Migrants are
200
not non-citizens with only narrowly circumscribed rights; as cosmopolitan 
citizens entitled in certain degrees to rights which extend to different 
spheres of political action, they have, in fact, as great an ultimate right to 
freedom of choice and to control over the decision-making processes word- 
wide as do ‘permanent’ residents. In accordance with a new concept of 
universal membership based on a deterritorialized notion of person’s 
rights, this chapter develops an argument for a consistent global democratic 
regime able to grant not only civil and social, but also political rights to 
migrants, through a legitimate migratory regulatory system.
Consequentialist cosmopolitan citizenship as applied to the 
case of migration
Two principal dilemmas concerning the notion of citizenship 
challenge any normative political theory which aims to deal with the theme 
of migration: how to deal with the received migrants, and if and how to 
admit new would-be migrants (Schwartz, 1995; Bader, 1997b). Despite 
some recent attempts to consider migration from a wider 
perspective □ including a more global approach □ a receivers’ point of view 
still dominates in the normative literature on migration. In opting for a 
different vantage point, this chapter deals with migration within a larger 
conceptual framework that also includes a third crucial element, i.e., the 
institution of multilevel citizenship as inherently anchored to the 
distribution of international responsibility.
With regards to the political reading of migration, the starting point 
of the consequentialist cosmopolitanism argument on the movement of 
people stems from two different observations: one descriptive and one 
prescriptive. In factual terms, migration is considered principally and 
inevitably as a global issue in that it refers to social phenomena primarily 
concerning the world level of political action and producing international 
effects^^. Historical patterns of migration have been fundamentally altered
This is radically different from Rawls’s point o f view, according to which in a realist 
utopia o f liberal and decent states the issue of migration would fall outside the scope of  
political concern since persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, other forms of
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by the global transformations of recent decades. Even if borders were 
closed today, there would still be a continuous flow, both legal and illegal, 
due to a number of factors, including at a minimum international and 
national norms of family reunion and political asylum. Even in an ideal 
world, the political question concerning the admission of aliens would 
persist, since even if poverty and violence were eliminated as causes of 
dislocation, there would still be personal motivations such as the desire to 
live in another society and lifestyle issues that would work as powerful 
engines of migration.
In normative terms, freedom of choice and the subsequent political 
entitlement to take part in the public decision-making process form the 
normative core of the consequentialist cosmopolitan criteria to assess 
international affairs. Underpinning this is the fundamental ethical postulate 
regarding impartiality that, when coupled with the teleological principle of 
the maximisation of the world well-being condition, demands the extension 
of the application of the norm of non-discrimination also to the global level 
(Singer & Singer, 1988; Goodin, 1992c). In fact, in order to preserve the 
individual capacity for free choice, the agent needs to extend his political 
entitlement to the totality of the sphere of political action. This new 
interpretation of political agency is particularly significant in those cases, 
such as that of transnational migration, where traditional state-centric 
conceptions of citizenship demonstrate an increasing inappropriateness, 
both moral and political.
These recognitions lead to the disputation of the mainstream 
framework according to which migration is considered only a national 
issue. Both explicitly nationalistic (Walzer, 1981; Miller, 2000a; 
Meilaender, 2001; Miller, 2003) and globalist scholars (Carens, 1987, 
1989; Bader, 1997b) commonly adopt the partial perspective of the 
receiving countries, in as much as admission to a country is considered the 
crux of the entire issue. According to consequentialist cosmopolitanism,
political oppression, famine and population pressure would disappear (O'Neil, 1982; 
Rawls, 1999, 8-9 and 38-9). It must be noted that this is in contrast to Rawls’s take at the 
domestic level, where the right to movement is included in the Rawlsian fundamental list 
o f primary goods (Rawls, 1982, 166). For a similar contractarian position anti­
immigration see also (Buchanan, 1995),
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this is an elementary instance of question begging; such a prejudicial 
limitation of the original question cannot but deliver a distorted and biased 
answer, in which the counterpart remains on an unequal standing. As an 
alternative to this, a radical repositioning of the receiving countries is 
developed, with the shift from the state-centric paradigm of national 
membership to a global political principle of residency and multilevel 
citizenship becoming the turning point for the renewal of the cosmopolitan 
paradigm, and thus a turning point offering a unique chance for the social 
and political development of the theory and practice of democracy.
Where this revolution of perspective occurs, the conferral of the 
equal status of cosmopolitan citizenship to migrants and ‘receiver’ citizens 
for what concerns individual possibility of choice, and the granting of the 
right to free passage^^ for what concerns the movement of people should 
result. A cosmopolitan citizenship characterised by these entitlements 
becomes de facto a crucial institutional factor in order for the individuals to 
increase (but sometimes even simply to implement) their freedom of 
choice among differing life options and their capability to govern the 
social-political domain, by changing their place of residence. Much as at 
the domestic level the right to movement over the national territory has 
proved crucial in the self-realisation of one’s personal projects and political 
participation^®®, an equivalent international right would be equally 
beneficial to the well-being of the individual in terms of choice 
opportunities and political control of one’s own life (Nett, 1971, 218).
Freedom of movement is a necessary requirement for the 
implementation of political participation insofar as only by having such 
entitlement can an individual join a group where his/her preferences can be 
aggregated with other similar views, thus creating a substantial political 
voice. The argument is similar to that of political parties pluralism. As
More specifically, freedom o f movement is here taken to cover both the right to leave 
one’s country and the right to remain in it.
1®® B y  contrast, it is instructive to look at all those national situations in which movement 
is restricted by legal or economic impediments: for example, the prohibition o f the free 
movement o f nationals in Italy during the period of fascist rule; or the poverty that 
prevents people in developing countries from travelling to another part o f their own 
country.
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much as the possibility of a plurality of political parties should be 
guaranteed in order to offer the individual the possibility to join the party 
that is most consistent with his view, so also the freedom to leave a 
group/country where his personal views are not comfortable should be 
guaranteed. Hence, the recognition of the right to free passage represents a 
legitimate political objective to be taken into consideration when shaping a 
multilayered political structure, in so far as it ultimately promote the world 
well-being condition by fostering individual freedom for self- 
determination 101.
Nonetheless, for this to satisfy the requirements of international 
political theory concerning multilevel dimensionality, an impartial 
weighing mechanism between the claims of migrants and those of local 
citizens has to be simultaneously envisaged. Having argued for a universal 
right to movement, it is here necessary to point out again that such a right 
has to be inserted into a wider institutional political framework, in which 
other kinds of rights also have legitimate claims. While migrants and 
residents are equal on the basis of a fundamental right to the protection of 
freedom of choice, they nonetheless differ in that the social v a l u e  o f  
their relative institutional entitlements concerning national citizenship can 
become unbalanced. This case is similar in many respects to the familiar 
situation of welfare state provision, in which one person’s set of secondary 
rights conflicts with other’s secondary entitlements, despite both 
counterparts having fundamentally equal claims to well-being, i.e., welfare 
provision from the state. In cases like this, some sort of impartial 
comparative assessment made by a public, all-inclusive institution is 
needed in order to solve the controversy. Institutional suggestions for the 
case of world migratory regime will be provided in the next sections, here 
it is important to offer more details on the reasoning underpinning them.
Beyond the increase in individual freedom of choice, international movement would 
also create efficiency gains in a neo-classical sense, in as much as it would maximise 
resource allocation and so maximise economic welfare for the world as a whole (Nayyar, 
2002, 166).
102 Assessed on the basis o f the socio-political performance of the given institution in 
terms o f world well-being promotion.
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Within the scheme of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, national 
citizenship, as an institution of the second—i.e., state—level of political 
action, maintains a certain degree of legitimacy according to a universal, 
indirect, and impartial division of moral labour. According to this division, 
different associative ties are in fact recognised as prima facie valid sources 
of well-being, but in order to depart from such provisional status and gain a 
definitive legitimacy they need to be consistently embedded into a wider, 
global institutional framework. In this specific case, they need to pass 
through a comparative assessment with the migrants’ conflicting 
entitlements. In this vein, the institution of national primary citizenship 
will only be warranted to the extent that its long-term social performance 
contributes to the maximisation of the world well-being condition, and 
therefore consistently meets the demands of the institution of cosmopolitan 
citizenship.
Such comparative assessment between different citizenship-related 
entitlements is based on the expected capacity of each set of rights to 
contribute to the promotion of the individual freedom of choice/political 
participation and so, in the ultimate analysis, to the improvement of the 
world well-being condition. It does not imply, therefore, substantial 
interpersonal comparisons of utility à la utilitarianism, in that it only takes 
into consideration the possibility of choice, rather than the outcomes 
directly produced by the chosen actions. This occurs on the different levels 
of choice: personal and political. In the case of migrants, consequently, 
their potential concerning the capability of choice has to be evaluated on 
their actual capability both to make a direct choice on life options and to 
influence the political system in which they are embedded. The right to 
migrate in fact affects both these types of choices, in that changing place of 
residency can improve the set of available life options but also increase the 
capacity to influence the decision-making process both locally and globally 
through different and multiple memberships. Hence, a universal right to 
movement represents a valid potentiate principle for the maximisation of 
general well-being and needs to be compared against the prerogatives of 
the set of rights concerning national citizenship, as traditionally intended. 
Consistent with this argument, two comparative assessments concerning
205
general migrants and refugees respectively can be differentiated. They are 
examined in close detail in the next two sections.
The general case of migrants
A number of theoretical consequences pertaining to the status of the 
citizen on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of transnational politics 
are subsequently generated by the re-balancing of the notion of citizenship 
according to an impartial, global calibre of membership claims. By 
definition, the multilayered notion of cosmopolitan citizenship entails 
political membership at different levels. While state membership would 
still remain inevitably subject to some constraints (e.g. not all can be 
American citizens), second order, global citizenship is characterised by all- 
inclusiveness (e.g. all can be world citizens). In this way, consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism grants to individuals civil, social and political rights in 
more than one country, and the complete parity of rights related to 
residency between local people and migrants (Goodin, 1996a, 357-62; A. 
Carter, 2001, 109)103.
Accordingly, the state-centric point of view should be rejected for at 
least two reasons, which in different ways concern the principle of non­
discrimination. Firstly, in not recognising the superveniency of the 
maximisation of the world well-being condition as the ultimate principle of 
justice, and in subsequently conceding an almost absolute privilege to 
original residents, state-centric policies unequally weigh the fundamentally 
universal claims of individuals to equal choice opportunity. Secondly, the 
nationalist orientation should be rejected for the way it intentionally 
discriminates among would-be migrants, admitting only those who satisfy 
entry requirements shaped on the needs of the receiving countries. In fact,
103 Within this framework, the right to free passage is considered as an enlarging 
entitlement, part o f a long-term emancipation project. From aristocrats to rich people, it is 
possible to trace a slow process o f extension toward a universal right in practice, which 
bring into question the legitimacy of reserving the possibility o f choice for the well-off 
and imposing the opposite limitation of the worst-off. Citizenship is here, in fact, taken as 
one, perhaps the only, privilege o f status still firmly associated to a socio-economical 
division o f people (Carens, 1987; Ferrajoli, 1999). In line with this, the title o f a well-
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it is very often the case that current policies of admission, which are mostly 
based on a nationalist principle, filter the in-flow of would-be migrants in 
accordance with their potential to contribute to the domestic economy, 
leaving the remaining vast majority of would-be migrants unjustly 
excluded, without the right to appeal. Hence, citizenship can be seen as the 
last bastion of privilege related to legal status, and as an obstacle which 
resoundingly fails to meet the general obligation of non-discrimination 
(Nascimbene, 1984; Goodin, 1992a; Ferrajoli, 1999); and migrants can be 
considered as the next informal political agents to acquire full political 
status, similarly to what happen for women before their enfranchisement.
The radical alternative of completely opening borders here and now 
should equally be refused for a number of distinct reasons related both to 
migrants and to receiving populations. Concerning the former, from a 
consequentialist point of view such a policy of open borders would be most 
likely self-defeating, in so far as it would subvert the expectations of 
would-be migrants. The motivations of the would-be migrants to move in 
fact include the possibility to reach a specific country with its distinctive 
cultural, social, and economic context. However, an unlimited and sudden 
inflow of foreign people would probably not be sustained by the 
destination country without a radical reshaping of its fundamental 
characteristics, thus disappointing the original objectives of the migrants 
themselves.
As for local residents, their expectations should also be taken into 
account and with equal weight. At the moment, it is plausible to assert that 
most citizens of the potential receiving countries are not willing to accept 
such a universalistic policy, nor are their politicians. Were borders 
suddenly and completely open, the likely result would be a substantial re­
shaping of social identity and of the entire state structure, with potentially 
huge social costs in terms of well-being expectation. In this respect, the 
communitarian stance is partially right in claiming the importance of social 
identity and institutional traditions. While often underestimating the 
importance of the modes of incorporation as political methods to facilitate
know article should then be rephrased to “If poor people were money” (Goodin, 1992c),
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the entrance of aliens in a new socio-political context (Zolberg, 1997, 148- 
53), such claims still holds a certain degree of validity (Ackerman, 1980, 
95; Perry, 1995, 110-24). It is of course likely that the long term 
consequence of aliens’ admission will provoke a change in a state’s 
identity □ and a subsequently modified state structure □ but this would be 
a different case of social evolution through the gradual re-negotiation of 
political identity. Hence, in opposition to an immediate open border policy, 
the strategy of reform by degrees seems the most appropriate to implement 
a universal right to limited immigration for the time being, opening up the 
possibility for unlimited migration in the future.
Since an open border policy is not viable in the near future and yet 
the right to movement is universal in principle, the subsequent problem 
becomes, then, how to distribute a scarce good equally (i.e., the right of 
residency in any state), and so avoid the dramatic situation of the unjust 
sacrifice of the few. The constraints, which, drawing on Humean 
terminology, I call the ‘circumstances of migratory justice’, consist in the 
fact that many want to enjoy the relevant good (i.e., right of residency), and 
yet such a good is not infinite at the national level. This situation is further 
aggravated by the current “win-or-lose all” procedure that daily haunts the 
lives of so many migrants. Migrants refused at the border lose everything, 
while those who make it through (by chance or illicit means) win the 
lottery. Those migrants refused (who may well have greater ethical 
grounds for wanting admittance) are excluded by a jungle system, where 
physical force and social power very often decide the result, beyond any 
moral constraints. The sacrifice of a few migrants (but actually many lives) 
represents then the tragic cost of sustaining such an unjust system: a cost 
which includes that of the other would-be migrants who remain at home, 
the legal migrants who have already been accepted, and the local 
population.
The response of consequentialist cosmopolitanism to the arbitrariness 
of the present mechanisms for entering consists in a moralised and 
impartial treatment of the distribution of the permits of residency based on
in order to highlight the mono-directionality o f the global flux o f movement.
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a universal right to movement embedded in an impartial global weighing 
mechanism. According to this cosmopolitical interpretation of citizenship, 
and the subsequent notion of ‘regulated openness’ (Ghosh, 2000b, 25) or 
‘fairly open borders’ (Bader, 1997a), the only viable solution to the 
distributive problem of admission consists in the recognition that 
citizenship too must be reconsidered as infinitely and impartially dividable 
over time and on different levels of political action. Universal availability 
of this good (i.e., the right of residency) is only possible through its 
potential division into infinite parts, temporally distributed. Consequently, 
temporally limited permissions of fi'ee movement and residency become 
the goods of this new migratory policy; goods widely available and 
complemented by limited extensions concerning the right to settlement and 
definitive change of primary state citizenship^^"*.
Such temporary permissions would foster the development of a 
multiple social identity, spread over several countries but unified by 
transnational individuals and ‘trans-border citizens’ (Glick Schiller & 
Fouron, 2001). In this way, the issue of collective ties and identity is re­
considered through a cosmopolitan filter, in that the possibility of multiple 
allegiances is consistently anchored to the possibility of a multiple 
citizenship. Transnational identity formation forms a principal part of the 
migratory experience of the contemporary world, together with the 
subsequent transnational engagement and assimilation across different 
groups. Simultaneity already represents a major characteristic of current 
migratory experience, in so far as individuals are embedded in a multi-site 
transnational social and political field, encompassing those who move, 
those who stay behind, and those who receive (Levitt & Glick Schiller,
2003). In keeping with this social trend, the system envisaged by 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism would produce an attitude favourable to
It is important to point out here that this system is not envisaged just for migrant- 
workers, insofar as the right of residency is offered regardless o f the personal motives. In 
this way, migrants’ preferences are preserved and the idea o f national interests refused. 
Nevertheless, migrant-workers will, o f course, exist and the labour market subsequently 
be adapted. Moreover, the problem of collective ties and identity is re-considered through 
a cosmopolitan filter as well. The possibility of multiple allegiances is developed together 
with multiple citizenship. The sharing o f both social and political sentiments between the 
original place and the place o f migration is deemed to be a likely effect o f the system.
I
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sharing both social and political sentiments between the original place and 
the place of migration, possibly contributing to the formation of a real 
global demos and civil society for the future.
The special case of refugees
In addition to the general promotion of freedom of movement, 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism also offers a specific new approach to 
dealing with the issue of refugees, which entails a reinterpretation of the 
status of refugee and, differently from the case of general migrants, an 
unconstrained duty of acceptance on the part of resident populations. 
According to the conventional definition of the Refugee Convention, a 
refugee is a person who
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reason of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country”.
According to the perspective adopted by the present study, 
conversely, a wider definition of refugee should be accepted, centred on 
the primacy of the vital interests as outlined in chapter IV and V. Security, 
health and education represent the minimal entitlements, together with 
political participation, that should be guaranteed to each individual being, 
regardless of his or her place of residence.
In line with this, any person who cannot enjoy the protection of these 
three vital interests is entitled to remedial assistance. The guarantee of 
these rights should normally be achieved through a world-wide scheme of 
public rules supported by a multilayered system of political institutions, 
financed by appropriate measures of global redistributive justice. However, 
where this system fails in protecting such interests locally, then people 
made vulnerable by this failure are entitled to receive care in safe countries 
that can guarantee the protection of their health, security, education and 
political participation. A scheme for administering this new status of
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refugees should thus be institutionalised through the supranational 
strengthening of the UNHCR.
Having outlined this new interpretation of the notion of migration 
and citizenship, it is necessary to concentrate on its political consequences. 
So far it has only been shown that citizenship should be re-conceptualised 
in terms of global justice. Consistency demands that this first move now be 
followed by the identification of the global political means through which 
to obtain the maximisation of the individual choice possibility and, 
consequently, of the world well-being condition. The following sections 
are dedicated to showing how both a fair allocation of entrance permissions 
and an impartial distribution of burdens among international agents might 
be achieved through appropriate political institutions. As argued, since the 
issue at stake is global in kind an adequate response cannot be other than 
equally global. In this regard, the establishment of an institutional 
framework of migratory cosmopolitanism forms a crucial component of the 
present proposal.
Institutions of migratory cosmopolitanism
The previous sections have disputed the traditional understanding of 
the migratory phenomenon as a purely domestic political issue consisting, 
in the ultimate analysis, in a sheer problem of admission, and have 
subsequently recognised the necessity to create a legal-political structure 
able to manage and implement this ‘good’, i.e., migration. Since the 
agency entailed in the movement of people refers primarily to the third 
level of political action, then the principles of justice to apply in this case 
have to be consistently calibrated as world responsibilities (Ghosh, 2000a; 
Helton, 2002; Düvell & Jordan, 2003). The state should no longer be the 
only actor who decides, according to its own principle of justice, whether 
to admit the alien or not. If this were so, it would simply be a matter of 
designing a political mechanism for national efficiency. But the case is 
different and, more importantly, concerns the issue of assigning moral 
responsibility, i.e., making every agent accountable in each political 
sphere. In response to this, the regulatory framework envisaged in this
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chapter consists in a set of institutional tools modelled on some existing 
international organisations, and composed of two main parts: an 
international convention and an international agency.
An international convention should be established in order to 
recognise migration as a global phenomenon. The convention should 
formulate a code of conduct to be implemented through a two-tier 
mechanism at the domestic and global level. An example to have in mind 
is the UN Geneva Refugee Convention and its Protocol, in that it provides 
a similar framework for the specific case of refugees. As a complement to 
this convention, a World Migration Agency (possibly under the umbrella 
of the United Nations) should also be created. This will provide the 
appropriate place for negotiations and the appropriate force for 
implementation of the decisions concerning migratory fluxes, both with 
respect to the general extent of right to movement and in the more specific 
case of refugees. This new agency should be characterised by all- 
inclusiveness, for it should provide the forum where conflicting claims 
about the global issue of migration can be publicly discussed.
This new system of migratory cosmopolitanism would enhance the 
legitimacy, efficacy, and accountability of the decisions taken at the 
supranational level, and at the same time decrease the degree of 
widespread social criticism against the current situation. All involved 
agents would have the possibility to express their point of view and to 
influence the decision-making process through appropriate political 
mechanisms. The creation of this new agency, to work in collaboration 
with several other institutional actors such as governmental and non­
governmental organisations, is therefore a crucial step toward the 
institutionalisation of a framework of global management of migration, and 
the subsequent avoidance of two political evils: arbitrary national policies, 
and the privatisation of the global public agenda.
Rules of non-discrimination such as the most favoured nation 
(MFN), universality of admission through temporariness, and equality of 
treatment between locals and foreigners are the most appropriate norms for 
this new regulatory framework. They produce a prima facie duty on the 
receiving countries to admit impartially from each foreign country in direct
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proportion to the population of the sending countries, without 
discriminating among sending countries. When a country does not exhaust 
its quota, then a mechanism for redistributing its spared options to other 
sending countries should be activated. Moreover, a system of 
burden/benefit-sharing through national quotas should also be agreed upon 
to set the quantitative criteria for receiving countries (Gosseries, 2002; 
Thielemann, 2002). In contrast to national policies based on morally 
arbitrary and disproportionate distribution, each country should admit its 
fair share of migrants regardless of the other countries’ compliance with 
the organisation decisions. The amount of migratory load should then be 
decided by the supranational organisation through an impartial procedure 
with regard to the actual receiving capacity of each country based on its 
economic and social conditions.
Conclusions
Through the adoption of a radical change in political perspective that 
re-interprets migration and citizenship as global issues, the ultimate 
exclusionary arbitrariness of the admission criteria of state migratory 
policies and the resulting loss of any potential increase in the world well­
being condition have come into view. To the original contention that state 
migratory policies are morally unaccountable, this chapter has suggested a 
cosmopolitan, all-inclusive answer. The core of its cosmopolitan argument 
resides in a particular interpretation of the idea of a universal right to free 
passage that takes into account the ‘circumstances of migratory justice’. 
From this, a number of political recommendations descend which are given 
substance in the proposal of new admission criteria and of a new system of 
migratory cosmopolitanism; the latter, in specific, entailing the adoption of 
a convention on migrants and the establishment of a supranational co­
operative agency to manage migratory fiux.
Only through such a pluri-level political system can the possibility of 
individual choice receive an impartial hearing, in that a multilevel 
citizenship is responsive to differing degrees of responsibility and relative 
power at all levels of political decision-making, including the global
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sphere. Arguably, these are, for the time being, the appropriate political 
arrangements required by a consequentialist cosmopolitan theory of global 
justice in the case of citizenship and migration. However, were the 
circumstances to differ in future, then political norms should be revised 
accordingly. Flexibility and reformism need to be combined with an 
awareness that moral law can only require a partial revision of social 
reality and that it is only reasonable to assume that international institutions 
will be fairer than national ones, much as national institutions are usually 
considered fairer than uncoordinated individual actions.
According to consequentialist cosmopolitanism, the institutions of 
migratory cosmopolitanism have to be considered as part of a more general 
trend toward global institutionalisation of international affairs. As pointed 
out at the beginning of this chapter, migration refers to one aspect of the 
conception of cosmopolitan citizenship, the horizontal. In order to 
complete the presentation of this new reading of citizenship and of its 
correlate in terms of global institutions, however, the second side of 
cosmopolitan citizenship should also be examined. The next chapter aims 
thus to analyse the normative rationale and the institutional consequences 
of the vertical dimension of global citizenship, which entail political 
participation to each sphere of political decision-making and appropriate 
mechanisms of public democratic accountability.
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VII
Multilateral Governance or Cosmo-federalism? 
Choice, Vertical Citizenship, and 
Supranational Institutions
“Our political and social conceptions are 
Ptolemaic. The world in which we live is Copemican.”
(Reves, 1947, 37)
“The federal pattern is the most clear-cut 
alternative to power politics” (Schwarzenherger, 1964,
526)
“If either of the two options has a better claim 
than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be 
encourj^ed and countenanced, it is the one which 
happens at the particular time and place to be in a 
minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, 
represents the neglected interests, the side of human 
well-being which is in danger of obtaining less then its
share” (Mill, 1859 [1962], 175)
A contradictory double movement characterizes the relationship of 
contemporary international affairs to democracy. While the conventional 
democratic assumption, according to which individuals have the right to 
self-determination through political participation, is increasingly 
recognized as the cardinal principle of politics both in international 
covenants and national constitutions, international affairs themselves create
215
a situation in which such an entitlement is conversely limited and 
decreasingly guaranteed. Unstable financial markets, environmental crises, 
and unregulated migratory flows are just few examples of phenomena that 
simultaneously and all too clearly remind us of the intense interdependence 
of contemporary international system and of its political deprivation. These 
intense processes of global transformation functionally require an 
increased co-operation, and yet pose a continuous challenge to the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of traditional political life. The lack at every 
level of activity of effective and legitimate political structures within which 
individuals can influence outcomes through expressing their free consent 
and exercising their capacity of autonomy, highlights the need for an 
adequate expansion of the democratic political system at the global level. 
A fundamental principle of justice thus demands strengthening 
transnational institutions of democracy, with the intention to create more 
inclusive mechanisms of democratic self-legislation in order to avoid the 
current high degree of international exclusion.
A number of competing theories, from realism to multilateral 
cosmopolitanism, have suggested differing responses to this demand for 
transnational democracy, without though offering viable solutions able to 
tackle the challenge of international exclusion. Acknowledging the limits 
of these theoretical positions, this chapter presents a proposal for a new 
reading of political agency in line with a reconstruction of its relative 
supranational institutional framework. The core of this proposal resides in 
a notion of cosmopolitan citizenship in terms of freedom of choice; 
understanding freedom of choice within the consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism attuned to the epistemological constraints on 
interpersonal comparability delineated in the previous chapters. 
Accordingly, the capacity of individuals to exercise personal choice within 
the social system becomes the primary objective of the envisaged political 
system. Such endorsement of the principle of control over one’s life leads, 
then, to the recognition of the relationship between choice-bearers and 
choice-makers as a pivot of democratic reflexivity, and the subsequent 
recognition of the need for its institutionalisation at each level of political 
life, including the global. In contrast with existing international law and
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national policies, citizens are consequently to be recognised as 
cosmopolitan stake-holders entitled to rights which extend to a number of 
different spheres of political action. Insofar as the right to democratic 
participation in every sphere of political action is considered to be the 
political tool for the maximisation of individual choice possibility and, 
consequently, of the world well-being condition (as explained in chapter 
IV), the argument for global citizenship presented here rests thus on the 
key necessity of political agents being able to influence those public 
decisions whose consequences extend across borders. This generates the 
claims for a multilayered and all-inclusive cosmopolitan theory as 
implemented through new institutional global arrangements, primarily a 
federal reform of the United Nations.
The case for world federalism is under-estimated in the current 
debate on cosmopolitanism. The few studies that consider it do not venture 
beyond a brief mentioning, on the simplistic assumption that world federal 
institutions are not viable. The vast majority of contemporary cosmopolitan 
scholars instead favor projects for democratic reform of current 
institutional arrangements of global governance. While accepting such 
proposals as promising mid-term suggestions, this chapter aims to dispute 
their legitimacy as a long-term political project, on the ground of their 
limited capacity for democratic inclusion and participation. Constructed on 
a notion of multi-level political agency, an institutional comparison is thus 
outlined in order to identify the limits of the model of cosmopolitan global 
governance, and alternatively to defend a cosmo-federal case for world 
institutions as a more consistent project of ideal international political 
theory.
This chapter begins by setting out the theoretical points of reference 
of the relationship between citizenship and institutions, in particular with 
regards to the international sphere, and proceeds to a survey of different 
political arrangements which have shaped the terms of this relationship 
from the Westphalian model to the current system of executive global 
governance. A brief presentation of the consequentialist cosmopolitan 
theory then introduces the core argument for the cosmopolitan 
interpretation of citizenship and institutions at the global level. Within this
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is a critique of recent proposals for a cosmopolitan reform of global 
governance regimes on grounds of an insufficient implementation of the 
congruence principle. In conclusion, a number of recommendations for 
reforming the current system, and in particular the organisation of the UN, 
are offered in line with a concept of consequentialist global justice as 
implemented through a project of cosmo-federalism.
The relation between institutions and citizenship
Freedom of choice forms the normative core of the consequentialist 
cosmopolitan criteria for assessing the international institutional 
framework, in so far as only through maximising the individual capacity of 
choice can the maximisation of social well-being be pursued, as explained 
in chapter IV. According to this, a fair political system should provide both 
the general legal-political fi-amework, i.e., institutions and rights, and the 
personal practical capabilities needed to put individuals in the condition to 
fi'eely choose what they think is best. This political endowment, to which 
each individual is entitled, is composed of two principal components: a set 
of rights concerning vital interests intended as fundamental prerequisites 
for any possibility of choice, and the set of rights related to the institution 
of citizenship.
Citizenship, understood as the set of legal entitlements allowing for 
the acquisition of a full membership, represents the core element of 
democratic political theory. In a democracy, these entitlements, which are 
based on a fundamental principle of equality and reciprocity, are 
impartially guaranteed to every member of the polity, insofar as 
membership within the collective exercise of self-governance is usually 
recognised as the minimal precondition of democratic life. The acquisition 
of such a set of rights is, thus, considered crucial in order to participate 
effectively in social and political life, the possibility of which represents a 
key condition for the individual freedom of choice. The concept of 
collective autonomy follows fi*om the idea of equal citizenship. Much as 
agents at the individual level enjoy a fundamental right to freely choose 
their destiny, so at the collective level groups are entitled to autonomously
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take decisions over their future. This signifies, consequently, that a 
legitimate exercise of political self-determination and self-legislation needs 
to be based on equal citizenship, insofar as only by equally and 
simultaneously retaining the status of legislators and subjects can citizens 
remain free to determine their fate. Since the key mechanism for 
democratic legitimacy relies on the congruence (alternatively referred to as 
equivalence, reflexivity or symmetry) between rulers and ruled, all voices 
must have equal access to the decision-making process. Only through this 
mechanism can individual freedom of choice be preserved and the world 
well-being condition maximised.
At the domestic political level, the reflexivity between choice-bearers 
and choice-makers is guaranteed through a variety of democratic 
institutions. Primary among them is an elected parliament where citizens 
can express their voice through pluralistic representation. The 
establishment of such a public and impartial institutional body through 
which individuals can form and propose their political agenda for society 
constitutes the premise of democratic life. At the core of this is the issue of 
political representation.
“The claim connecting democracy and representation is 
that under democracy governments are representative 
because they are elected: if elections are freely contested, 
if electoral participation is widespread, and if citizens 
enjoy political liberties, then government will act in the 
best interest of the people” (Manin et a l, 1999, 29).
When elected politicians mirror the composition of the electorate to 
the greatest degree, the electorate’s has thus the best chance of having their 
interests protected (Mill, 1861 [1991], § III).
A government is compelled to be representative (representation here 
intended as likely congruence between interests and strategies to achieve a 
preferred outcome) through two kinds of political mechanisms: mandate 
and accountability. In both cases the principal political instruments in the 
hands of citizens are elections and the crucial information that puts citizens 
in the position to carefully screen politician conduct. While mandate 
operates prospectively on the basis of the electoral choice of policy
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programmes, accountability relies on a retrospective voting sanctioning 
outcomes.
“Democratic accountability is best seen as a relation 
between the past acts of those who exercise public power 
and their future personal liabilities. Its core site is the 
degree to which our rulers, in a democracy, are effectively 
compelled to describe what they are doing while ruling us, 
and to explain why they take this to be appropriate: to give 
us [...] reasons for their actions” (Dunn, 1999, 335).
All this is widely recognised as the fundamental formal requirement 
for the legitimacy of a democratic government. That a considerable number 
of current national political systems world-wide are shaped in such a 
manner attests to a general recognition that this is the requirement of any 
legitimate government.
In principle, the democratic correspondence between decision­
makers and decision-bearers should be public—universal and all- 
inclusive—in order to guarantee complete freedom to the individual. Such 
a congruence should cover all the relational dimensions in which 
individual life is embedded, i.e., one should be in the position to self- 
legislate within the entire range of activities one is involved. Having the 
possibility of choice at the individual level and at the national level is 
ineffective if it is not complemented by the equivalent possibility to have a 
voice in the decision-making processes at the international level. Cases 
such as the environmental problems related to the global warming or the 
spread of infectious diseases clearly show how ineffective a national policy 
can be when it is not integrated within a wider international action. Thus, a 
partial implementation of the principle of universal congruence in an 
interdependent environment in which agents interact on multiple levels and 
in different domains is, for the most part, self-defeating in terms of 
guarantee of freedom of choice.
Until recently, domestic socio-political life has been the dominant 
influence on citizens’ lives (with the notable exception of trans-borders 
phenomena such as wars or religions) and consequently the focus of 
politics has concentrated mainly on institutions with such a limited scope.
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However, given the current global transformations affecting almost all 
aspects of citizens* lives, state-only democracy and its subsequent 
international institutions have come under increasing pressure for the high 
degree of political exclusion that they generate. Hence, a serious 
democratic deficit characterises current international affairs. An 
enlargement of democratic institutional arrangements to the global level is, 
therefore, needed in order to include the excluded political agents and so to 
preserve democratic congruence between choice-bearers and choice- 
makers, thereby ensuring the individual capacity for free choice. With the 
recognition of normative interdependence strictly linking democracy, 
human rights, and peace as three faces of the freedom of choice, inclusive 
democracy at the global level becomes an urgent international issue 
(Bobbio, 1995; Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Bobbio, 1999, 337; Annan, 2002). 
However, before expounding the normative reasons why the current 
international institutions are not sufficient to guarantee the required degree 
of democratic congruence, it is necessary to examine the principal factual 
characteristics, the ‘anatomy*, of the present international institutional 
arrangements.
From Westphalia to global governance
The international correlate of domestic state institutions is 
conventionally known as the ‘states system*. Arising almost 
simultaneously with the state itself, the states system was grounded on the 
institution of classic sovereignty and international law. Rarely a stable 
system, a distinct rupture was marked in the middle of the 20^ ’’ century with 
the establishment of the UN: an inherently deficient juxtaposition of 
classic, liberal, and cosmopolitan elements (Held, 2002). In recent decades 
a strengthening of multilateral political engagement has paralleled and at 
times challenged the UN order, creating a new system of global 
governance.
Reflecting as it does its origins (conventionally fixed with the Treaty 
of Westphalia, in 1648), the modem states system is centred on the 
absolute sovereignty of a state within its territory. In opposition to the
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medieval ‘two Suns* convention, the cardinal principle of sovereignty, 
which differentiates territorial political units in terms of juridically and 
morally exclusive domains, has decisively characterised international 
politics for more than three centuries in that it has generated à number of 
secondary—utterly relevant—norms of the catalogue of international law. 
Among them, the following derivative principles stand out as particularly 
significant for the interest of the present study: a) no superior authority is 
recognised above the state (which produces an international system 
completely dependent on states’ consent); b) formal equality of status 
granted to each state, with the only accepted principle of legitimacy the de 
facto control over territory; c) indifference of international organisations to 
domestic political organisation, i.e., the relationship between citizens and 
state is entirely relegated to national law; d) non-intervention; and e) the 
right to self-defence (Bodin, 1576 [1967]; Grotius, 1625 [1925]; Hobbes, 
1651 [1968]; James, 1986; Crawford & Marks, 1998, 73)^0^.
Neutrality concerning domestic political organisation is perhaps the 
crucial principle on this list, which can be regarded more as a modus 
vivendi than as a full moral code. Whereas the right to self-defence or the 
consideration of states as equals mirrors some important, but possibly 
secondary, distinctions in comparison with the domestic domain of 
democratic law (the public use of force through law and the voting system 
based on the principle ‘one person, one vote’, respectively), the 
indifference of classical international law to the internal political 
arrangements of independent states is of key importance to the issue of 
democracy. The ‘domestic analogy’ is here a source of confusion, for it 
leads to the argument (in a liberal mood) that states as much as individuals
^9  ^A point of clarification is due on the issue of reciprocity within the states system. It 
has long been hold that the norm o f sovereignty implies that o f reciprocity, and that 
therefore respect for reciprocity is part o f the practice o f sovereign statehood (Wight, 
1977, 135; Keohane, 1988,383; Miller, 1995, 2000b). From the present cosmopolitan 
perspective, such a view represents instead clear evidence o f the normative inconsistency 
o f an un-ruled system o f supposedly equal states. As argued by Kelsen following Hobbes, 
without the hypothesis o f a supranational principle, the very essence o f international 
order, i.e., the idea o f a community o f states endowed with equal rights despite o f their 
diversity in territorial, demographic and power terms is logically inconceivable (Kelsen, 
1920; 1952, 586). Where no superior autiiority exists with the power and authority to
222
should be free to organise their internal political system at their preference. 
A corrective for this misinterpretation, however, is to recall the centrality 
of individuals in democratic theory, and the consequent importance of an 
institutional framework designed to protect individual freedom at each 
level of political action. This brief comment suffices here, as the issue will 
be dealt with in detail in the next sections; for now what is needed is to 
examine further how classical international law developed in 20* century.
A first major change in the legal-institutional framework of 
international society occurs with the creation of the League of Nations in 
1920, following WW I. The pact of the League amends a number of 
international rules in opposition to the limited rules of coexistence of the 
state system. It imposes, for instance, limits to the unilateral use of force, a 
new idea of collective security, and the procedure of majority vote Din 
that unanimity of the Council of the League did not include the votes of the 
countries involved in the dispute to be conciliated. This marks a fracture of 
the absolute sovereignty of the classic system, yet the League failed to 
deliver a legitimate and effective political framework for reasons related to 
the continued centrality of state institutions. In this regard, the covenant of 
the League was not concerned with any alternative mechanism of self- 
defence other than war, insofar as it excludes threat or security operation 
implying the use of force. The covenant also lacked juridical supremacy 
over other international treaties. And last but not least, it was characterised 
by a low level of membership, and in that lacking de facto universality. All 
these were major factors preventing the League to manage the international 
system effectively, leaving the mainstream tradition of a classical 
international law of states still much in power until 1945.
The second and more radical change in the international legal 
framework emerges with the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, in 
the aftermath of WW II (Ziring et a l, 2000). Aiming to protect human 
rights and national self-determination, and to foster co-operation on 
international problems (art. 1), the UN charter contains a number of 
innovative principles of international law that impose a radical shift in the
grant and guarantee equality between the sub-parts, only a strategically contingent
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international normative praxis toward a confederal model. A first major 
step in this direction, based on the idea of collective security, consists in 
the expropriation, in favour of the UN, of the absolute right of the states to 
resort to the use of force (art. 2). This led to the subsequent crisis in the 
classical institutions of international law concerning self-defence. A second 
important deviation fi'om classic international law is the adoption of a 
majority vote (albeit one qualified by the non-procedural voting of the 
security council giving-^veto power to the five permanent council members) 
(art. 18 and art. 27.3). Finally, a further relevant modification of the 
previous international practice resides in the acknowledgement of the legal 
suprernacy of the UN charter over any other subsequent international treaty 
(art. 103).
Three principal dimensions of change concerning international norms 
can be identified within these moves. The first regards the content of 
norms, in that the UN charter supports a more extensive scheme of co­
operation to safeguard peace and security, to solve common problems, and 
to sustain common values. The second domain of change pertains, 
conversely, to the justification of norms, and it is related to a number of 
internationally agreed upon core principles, including human rights and 
self-determination, underpinning a broad notion of a world common good. 
Finally, the third change affects the issue of implementation, through the 
use of more effective mechanisms recognising the failure of the previous 
soft compliance attitude (Hurrell, 2001, 38-9). The new legal system 
generated by these changes has seriously affected the authority of state 
sovereignty, as understood within the classic model, and has opened up the 
way for a further dramatic change which disputes at its roots the entire 
domestically circumscribed practice of democracy.
In the last decades, a third major shift has occurred in the 
international legal-political framework concerning a substantial increase 
and intensification of mechanisms of global governance (Krasner, 1983; 
Keohane, 1984, 1989; Czempiel & Rosenau, 1992; Ruggie, 1993b; 
Rosenau, 1997). The model of embedded liberalism Da combination of
recognition is possible. I discussed this point in greater detail in (Marchetti, 2003a).
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free trade and national political systems (Ruggie, 1983)0 in the age of 
globalization has provoked a rising need for widened and deepened 
international co-operation, which has eventually led to the establishment of 
new multilateral and intergovernmental institutions (Zürn, 2004). A 
continuously growing net of (not necessarily democratic) political norms 
and legal rule-making has increasingly characterised the normative side of 
contemporary international society, eroding the legitimacy of both the state 
and classic international law. Recently, however, this model of 
international embedded liberalism has shown signals of decadence under 
the pressure of international liberalisation (Ruggie, 1995; Bello, 2002, § I). 
The initial fervour in support of this internationalist extension of the 
domestic liberal paradigm to multilateral intergovemmentalism has failed 
to tackle properly the global problems of our current era. Poverty, 
contestation, and violence represent just few examples providing evidence 
of the need for yet another revision of international political theory. For 
these reasons, a return to international ethics—or utopian realism—is much 
due in order to elaborate political projects able to be at the same time more 
legitimate and more effective (Booth, 1991, 535-9; Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998, 916). An important step in this direction consists then in the 
examination and critical re-evaluation of the deficiencies of the current 
systems.
Among the characteristics of the present systems of global 
governance the following are most relevant in comparison with the 
previous normative considerations on international exclusion. Firstly, such 
a governance covers a wider scope since it directly concerns a multilayered 
rule system wherever it is based, be it global, transnational or regional 
(Held & McGrew, 2002, 8-13). Secondly, despite being broader in scope, it 
is more limited in terms of inclusiveness and participation, since it 
concerns only given issue-areas and the agents therein involved (Krasner, 
1982, 185). Thirdly, in being multilateral (i.e., including three or more 
actors), it entails generalised principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity
106 jjjjg remains valid despite the strong pressure toward unilateralism o f the current US 
government.
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(Keohane, 1986a; Caporaso, 1993, 53-6; Ruggie, 1993a, 11). Moreover, it 
is polyarchic since it includes diverse authorities, often on unequal formal 
standing, such as states (which, though, maintain a degree of primacy 
according to the model of executive multilateralism), sub-national groups, 
and transnational special interests and communities, including both private 
and public bodies (Rosenau, 1992, 284-5). Global governance, thus, 
implies a change with reference to the concept of international agent 
insofar as the sovereign,state loses its status as the uniquely recognised 
actor, and with reference to the institutional framework in that UN system 
has become integrated with a number of other multilateral governance 
structures.
Beyond the different interpretations of global governance, a major 
normative question arises concerning the legitimacy of these global 
institutions and their relation to democratic theory, insofar as they attribute 
different political power to different agents, thus generating exclusion. 
Greater world interdependency increases the necessity of having 
international institutions to regulate the interaction between diverse 
international actors, and in so doing stimulate co-operation, which could 
not be achieved through uncoordinated individual calculation of self- 
interest in a heterogeneous sphere of political action. In this sense, the 
value of international regimes of global governance rests on the increase in 
the level of efficiency of international relations exchanges that they can 
bring about. Despite their effectiveness, however, a normative fundamental 
demand arises which concerns the issue of democratic participation. While 
implementation of international policies was conducted at the 
governmental level, it was sufficient for hegemonic actors to bargain with 
the states and disregard the issue of legitimacy. Now the question of 
legitimacy has re-acquired importance, since policies have a broader scope 
of compliance (in that they need to be enforced in greater depth within 
states), and consequently compel the need to deal with different kinds of 
political actors (Woods, 2000, 217). Hence, the dilemma consists in the 
simultaneous need of intrusive implementation of common policies, and of 
the enhanced legitimacy in terms of political consensus necessary to attain 
efficacy in a complex social world.
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As a consequence, the improvement in effectiveness in dealing with 
global affairs rests on the identification of a legitimate structuring of 
international institutions which consistently links political participation at 
the global level of decision-making with to the other levels of political 
actions, so allowing for social acceptance of international policies. 
Reforming the current international political system □ an irregular 
combination of the classic state system, UN intergovemmentalism, and 
global governance □ becomes a priority. This institutional possibility of 
reform will be examined in the rest of this chapter, beginning with the 
presentation of a number of normative considerations which are needed to 
firmly link the discourse of global democracy to that of global justice, 
according to the present consequentialist perspective.
Consequentialist cosmopolitan citizenship and global political 
institutions
An important characteristic that distinguishes consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism from other international political theories is its 
consideration of the link between responsibility and vulnerability that 
determines the double universalistic conception of moral agency in terms 
of choice-maker and choice-bearer. This feature marks the strength of 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism as an inclusive paradigm, able to adhere 
more strongly than others to social and political reality in a time of radical 
transformations. Until recently the effects of actions were mostly contained 
within a defined territory; most people could influence (and be influenced 
by) the lives of a limited number of other people. The relationship between 
responsibility and vulnerability was thus far more legible, and one could, 
for the most part, reasonably expect to maintain the integrity of this 
relationship through domestic democratic political channels. The present 
situation is quite different: through intensifying the level of global 
interaction, the current world system pushes the limits of the relationship 
between choice-makers and choice-bearers, with the effect of loosening the 
moral and political ties of accountability. Such circumstances consequently 
compel us to confront demands for inclusive moral responsibility and
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envisage new political mechanisms of social liability. Since social action is 
spread over distinct and yet overlapping spheres of conduct, democratic 
legitimacy, as based on the congruence mechanism, is only possible 
through the recognition of the political system as multileveled and all- 
inclusive.
A prominent characteristic of the current socio-economical situation 
at the global level is that among the abundant channels of action, political 
representation is notably lacking. Collective agents, such as multi-national 
corporations (MNCs) or international organisations, have a decisive and 
versatile capacity to intrude in states’ domestic politics and individuals’ 
lives. And while individuals also “have a multitude of new points of access 
to the course of events” (Rosenau, 1992, 285), unlike the collective agents 
mentioned, individuals are on whole denied the direct political access to 
institutions which could provide an opportunity for their public expression 
of dissent/consent. In this, they are denied the right to self-determination. 
The lack at each level of political action of a corresponding channel of 
access to political representation becomes strikingly apparent when 
juxtaposed to the asymmetrical power of influence wielded by the other 
international agents. General awareness of this unequal control over the 
fate of the world social system is becoming increasingly acute, and 
consequently provoking a growing discontent in a considerable sector of 
civil society (Pianta, 2003). Hence, a convincing concept of global political 
agency which offers the capacity to redress the erosion of the right to self- 
legislate in a multi-layered world constitutes a particularly urgent element 
of any proposal on international political theory.
The response of consequentialist cosmopolitanism to the 
multiplication of diverse social actions dispersed geographically and 
institutionally on different levels, consists in the identification of a unified, 
three-layered focus on guarantees covering the three domains of action: 
individual, state and global. Only through the simultaneous guarantee of 
these three kinds of rights can individual freedom of choice be preserved 
and the World well-being maximisation pursued. Of these three, the rights 
concerned with global political participation are the most contested and 
most denied by the current political system. They are therefore the most
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promising in terms of well-being promotion. Within this set of global 
rights, the entitlements concerning world citizenship represent a crucial 
step toward overcoming the established system of agency and 
implementing a cosmopolitan model. This new model of citizenship, rather 
than supplanting all other social ties, instead engenders a more consistent 
political way of addressing the phenomena that affect one’s life, and 
subsequently provides an effective means to align one’s personal with 
one’s political identity. In this regard, the suggestion advanced by the 
present version of cosmopolitanism is distinct from other like-minded 
proposals in that it concerns the establishment of new institutional 
mechanisms in which subjects can expect public and political recognition 
for their actions through all-inclusive forms of accountable, transnational 
citizenship; and so avoid international exclusion.
The principle of democratic congruence, however, encounters 
tenacious resistance from all comers when extended at the global level. 
While among democratic states it is widely recognised that in the domestic 
sphere of political action all citizens should have a voice on public 
decisions, the limits of international accountability are still equally 
confused and contested. The legal entitlements of the single agent to take 
part in the decision-making process at the international level are still very 
limited, and the cause of a great degree of exclusion. Indeed the extent to 
which an agent can hold another accountable, i.e., the extent to which the 
agent who suffers costs can demand punishment of and compensation from 
the choice-maker agent, forms the object of a heated dispute on the scope 
of international norms (Kutz, 2000; Keohane, 2003, § II; Keohane & Nye, 
2003; Held, 2004a). Attesting to the scope of the dilemma posed by this 
issue is the patent failure of a straightforward principle of affect to resolve 
it. The appeal of such principle is of course its objectivity; its disregard for 
the specific interpretation of the role of the choice-maker agent
Three principal interpretations are available on the issue o f agent’s accountability. 1) 
The individual difference principle, according to which the agent is accountable for a 
harm if  he did made a difference to its outcome; i.e., without the agent, the outcome 
would have been different. 2) The control principle, according to which the agent is 
accountable for an event if he had control over its occurrence; i.e., he could have 
prevented it. 3) The autonomy principle, according to which an agent is accountable for
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However, since an action’s effects could affect, with different intensity, an 
almost infinite number of agents (one need only to think of potential claims 
of future generations), if the legitimacy of an action were to depend on 
prior consultation for consent of all affected parties human engagement 
would become paralysed under the charge of responsibility. Thus simply 
from a practical standpoint the mere fact of being affected cannot 
constitute valid ground for a legal or even political claim.
A more political principle has to be adopted, one that grants to all 
citizens as members of the public constituency in each level of political 
action, including the global, a political voice and the power to make the 
choice-makers accountable. At the global level of action in particular, the 
strategy of consequentialist cosmopolitanism consists in the creation of a 
political system characterised by a universal constituency, which in 
granting rights of political participation to all citizens, is able to identify 
both responsible and vulnerable agents, and consequently to implement a 
sanctioning system on several levels. The consequentialist selection of the 
most appropriate institutional framework for a project of the reform of 
international politics must, in fact, be based on the assessment of the 
institutional performance of the different frameworks in relation to the 
criteria exposed in chapters IV and V, principally that concerning 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ^  08 fundamental premise of this argument, in fact, holds 
that each individual is entitled to an equal opportunity to influence, within 
an institutional order, the making of any public decision that significantly 
concerns him or her, in so far as only by granting such personal rights—
the harm another agent causes, if  he induced or coerced that agent into performing that 
act. For a detailed discussion of these interpretations see (Kutz, 2000).
In particular, a legitimate institutional framework is arguably composed of three 
principal factors: participation, accountability, and fairness (Franck, 1992, 1995; Manin et 
al ,  1999,47-9; Woods, 1999; Chamovitz, 2003). A good institution encourages an 
elevated degree o f egalitarian participation, aiming at the inclusion o f all the different 
categories o f stake-holders, insofar as this empowers people with an effective capacity to 
influence outcomes which affect their lives. A legitimate institution also cultivates a 
practice o f accountability, both vertically through elections and horizontally through an 
appropriate institutional design and governmental structure. Accountability mechanisms 
typically include: clear assignment of responsibility for institutional performance, fair and 
transparent voting procedures and decision-making mechanisms, and publicity of 
decisions. Finally, but not least, a legitimate institution implements procedural fairness 
which relates to both impartial and predictable processes: processes that are clearly 
specified, non-discretionary, and internally consistent.
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i.e., the legal instruments necessary for the free determination of one’s own 
destiny—can the maximisation of individual well-being be expected. Since 
in consideration of epistemological constraints the indirect strategy 
remains the only viable way to pursue consequentialist goals, the preferred 
institutional framework should thus be one that reduces the constraints on 
participation in the decision making in all the vastly diverse political units 
dispersed throughout the vertical and horizontal dimensions of social 
action. More specifically, the two sub-criteria of an optimal framework are 
decentralisation, in order to maximise opportunity, and centralisation, to 
avoid exclusion (Pogge, 1992, 58, 64-5; 1995).
In this regard, a strong accent needs to be placed on the centrality of 
the procedures of representative participation, in so far as the outcome of 
an un-formalised (not authorized by a general agreement and not arranged 
in formal hierarchies) political process should not take precedence over 
institutional procedures. The issue concerning the priority between output 
legitimacy (acceptance created by system effectiveness) and input 
legitimacy (acceptance created by democratic procedure) represents a 
highly contentious topic in the current international discussion (Dahl, 
1994; Scharpf, 1997; Zürn, 2000). Surprising as it may seem, from a 
consequentialist point of view political predominance has to be granted to 
input legitimacy, for only by focusing on this can individual freedom of 
choice and political participation be guaranteed. At the level of 
international institutions (as also exemplified by the case of migratory 
cosmopolitanism in chapter V), what counts in this version of 
consequentialism is correct political structures and institutional procedures 
rather than substantive outcomes, since the latter cannot be universally and 
legitimately compared. This clarified, a move can be made to compare 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism against the other principal model for 
cosmopolitan reform of international institutions. First, the model of 
cosmopolitan governance is presented and criticized for its insufficient 
participatory attitude. In opposition to this, consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism, based on a model of cosmo-federalism, is presented as a 
more democratic project.
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Cosmopolitan Governance
Recent proposals for cosmopolitan global governance, ostensibly 
intended as a ‘democratic’ correction of the distorted ‘executivism’ of the 
current forms of multilateralism, have received favourable acceptance both 
in public discussion and in practice (Rosenau, 1997; Held & McGrew, 
2002; Held, 2003). Without underestimating their very real relevance and 
effect as persuasive arguments for globalising democracy, the 
cosmopolitan proposals for global governance demand critique exactly on 
the issue of the democratic deficit. From the perspective outlined by this 
thesis, acceptance of this cosmopolitan global governance proposal could 
only be warranted as a transitory mid-term political p r o j e c t w h i c h  has to 
be supplanted in the long-term by a federal reform of international 
organization based on consequentialism. In the rest of this section, 
consequently, a critique of such a proposal is presented.
‘Global governance cosmopolitans’ tend to recommend a 
decentralised and opaque-cut governance structure characterised by 
multiple decision-making centres in which states still retain a certain 
degree of national autonomy and only those agents who are part of a given 
socio-political interaction are entitled to join in the decision-making 
process 1^ ®. In this vein, the agencies of global governance that they 
propose would be characterised according to an intergovernmental model 
of diffuse authority. Similarly, their vision of an additional UN Chamber 
would be based on a low democratic standard because of its limited 
consultative function. In consideration of these limits concerning 
democratic participation, this kind of inter-nationalism remains incapable 
of facilitating genuinely democratic global counter-measures to global 
issues.
^99 Which is not, however, what global cosmopolitans such as Archibugi, Held, and 
Linklater argue for, in that they consider cosmo-govemance as the ultimate stage of  
democratic development, beyond which it is not prudent to venture.
 ^ For a reference see (Pogge, 1992; Held, 1995, 237; Archibugi, 1998, 219; Linklater, 
1998b; O'Neill, 2000, § 10; Dallmayr, 2001, § 41-8; Habermas, 2001, § 5; Held, 2002; 
Archibugi, 2003; Held, 2004b, § 10). Held took a different position in his earlier work, 
where he refers to the federal model. He shifted toward a more decentralised type of 
cosmopolitan global governance in the nineties, in part as a consequence o f the encounter 
with Archibugi (Held, 1993, 51, n. 77).
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More specifically, three principal problems can be individuated in the 
project of cosmopolitan democracy. The first flaw consists in the exclusion 
generated by the proposed issue-oriented political structure according to 
which only those agents that directly interact on a given issue-area are 
entitle to political voice. In holding to a notion of democratic congruence 
based on the strict relation between those who make the rules and those 
who directly suffer the consequence of the rules (rather than one granting 
political power within the decision-making process of public rules to all 
the citizens regardless of their being directly affected by a determined set 
of actions), cosmopolitan global governance can only avoid direct 
exploitation, but not democratic exclusion. The strict notion of congruence, 
in fact, can be more easily associated to the decision-making method of a 
democratic club rather than a democratic political system, in that it does 
avoid exploitation of those recognized as members (and those recognized 
by members) but does not allow for the inclusion into the public decision­
making process of the individuals who are classified (typically by those 
inside the club) as only indirectly or ‘publicly’ involved in the socio­
political interaction. A significant consequence of such club-based theory 
of democracy is that entire states or regions can be left apart or excluded 
from the centers of power if  they are not recognized actors in the political 
interaction. In this sense, the project of cosmopolitan global governance 
based on ad hoc and limited functional bodies remains problematic, in that 
it lacks democratic centrality and therefore risks exclusion. In suggesting a 
net of delimited institutions, such a proposal does not guarantee 
representation to citizens outside that structure, and does not offer a chance 
to compare the effects of the uncoordinated decisions taken by different 
agencies, which are considered equal in political authority (Thompson, 
1999). In multiplying specialized agencies (supposedly, one for each global 
issue), this cosmopolitan governance model fails to establish a central 
authority where a legitimate political discussion can take place to 
determine the allocation of competencies and responsibilities on any 
determined issue-area. But this is not the only flaw of the cosmopolitan 
interpretation of global governance.
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The second flaw of this project regards the participatory deficit 
evident in its intergovernmental structure. Despite the recommendation for 
a consultative second chamber at the UN, the predominant political 
principle underpinning the global governance proposal remains based on 
the relation between governments. In this sense, however, the global 
governance model insufficiently addresses the very issue of representative 
democratic congruence. Governance policies are in fact taken at a high, 
often intergovernmental level, without offering individuals, who are the 
ultimate moral reference, the chance to have a direct influence on the 
decisions that affect them. Moreover such an approach, which ultimately 
rests on an inter-state bargaining of national interests, fails to offer an 
adequate response to global issues such as international migration, 
terrorism, and overpopulation that require responses equally global in kind. 
Following from this □ and also typical of the confederal model □ another 
principal flaw of the global governance model is that the impediment it 
creates for open communication between decision-bearers and decision­
makers leads, in the best case, to the duplication of the channels of 
accountability, and in the worst case, their breakdown.
Finally, a third flaw of the global governance model consists in its 
weak acknowledgement of the risk of distortion inherent to global 
governance; the same distortion currently so in evidence in international 
affairs. In the last decade, global governance has affected national 
governance through a relocation of authority related both to political 
dimensionality and agency. While a clear-cut process of redirecting power 
to supra- and sub-national spheres has marked the decline of the nation­
state, no strong political alternative to tackle this unbound and de-localised 
power has arisen. Consequently, the locus of legitimacy has been shifted 
away from the public to the quasi-public and private sector, both at the 
domestic and at the international level^^k The private agents, primarily 
MNCs, have been the greatest beneficiary of this tendency and have 
consequently acquired the status of stakeholder in governance to the
111 A typical example o f this ‘libertarian’ trend is the increasing use o f international 
arbitration in which social rules are re-interpreted through self-regulation.
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detriment of citizens’ participation (Held & McGrew, 2002, 10; Coate, 
2003). With respect then to the global governance proposal’s neglect to 
ensure comprehensive participation, this last phenomenon offers further 
doubts on the viability of its project of global governance, even in its 
moralised cosmopolitan version.
Contrary to the argument for global governance, a strong political 
response is needed; one able to offer effective supranational public power 
while at the same time preserving a space for the national sphere of 
political action. In this regard, consequentialist cosmopolitanism considers 
public representative institutions as the most appropriate (and urgent) 
mechanisms to be reformed in order to close the gap between choice- 
makers and bearers at the global level. If the democratic deficit of the 
current international system is to be eliminated, if the link between 
responsibility and vulnerability is to be re-established and an ultimate 
political authority affirmed, a more centralised and inclusive framework of 
increased political participation needs to be envisaged, rather then a fuzzy 
net of global governance. The following section offers an alternative model 
of global government based on a federal ideal, which through the reform of 
international institutions aims to tackle the problem of global congruence 
properly. On account of its prominent position in international affairs, the 
UN unquestionably provides the first substantial candidate for such federal 
and cosmopolitan reform.
Reforming the UN
The discussion on the reform of the UN is almost as old as the UN 
itself. Beyond outright calls for its abolition (Pines, 1984), arguments for 
reform principally put five areas of UN action under scrutiny. The Security 
Council has been questioned and proposals for its enlargement have been 
formulated, together with the abolition of the veto powers of the ‘big five'. 
An Assembly of the Peoples to be juxtaposed to the General Assembly has 
been repeatedly advocated in order to balance the governments’ power in 
favour of a more direct representation. The expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the actual International Court of Justice, together with the creation of an
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International Criminal Court (now in force), has been recommended with 
some degree of success. The limited endowment of the UN institutions 
concerning financial resources and political capabilities sufficient to 
control deviant behaviour and co-ordinate co-operative undertakings has 
been criticised. Finally, a reformation of the UN peace mandate, oscillating 
between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing, has also been hotly debated 
in the last decade (Baratta, 1987; Falk, 1993, 16; Archibugi, 1995a; Imber, 
1997; Aj-chibugi et a l, 2000; Patomâki & Teivainen, 2004, § 1 and 8).
Behind these practical issues, three political problems of 
predominant relevance can be identified. Firstly, the internationalisation of 
recent decades together with—and of immediate importance here—an ever 
more visible UN system with no allowance for direct electoral 
representation, highlights that the distance between rulers and ruled has 
widened to the maximal distance possible. Secondly, the heterogeneity of 
the ruled has also increased significantly insofar as such diverse political 
agents as individuals, groups, and states all claim recognition at the global 
level. Finally, the third crucial striking point of UN reform is dual subject 
status, with the current discrimination favouring a territorial (one state, one 
vote) over an individualist (one person, one vote) mode of representation 
(Bienen et a l, 1998, 290). In general, the debate has concentrated on the 
dual status issue rather than on the other two questions, with subsequent 
proposals locating accountability with the Security Council or the elected 
second assembly, thus recognising the predominance of states or 
individuals respectively.
The perspective of the present research is based on the observation 
that any reform of the UN would invariably fail on the side of political 
inclusion were it not grounded on a direct and democratic model of 
participation. That the current institutional structure has to be changed is 
proved first and foremost by the straightforward undemocratic rules of the 
veto power within the Security Council. But even if this norm were 
modified and the effective decision power were granted uniquely to the 
General Assembly, as it is currently organised the entire procedure would 
still be utterly undemocratic. On the one hand, a large number of states do 
not have democratic voting systems and therefore vast sectors (perhaps the
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majority) of their population would be excluded from representation, and 
on the other hand, even the currently ‘democratic’ states would deprive 
their minorities, be they national or transnational, from representation. 
Concerning the latter states, furthermore, a serious problem of 
accountability remains, insofar as the multiple steps of delegation loosen 
the effectiveness of concrete control from their constituency. Finally, the 
situation would still be one of ‘equality’ between the representative of San 
Marino with a constituency of 20,000 voters and the representative of India 
with a constituency of 1 billion, which is an evident denial of the 
democratic rule of ‘one head one vote’, for the head of one citizen of San 
Marino would count as much as would 50.000 Indian heads. Hence, even if 
these reforms concerning the Security Council and the General Assembly 
be implemented, democracy would remain in the far distance.
Two kinds of strategies have recently been proposed in the attempt to 
increase the level of democratic control of the UN—allowing both national 
MPs and civil society organisations to influence (often on a consultative 
basis) UN works—but both represent insufficient responses on the side of 
political inclusion. Within proposals such as the Inter-parliamentary Union, 
any national MP, who has been elected by a national constituency and for a 
national party, will remain anchored to national priorities, insofar as his 
mandate is principally national in kind. Where a conflict arises between a 
national and international interest, his decision is structurally constrained 
to favour the national side for its unique voting power. A different proposal 
forwards the case for transnational constituencies and a global mandate, 
which would allow representatives to endorse a non-territorially biased 
perspective. However, civil society organisations are affected by a 
different, and yet equally serious, democratic deficiency on a number of 
political levels of analysis. The constant challenges made to the legitimacy 
of NGOs, interest groups, and social movements principally concern their 
capacity to represent the relevant constituency, their internal democratic 
procedures and organisational accountability. Until a plausible response to 
these challenges is offered, their political status cannot be more than 
consultative. Beyond these two failing strategies for the democratic 
enhancement of the UN procedures, a third more plausible proposal
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remains; one that pursues a truly global democratic inclusion in 
international institutions: the federal alternative.
Cosmo-federalism: principles
The consequentialist cosmopolitan perspective advocates a federal 
reform of the in response to its claim that the democratic goal of
participation c a n n o t b e  properly achieved through either a liberal 
confederation of republican states or an enhancement of multilateral 
structures of global governance. It must be noted that the present proposal, 
unlike those within the federal tradition, seeks the establishment of a more 
democratic form of governance at the global level for merely 
consequentialist reasons pertaining to the democratic reflexivity between 
choice-bearers and choice-makers. While a major concern for many 
federalists was peace (Russell, 1961; Clark & Sohn, 1966), the primary 
concern for consequentialist cosmopolitanism is the maximisation of world 
well-being condition. As this is determined to be attainable only through 
the enhancement of individual choice possibility, it is necessary to obtain 
the political empowerment enabling political agents to self-legislate on all 
aspects of their lives. Consequently, at each level of political action, be it at 
the individual, state or world level, norms of democratic reflexivity should 
be implemented that guarantee the preservation of the individual capacity 
to choose. The most effective and consistent way of responding to these 
requirements at the global level currently resides in a federal and 
cosmopolitan reform of the UN.
 ^ For a first reference on federalism see (Althusius, 1614 [1995]; Hamilton et a l ,  1787- 
88 [1961]; Riker, 1964; Friedrich, 1968; Bernier, 1973; King, 1985; Albertini, 1993; 
Malandrino, 1998; Watts, 1998; Levi, 2002). For the discussion on ‘international/world’ 
federalism see (Reves, 1947; Hutchins et a l ,  1948; Johnsen, 1948; Clark & Sohn, 1966; 
Forsyth, 1981; Baratta, 1987, 1-15; Nielsen, 1988; Codding, 1990; Bamaby, 1991; Falk et 
a l ,  1991; Baratta, 1992; Glossop, 1993; Yunker, 1993; Heater, 1996, § 6-7; Elazar, 1998; 
Bohman & Lutz-Bachmann, 2002; HofFe, 2002; Delbmck, 2004; Frankman, 2004).
 ^ Reassured as it may be by the prediction that a world government will in any case be 
established within a hundred years (Wendt, 2003,491), this proposal sticks to the 
normative stance and more modestly suggests that such institutional arrangement should 
be actively welcomed rather than awaited.
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Federalism is traditionally intended as the political theory affirming 
the division of powers between two or more institutional levels of 
government, the central power and the powers of federate communities^
In organising political power on several levels, federalism benefits from 
the advantages of both cosmopolitanism and patriotism, in that it permits 
applying the principle of self-government (thus preserving the identity of 
the units) to a plurality of centres of independent power, consistently and 
democratically co-ordinated. Every citizen is subsequently subject to two 
powers (double loyalty), without this implying the renunciation of the 
principle of uniqueness of decision, thanks to the mechanism of 
subsidiarity (Vernon, 1988; Norman, 1993). Rejecting the traditional 
model of double indirect representation through states’ representatives, 
federalism proposes a democratic rather than diplomatic union of states, 
according to which all political representatives are directly elected to a 
law-making assembly by the people, and political decisions taken by the 
federal government apply directly to citizens rather than states. Finally, 
central to the federal ideal is the transformation of inter-state relations from 
un-ruled and violent to a complete juridical status. Since peace is not 
interpreted negatively as the lack of war, but rather positively as state and 
law, a central government is envisaged as a machinery for the peaceful and 
lawful solution of the political, economical or social international conflicts. 
Contrary to those confederations with no check on the power of single 
states, the law of the federal system provides the political means to 
eliminate the appeal to arbitrary violence.
Following from these features, the superiority of federalism over 
confederalism with regard to the three criteria for a good institutional 
framework (participation, accountability, and fairness) is evident.
11^ The process o f the historical extension of democracy has constantly been at the centre 
of federalist thought. The traditional line holds that democratic government has been 
continuously adapted to historical circumstances—from the limited extent o f the polis 
assembly to the intermediate enlargement in the modem representative state— and that the 
time has come for the third extension toward a federal world government. Equally, 
federalists have reckoned that economic development always imposes a functional 
imperative on the stmcture of political system. Thus, from the first agricultural city-states 
to the nation-states focused on the industry and commence (Seeley, 1883), the historical 
trajectory o f economic globalization leads toward a world federal system.
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Federalism fundamentally fulfils these criteria in so far as it allows for 
direct representation of citizens (and not of states) at several levels of 
political decision-making. In this way, it offers a viable answer to the 
current unchecked invasiveness of international policies, it promises to 
establish a permanent peace because of the presence of a superordinate law 
that importantly does not permit withdrawal from the federation, and it 
envisages an attitude more convenient to solving global problems, in that it 
reduces biased decisions based on national interests. Additionally, the 
federal form of government offers the best political device to avoid 
despotism, in that “the federal level of deliberation and legislation provides 
a second chance to protect against abuse by local majorities” (Follesdal, 
2001, 11). Finally, such political system promises to be able to secure 
efficiency in that it has an in-built responsiveness to local circumstances, 
and institutional innovation in that it allows for more experimentation at 
different political levels (Hamilton er a/., 1787-88 [1961], esp. § 15).
Cosmo-federalism: objections
A number of the objections traditionally raised against the idea of a 
global federation, including practical and normative arguments, can be 
dismissed from the point of view of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. 
Two arguments regarding the feasibility and desirability of the federal 
proposal are the most frequent and, apparently, decisive (Kant, 1795 
[1991]; Carr, 1939, § 5; Schmitt, 1950 [2003], 324-35; Walzer, 1985a, 224, 
236; Suganami, 1989, 187-91). As regards feasibility, critics point out that 
federations have historically come into being in reaction to external 
enemies or for common interests, and that this is inconceivable at the 
global level. This argument can be refuted by pointing to, on the one hand, 
global threats such as global warming, and on the other, global public 
goods such as peace and international financial stability, which clearly 
represent common interests capable of unifying differing strategic agendas. 
Such interests currently provide the motive pushing international co­
operation strongly beyond borders toward a tighter political system. The 
other concern, feasibility, is mainly technical and regards the practical
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difficulties of world management in a scenario characterised by high 
quantity and high complexity. Three points provide adequate response: 
firstly, there have been enormous improvements in technology since 
Kant’s time are acknowledged (Wendt, 2003); secondly, the demands of 
justice may well require a certain degree of trade-off at the expense of 
efficiency; and thirdly the high diversity of global political agents provides 
a reason for (not against) the search for a common, non-exclusionary 
framework of justice. The two latter points, moreover, crucially 
underscores the desirability of global federalism.
The other major critique of global federalism concerns the issue of 
desirability and holds that the power accruing to a world government 
would inescapably lead to homogeneity, or worse, tyranny (see especially 
Kant, 1795 [1991], 113; 1797 [1991], 171; Hurrell, 1990, 190). The quick 
response to this consists in stressing that these risks are higher without a 
federal authority than with it, exactly the point of The Federalist. With 
regard to homogeneity, it should be remarked that only through a political 
system where action bearer can democratically express their consent based 
on an equal standing, can the imposition of mere power (both political and 
cultural) be avoided and local differences be respected. If we reckon the 
infinite ways of influencing other countries, an all-inclusive world 
organisation based on equal democratic participation represents the only 
political project able to escape the imposition of a local standard on the 
world community. With regard to tyranny, the distinction between a 
unitary state and a federal government should be highlighted, together with 
the recognition that a federal global institution would only rule on global 
issues, while leaving national affairs to the jurisdiction of the local 
authorities. In this way, states would preserve their raison d ’être and the 
risk of an authoritarian state would be diminished.
Recently, Robert Dahl famously re-stated a further objection, the 
restricted-size argument, to any proposal for the establishment of a global 
democratic institution. According to this objection, which in a less recent 
version dates at least to the writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau and was 
amply discussed and rebutted in the Federalist Papers (Hamilton et a l, 
1787-88 [1961], § 39), an extended republic is an oxymoron. In brief, Dahl
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argues that the bigger a state is, the smaller is the weight each single vote 
has in proportion to the total of the voting lot; consequently, the less 
democratic the state is (Dahl & Tu Ale, 1973; Dahl, 1999). Three counter­
moves can be used to reAite Dahl. First, as already made clear by the 
federalist writers, the right size of a republic is not at all clear, since it 
seems that if we stick to the original ideal of a republican society, states 
such as the US, Russia or Brazil, or indeed most contemporary states, are 
structurally inadequate for any form of democratic government. Second, in 
the current interdependent international affairs, it is likely that the 
individual will be affected in any case by decisions taken outside of his 
community. In the light of this, it goes against reason to argue against 
granting the possibility to influence politically such decisions, even if the 
final result is minimal impact. And thirdly, in a situation such as the 
current one, i.e., one deprived of any form of direct international 
representation, the relative weight of each individual’s vote should be even 
more severely discounted, in so far as it passes through a double 
mechanism of representation: from the citizen to the national MP and from 
the MP to the state’s delegate in the international o rgan isa t ionsH av ing  
presented and rebutted the traditional objections to the federalist model, it 
is now legitimate to move on to the examination of a concrete application 
of the federal ideal to the structure of the UN.
Cosmo-federalism: institutions
A reformed UN would be a global federal organisation in which 
states would share power for specific global purposes under a system of 
strengthened international law. Consequently, states would renounce a 
portion of their sovereignty and agree to a compulsory jurisdiction 
uniquely for a determined list of competences on global issues (typically, 
non-territorial or territorially intermingled issues), while retaining those 
powers and specific institutional forms directed at domestic concerns. 
Rather than a loss, this would be regarded as a gain in freedom and order.
i i ^  I owe this point to D. Archibugi.
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since states would be compelled only to accept decisions taken according 
to majority rule—General Assembly resolutions would have a legally 
binding status—and implemented through a subsidiary scheme of actions 
at both global and state levels. Moreover, individuals would acquire a full 
cosmopolitan citizenship while remaining national citizens within a 
consistent scheme of multiple allegiances, which would allow for 
frustrated and excluded citizens to channel their claims beyond their 
governmental representation. They would be enfranchised as voting 
constituents for an elected legislative world assembly with an authoritative 
mandate representing general as well as special interests restricted to 
global issues^ 1^ . Finally, since global agents would be recognised as 
vulnerable and responsible, they would also be protected from and 
punished for global crimes, according to an appropriate multilayered and 
multi-agents scheme of sanctions.
A critical point of a federal reform of the UN resides in the allocation 
of the diverse functions and powers between the central world government 
and the federate states. As with current forms of federalism, even in the 
case of the reformed UN a stable equilibrium would not be possible 
without a constitution whose authority is accorded primacy over all other 
powers. A global constitution is thus required to delineate the distribution 
of legislative and executive authority regarding a number of functions 
among the different levels of political action. A clear demarcation of the 
issue of competence is crucial not only to allocate ab initio authority (and 
its limits), but also to solve conflicts that may arise about the power to 
judge. Neither the central power (as in the unitary state) nor the single 
states (as in the confederation) have the authority to decide on who has to 
decide, but only the constitutional court (Kelsen, 1944; Levi, 2002, 11).
While a straight consequentialist reasoning to allocate functions and 
authority would consist in the comparison of the expected effects of 
alternative distributions between central power and sub-units (benefits and
^1^ Proposals for the creation of a Global Parliamentary Assembly has been recently re­
stated by Falk and Strauss (Strauss, 1999; Falk & Strauss, 2000, 2001), though their 
project does not endow the suggested assembly either with federal or fully legislative 
powers.
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burdens, risks and opportunities), the method followed by consequentialist 
cosmopolitanism is different, in that it takes into consideration the 
epistemological constraints put on political action and thus relies on the 
principle of subsidiarity and individual participation. As shown in chapter 
IV, the acknowledgement of the limits of interpersonal utility comparisons 
leads to the distinction of three principal spheres of political action 
(individual, state, and world), in each of which a set of guarantees are 
envisaged to protect different kinds of interests. According to this 
structure, the federal government and its delegate agencies would have 
direct competence only on a limited set of global issues, while retaining 
only a subsidiary charge for universally protecting a set of minimal rights 
at the individual level, and for supervising the possibility of collective self- 
determination and respect for minority rights at the state level. Global 
institutions should primarily pursue at the global level the safeguard of 
global public goods and the handling of all those political issues that have a 
pre-eminently global character. In sum, a partition of functions can be 
delineated between the following two universal fields of action: a positive 
global politics to guarantee the vital interests of each human being together 
with a number of other collective national and global interests, and a 
procedural politics to guarantee political participation to each citizen and 
thus democratic congruence globally.
Falk has offered a broad description of the would-be tasks of a world 
government. There should be
“considerable centralised capabilities with respect to the 
following governmental functions for the world as a 
whole: legislative organs to establish binding standards; 
administrative capacities to interpret these standards; 
financial powers, including revenue resources, and taxing 
powers; rules and procedures determining membership 
and participation in international institutions and the status 
of international actors, as well as modes to render all 
actors accountable; verification of compliance with 
behavioural constraints and enforcement mechanisms; 
disaster, relief, and refugees services; regimes for 
protecting and managing the global commons; regulation 
of collective violence and supranational police; framework 
for world economic life, including trade, monetary and
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financial spheres, and protection against agreed-upon 
categories of disruption (debts, price shifts, boycotts, 
credit lines); and finally, ?i global constitution''‘{¥dXk, 1993,
15 -Falk's emphasis).
Within the federal reform of the UN, a renewed general elected 
assembly would acquire the role of the chief deliberative, policy-making 
and representative organ of the UN, whose accountability and transparency 
would be consequently improved^^^. Members of such an assembly would 
be elected through a universal democratic voting system, according to 
which the national representatives’ quotas are measured according to a 
function made up of diverse elements including: population, state 
recognition (in order to safeguard small countries), and proportionate and 
actual financial contribution to the UN system (in order to take into 
account economic capacity of wealthier states)!^®. However, the necessity 
of fair voting procedures in the original countries poses a severe practical 
constraint for this proposal. While this mechanism could, in fact, have 
beneficial effects on the remaining non-democratic countries in terms of 
pressure to change, it would also be impracticable if democratic regimes 
were not dispersed throughout a minimally sufficient number of countries. 
This variable profoundly marks the political strategy for implementing this 
reform proposal.
A clear precondition for a legitimate reform of the UN remains the 
existence of domestic democratic systems, since any new membership to 
this democratically-renewed supranational organisations must be on a free 
and voluntary basis (Kant, 1795 [1991]; Bobbio, 1989, 9; Archibugi, 
1995b; Habermas, 1997). Only when states have accepted democratic 
voting procedure domestically, can democratic elections (with guarantees
 ^ The judicial and the executive powers o f the UN have also been criticised and reforms 
subsequently proposed in order to enhance the International Court o f Justice and to 
abolish the veto power in the Security Council. Due to space constraints, this chapter 
concentrates, however, on the legislative power because o f  its political supremacy.
 ^ Proposals on voting systems have been numerous and diverse during the last fifty 
years. For a selection, including the so-called Binding Triad, see (Clark & Sohn, 1966, 20- 
34; Hudson, 1976; Newcombe, 1983; Hudson, 1991; Newcombe, 1991; Szasz, 1991).
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of fair procedures)ll9 called for delegating an assembly with the 
specific task of reforming the Charter^^®. While this does not deny the 
possibility that a relatively small number of democratic states provide the 
initial basis for such an assembly—possibly, but at least at the beginning 
not necessarily, in conjunction with the UN (Falk & Strauss, 2001, 219)— 
the fact that currently only a minority of states are democratically 
organised (Freedom-House, 2001) requires the formulation of an 
appropriate political strategy. A previous de-centralised process fostering 
democratic systems within states does, indeed, form a condition for any 
legitimate reform of the UN, and is therefore a priority for any 
cosmopolitan political project. This seems to be the most promising 
strategy for escaping from the dilemma of ‘attainable and irrelevant or 
radical but unattainable reforms’, and overcoming the causes that currently 
block any reform.
In envisaging this federal plan of reform for international institutions, 
consequentialist cosmopolitanism aims at re-establishing the congruence 
between choice-makers and choice-bearers, which is central to any 
democratic form of politics in as much as it constitutes one of the most 
severe challenges of global politics. Only where this correspondence is 
universally respected through a centralised and comprehensive mechanism 
of public decision-making and accountability, such as the one presented, is 
the individual in fact in the position to self-legislate over the entire range of 
activities in which he or she is involved, and thus his or her democratic 
freedom preserved.
 ^ Without this proviso, any proposal for a UN assembly with representation contingent 
only on the democratic election o f the representatives from each country, irrespective of 
country’s form o f government or its observance of human rights, would be self- 
contradictory. For an instance of such a misjudgement see (Singer, 2002, 148).
This would be legitimate, but not necessarily legal, according to the existing UN  
charter. In fact, art. 103 states that the UN charter has legal supremacy over any other 
international agreement or covenant, and art. 108 affirms that changes in the charter are 
allowed only if  voted by 2/3 of the existing (state) members, including the big five. This 
arrangement, due to the historical circumstances following the WWII, perfectly preserves 
the power o f the five permanent members of the Security Council, in that it does not allow 
for any change without their consent. A reformist strategy to deal with this legally 
invulnerable system relies on the persuasive power o f a legitimate public opiniion, such as 
the voice that could potentially be expressed by a qualified world majority.
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Conclusions
To the original contention that the international political system 
generates exclusion and is thus morally unaccountable, this chapter has 
suggested a cosmo-federalist answer. The current rupture of accountability 
between choice-makers and choice-bearers has been revealed and criticised 
through the adoption of a radical democratic perspective, which offers back 
to all citizens the possibility of participation in the process of self­
legislation. The specific circumstances of international justice have been 
take into account by a particular interpretation of the idea of a universal 
right to self-determination, which forms the core of the present 
cosmopolitan argument and generates two key proposals for reforms: a) a 
recognition of multiple membership at different level of political action in 
terms of cosmopolitan citizenship; and b) a federal reform of the United 
Nations, entailing the creation of an elected world assembly endowed with 
legislative power for issues concerning the global sphere of action. Only 
through such a pluri-level political system and the subsequent multilevel 
citizenship encompassing differing degrees of responsibility and relative 
power at all levels of political decision, can the individual possibility of 
choice receive an impartial hearing, and so the maximisation of world 
well-being condition be pursued. Arguably, these are, for the time being, 
the appropriate political arrangements required by a consequentialist 
cosmopolitan theory of global justice in the case of citizenship and global 
political institutions.
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vni
Concluding Remarks
“Utopia and reality are thus two facets of 
political science. Sound political thought and sound 
political life will be found only where both have their
place” (Carr, 1939, 10)
This concluding section aims to summarise the principal findings of 
the thesis and present a number of considerations on future directions of 
research.
Chapter I introduced the problem of international exclusion in terms 
of political disenfranchisement, underlining the degree of subordination 
that it imposes on so many citizens around the world. This is nowhere 
more visible than in the institutional barriers keeping individuals from 
influencing decisions that transnationally affect them. Having identified 
this key political deficiency, critical attention turned to its ideological 
fundaments: the normative theories underpinning such exclusionary 
phenomenon. These theories share a common fundament: they rely on an 
interaction-dependent paradigm of justice, according to which any 
substantial duty to those with whom one does not interact is denied. Both 
in its contextualist and in its universalist variant, this paradigm of justice is 
the major contender if the assumption of international exclusion has to be 
disputed.
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In order to challenge these normative bases of international 
exclusion, the rest of the thesis re-constructed an alternative international 
political theory anchored on different grounds—a combination of the 
consequentialist and the cosmopolitan approaches. Chapter II and III 
surveyed the utilitarian tradition of international thought as the major 
precursor of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. In the two centuries 
examined (the 19^ ’’ and 20^), a number of crucial arguments were 
highlighted, including the interpretation of political institutions as welfare 
providers, the universal scope of the ethical-political principles, the 
adaptation of global principles of justice to the findings of social theory 
concerning cultural and political allegiances, and the recognition of the 
multilevel dimensionality of political life. From these and other 
considerations, arose a perspective made fertile by the possibilities, but 
also trained by the limits, of international utilitarian thought.
Chapter IV and V presented an alternative international political 
theory designed to overcome the limits of international utilitarianism 
through consistently retaining the goal-based and cosmopolitan 
characteristics needed for an inclusive project. Chapter IV outlined the 
ethical and political aspects of the proposal. Through the recognition of the 
unreliability of interpersonal comparisons, the welfarist focus of the 
consequentialist theory was re-directed to the individual freedom of choice. 
Individual capacity for free choice played thus a crucial role in structuring 
the entire normative mechanism, in procedural and all-inclusive terms. 
Comparisons with the major ethical theories were drawn in order to reveal 
the affinities and the contrasts with alternative normative proposals. 
Finally, from the principle of freedom of choice a dual metric of justice 
was identified—consisting in the guarantee of vital interests and political 
participation—as a legitimate premise for a renewed conception of political 
agency.
Elaborating on this ethical ground, chapter V presented the 
institutional and international aspects of the proposal. The institutional 
framework of consequentialist democracy was outlined according to a 
procedural methodology for institutional assessment. In this, the role of 
political participation (as opposed to exclusion) is crucial in that it allows
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the democratic congruence between choice-makers and choice-bearers, 
thus preserving individual freedom of choice. The theory was defined as 
ideal-theory, in that it was thought to provide the ultimate principles for 
both envisaging the minimal conditions of an ideal system and criticising 
the limits of the current political arrangements. From this general outlining, 
further features of the proposal were discussed including the double 
dimension of political agency (individual and collective), and the 
multilayered political structure, as unfolded over three principal levels 
(individual, state and world).
Finally, he last two chapters were dedicated to testing the proposal on 
two aspects of one of the most challenging issue of international political 
theory: political agency as embedded in the notion of cosmopolitan 
citizenship. In chapter VI the horizontal dimension of citizenship was 
examined through in the case of migration and the right to movement. 
Chapter VII analysed the vertical dimension, looking at both the 
participatory rights in international institutions and their collective agency. 
Both chapters began from the observation of the limits of the current 
international political structure in terms of political exclusion, and 
concluded by offering alternative recipes for an all-inclusive political 
model. With regard to the case of migration, a global perspective was 
advanced that is able to re-balance the claims of the migrants against those 
of the residents, according to a principle of non-discrimination. With 
regard to the case of international institutions, a cosmo-federal reform of 
the UN was suggested as the most consistent project for the extension of 
the all-inclusive democratic ideal at the global level.
Through these seven chapters, this thesis has elaborated and 
defended an all-inclusive political model, serving two main aims. On the 
one hand, it intends to offer a consistent stance from which to criticise the 
current degree of exclusion; generated by the decision-making process 
presently in force and underpinned by the interaction-dependent theories of 
justice. On the other hand, the consequentialist cosmopolitan model also 
draws a clear alternative to the phenomenon of international political 
exclusion through a system that is universalist and yet multilayered. This 
vision stems for the most part from a normative exercise of international
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ideal-theory. In this vein, it is critically different from current political 
reality, it is ‘unrealistic’. And yet, it claims to grasp the certain—still 
minoritarian—tendency toward progressive démocratisation of political 
life which is under way through differing social struggles 1^^ In sum, the 
thesis maintains that global democracy is no more unrealistic today than 
national democracy was 200 years ago, or women’s enfranchisement 50 
years ago, if we assume a normative perspective.
Alongside its principal result in terms of envisaging an all-inclusive 
political system and thus depicting a new version of international political 
theory, this study also sheds light on a number of correlated investigative 
topics which are worth mentioning here for future research. On account of 
the specific focus of this thesis (as well as simple lack of space), these 
topics could not be examined comprehensively here, but they certainly 
represent important themes on which to concentrate in the future, for they 
are at the same time severely underdeveloped in the literature and highly 
relevant in practical terms. They are also, significantly, often 
multidisciplinary. The contribution of consequentialist cosmopolitanism to 
these sectors of research primarily consists in the clarification of the 
general normative framework within which they can be advanced, and in 
the indication of the initial steps which should lead toward more elaborated 
arguments. These topics include the problematisation of the theoretical 
dichotomies between individual and collective responsibility, between 
ideal and non-ideal theory, and between cosmopolitan theory and 
cosmopolitan political practice.
Similarly many transnational social movements campaigns “began with an idea that 
was almost unimaginable, even by its early proponents. That they could abolish slavery, 
gain vote for women, or end footbinding hardly seemed possible. One o f the main tasks 
that social movements undertake, however, is to make possible the previously 
unimaginable, by framing problems in such a way that their solution comes to appear 
inevitable. The case of female circumcision reminds us that such changes are neither 
obvious nor linear. They are the contingent result o f contestations over meaning and 
resources waged by specific actors in a specific historical context” (Keck & Süddnk, 
1998,40-1).
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The relationship between individual and collective responsibility is 
of decisive importance in political theory, and even more in international 
political theory. Being somewhere in the middle between the disciplines of 
political theory, ethics, and legal theory, the issue of the allocation of 
responsibility, and subsequently that of the enforcement of punishment, 
represents a still poorly developed issue in the discussion of international 
political theory. Studies that are opening up interesting ways of 
investigation on this tc^c  are Erskine’s and Kutz’s (Kutz, 2000; Erskine, 
2003). Secondly, the dichotomy between ideal and non-ideal theory forms 
another crucial aspect for any theorisation of political theory, both 
domestically and internationally. Political thinking usually disregards the 
non-ideal side of normative reasoning, insofar as it rarely addresses the 
demands on individual behaviour in a situation of non-co-operation or of 
non-existence of political institutions. This case is obviously relevant in the 
international domain where defection from co-ordination and a low degree 
of law enforcement are two principal characteristics. Points of reference in 
this case are the writing of Cohen and Singer (Cohen, 2000; Singer, 2002). 
Finally, the relationship between cosmopolitan theory and cosmopolitan 
political practice also needs to be examined more profoundly. The 
theorisation of cosmopolitanism from above, from the academia, needs to 
be compared with that arising from below, from the social and political 
movements that are engaged in political struggle for the démocratisation of 
international affairs. In this regards, the works of Finnemore and Sikkink, 
and Patomaki and Teivainen are innovative and educative (Finnemore & 
Sikkink, 1998; Patomaki & Teivainen, 2004).
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